Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant determined that Plaintiff’s renovation of property violated local ordinances. Although he conceded the ordinance violation, Yoshikawa alleged that the enforcement action against him was motivated by racial animus, in violation of Section 1981. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the building inspector Defendant’s motion to dismiss, on the basis of qualified immunity.   The court held that, in addressing a qualified immunity claim in an action against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the court first asks whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. If not, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Second, the court asks whether the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established, such that the officer had fair notice that his conduct was unlawful.   The court held that Plaintiff stated a Section 1981 damages claim against Defendant a state actor. Under Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020), an allegation of discrimination on the basis of race is a but-for element of a claim brought under Section 1981. The court further held that Defendant’s alleged actions violated clearly established law because he was accused of intentional racial discrimination. The court found irrelevant to qualified immunity, at the motion to dismiss stage, the issue of the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas test, an evidentiary standard, for analyzing Section 1981 claims in non-employment cases. View "HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA V. TROY SEGUIRANT" on Justia Law

Appellants are four Minnesota state employees who sued unions that represented their local bargaining units. The employees sought monetary relief based on the amount of so-called “fair-share” fees that were deducted from employee paychecks for the benefit of the unions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the unions.  On appeal, the employees argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the unions on each of the claims for retrospective relief.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the unions’ reliance on Section 179A.06 was objectively reasonable. It is an open question whether subjective intent is relevant to the defense, but the employees did not present a submissible case that the unions collected fair-share fees in subjective bad faith in any event. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the unions on these claims.   The unions prevailed on motions for summary judgment. The rules of civil procedure provide those costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party,” unless the court or a federal statute or rule directs otherwise. Further, the employees point to no authority that requires a district court to reduce an award of costs because a defendant opted to forgo a motion to dismiss and to file a dispositive motion only after developing a factual record. A defendant may choose how best to defend a lawsuit, and if the case is resolved in favor of the defense on a motion for summary judgment, then the defendant is presumptively entitled to costs. View "Linda Hoekman v. Education Minnesota" on Justia Law

This was the second time these consolidated cases went before the Michigan Supreme Court. Previously, the Court considered whether a decades-long procedure used by the Grand Rapids Police Department (the GRPD) was a policy or a custom attributable to the city of Grand Rapids (the City). At issue here was the constitutionality of the GRPD’s policy of photographing and fingerprinting individuals stopped without probable cause, referred to as the “photograph and print” (P&P) procedure. In considering the fingerprint component of the P&P procedure, the Court held that the P&P procedure was unconstitutional: "Fingerprinting an individual without probable cause, a warrant, or an applicable warrant exception violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights." View "Johnson v. Vanderkooi" on Justia Law

Jarvela drank several rum-and-cokes, then drove his Silverado to a Shell station to buy cigarettes. Afterward, the store clerk called the police to report that “a drunk guy" had just left driving a black Silverado. In a nearby police cruiser, Officer Trevino spotted the Silverado, speeding and drifting over the road’s center line. Trevino activated his lights and pursued the truck. Jarvela led Trevino on an extended chase. After about five minutes, the road turned to gravel and the Silverado struck a tree. Jarvela fled on foot into a darkened wooded area. Trevino called for backup. Deputy Houk and his service dog, Argo, arrived and began searching with Argo leashed. After about five minutes, Argo found clothing. Moments later Jarvela was visible in the weeds, wrestling with Argo, who was clinging to Jarvela’s arm. Jarvela tried to injure Argo. Houk delivered seven blows to Jarvela's back, yelling “Let go of the fucking dog.” Trevino shot his taser at Jarvela, who rolled onto his back. Trevino again deployed his taser.In Jarvela’s excessive force suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit held that Houk had no constitutional duty to shout out a warning to Jarvela before searching for him with the dog and was entitled to summary judgment. View "Jarvela v. Houk" on Justia Law

After a decade in state prison for gross sexual imposition and kidnapping, Sharp was released on parole with conditions that required him to refrain from unsupervised contact with minors; obtain his parole officer’s approval of any adult who might supervise his contact with minors; and submit to “warrantless search[es]” of his person and property “at any time.” Under Ohio law, a parole officer may search a parolee without a warrant if he has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the parolee has violated the law or a parole condition. During his parole, a woman told police that, 10 days earlier, Sharp had sexually assaulted her at his house while her children slept nearby and that Sharp had been assisting her children with transportation. Sharp’s parole officer concluded that Sharp had violated his parole. Nearly three weeks after the alleged assault, officers arrested Sharp, transported Sharp to his home, then conducted a warrantless search and found a loaded firearm.Sharp was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress the gun. Under the special-needs framework, a parolee search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances if it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Bailey reasonably suspected that he would find evidence of a parole violation at Sharp’s home. A parolee’s search conditions factor into the reasonableness balance. View "United States v. Sharp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of threats of violence in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.713, subd. 1, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated in this case.At issue was whether trial delays caused by judicial orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic weighed against the State in the evaluation of whether Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative and affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) trial delays caused by statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic statewide orders do not weigh against the State; and (2) the State brought Defendant to trial quickly enough so as not to violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial. View "State v. Paige" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the County of Anoka in this case concerning the proper interpretation of Minn. Stat. 103D.311, which governs the appointment of watershed district managers, holding that several of the district court's conclusions were erroneous.The City of Circle Pines brought this action alleging that the County followed an improper procedure in reappointing Patricia Preiner, a resident of the City of Columbus, to the Rice Creek Watershed District board of managers. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, ruling that section 103D.311 unambiguously allowed the County the discretion to appoint a manager from any city that neglected to submit a list of nominees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 103D.311 is ambiguous; (2) the statute requires the aggregate list of city nominees to have three nominees to be valid; and (3) the requirement under the statute that counties appoint managers from city nominees applies unless those nominees cannot fairly represent the various hydrologic areas in the watershed district. View "City of Circle Pines v. County of Anoka" on Justia Law

The Janesville Wisconsin Police Department created a “no‐preference tow list” to simplify its response to traffic accidents in which a vehicle owner expressed no preference as to which tow company towed their car. Smith is Black and owns Flying A.J.’s Towing Company, which operates in the area. Flying A.J.’s was added to the list. Less than two months later, the Police Department removed the company from its tow list, citing the company’s unresponsiveness and complaints related to one particular tow job.Smith and Flying A.J.’s claim that their removal was due to Smith’s race and in retaliation because, in 2010, Smith had successfully sued the town of Beloit after experiencing racial discrimination by the police department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981. Smith had failed to put forth sufficient evidence to allow a jury to determine that Smith’s race or former complaints caused the decision to remove Flying A.J.’s from the tow list. Smith claimed that a tow company owned by a white man had received a lesser penalty but the situations leading to the two complaints are too dissimilar for any reasonable jury to conclude that the factor leading to any perceived disparate treatment was race. View "Smith v. City of Janesville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and driving during revocation, second offense, holding that there was no merit to Defendant's assigned errors.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of non-aggravated DUI and of driving during revocation and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The trial court further revoked Defendant's operator's license for a period of fifteen years following his release from incarceration. On appeal, Defendant alleged five instances of error, including the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding that Defendant's warrantless blood test was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment; (2) there was no error in the district court's challenged evidentiary rulings; (3) the evidence supported the convictions; and (4) Defendant's challenges to the sentences imposed were unavailing. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

Myers, a Centerville Police Department detective sergeant, Myers reported to then-Lieutenant Brown and then-Police Chief Robertson, that Lieutenant Lavigne possessed and “possibl[y] disseminat[ed]” sexually explicit photos of minors that he obtained while investigating a “sexting" complaint at Centerville High School. Myers continued to pursue that allegation to no avail. Three years later, Myers sought whistleblower protection and met with City Manager Davis to report new allegations against Robertson, and to repeat the allegation against Lavigne, then met with an outside attorney appointed by Davis. After learning of the investigation, Robertson retired. Myers was interviewed but not hired for the vacant chief post, which went to Brown; the hiring panel included Lavigne. Myers was also passed over for two lieutenant positions. He was admitted to the FBI National Academy but Quantico rescinded that offer after its background investigator spoke to Lavigne. Myers was disciplined for writing a “character letter” for another city employee; the letter was critical of the city. He was later terminated for recording a meeting.Myers sued. alleging First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion claiming qualified immunity. The district court erred by failing to meaningfully analyze the assertions of immunity by Brown and Davis at the pleadings stage, but Myers plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation, and the defendants are not yet entitled to qualified or statutory immunity. View "Myers v. City of Centerville, Ohio" on Justia Law