Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a black male who was 60 years old at the time his employment was terminated, brought race, sex, and age discrimination claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act ("MWA") after the Minnesota Guardian ad Litem Board (“GALB”) terminated his employment following internal and external investigations into allegations of his misconduct. The district court granted GALB’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, even if he had done so, he failed to demonstrate GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.   Appellant appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant failed to point to any direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; thus, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. The court concluded that GALB has demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for terminating Appellant in March 2018: the internal and external investigations into Appellant’s alleged misconduct uncovered evidence that Appellant had engaged in gross misconduct. As such, because Appellant failed to show that GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to GALB on his race, sex, and age discrimination claims and his retaliation claim. View "Gregory King v. MN Guardian ad Litem Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court judge dismissing this case with prejudice after suppressing evidence as a discovery sanction, holding that, under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.Defendant was charged with drug-related offenses. The district court ultimately dismissed the charges with prejudice after suppressing certain evidence as a discovery sanction. The court of appeals reversed and remanded hte case, concluding that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice for a discovery failure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judge infringed on the prosecutor's discretion by not leaving to the prosecutor the decision of whether to proceed to trial; and (2) the error was harmless. View "State v. Mulleneaux" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals concluding that Defendant had waived his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, holding that Defendant did not waive his right to appeal the suppression ruling.Defendant, who was indicted on charges of possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence and other crimes, moved to suppress the gun and loaded magazine that police recovered inside a closed overnight bag during a warrantless search of Defendant's hotel room. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress. Thereafter, the State filed a superseding indictment under a new case number to add additional charges. When Defendant renewed his motion to suppress the transcript and all exhibits from the motion filed in the first case were admitted and incorporated into the record. The handgun and magazine were admitted into evidence during Defendant's ensuing trial. The court of special appeals denied Defendant's appeal, concluding that Defendant waived his right to appeal the suppression ruling by making no objection to the introduction of the challenged evidence at trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the decision below, holding that Defendant did not waive his right to appeal the suppression ruling. View "Huggins v. State" on Justia Law

Seven years into his 15-year sentence for heroin dealing, Brock sought early discharge under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Receiving that relief depended on Brock first identifying a legally cognizable “extraordinary and compelling” reason for ending his sentence early and then convincing the district court the outcome was further justified by an application of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Brock argued, as “an extraordinary and compelling ground to consider a lower sentence,” that his 2005 cocaine conviction was no longer a proper predicate for his 21 U.S.C. 851 sentencing enhancement because the Illinois statute under which he was convicted covers isomers of cocaine omitted from the federal definition of cocaine.The district court denied relief, finding that the compassionate release statute could not be used as a path to a sentence reduction based on a position available to defendants during plea negotiations or trial, direct appeal, or in a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenging a sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Intervening Circuit precedent, even if viewed as announcing new law or a new interpretation of an existing statutory provision, cannot alone constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason authorizing a reduced sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A). View "United States v. Brock" on Justia Law

Akron Police received an anonymous call that men were smoking marijuana in Whitney Park, "a high-crime area." Several officers, including Detective Elam, went to investigate. They arrived at the park in the early evening and saw a group of 10-15 men, including McCallister; they detected the odor of marijuana and began stopping people. Four men, including McCallister, tried to walk away. An officer instructed them to stop moving and place their hands on their heads. McCallister did so. Elam saw a “little bump out on his shirt,” which the detective concluded was a gun, and saw McCallister “turn[] his body in towards the huddle so no one would see.” Elam asked McCallister if he was carrying any weapons; McCallister did not respond. As McCallister raised his hands, his shirt lifted, and Elam saw a firearm magazine tucked into McCallister’s waistband. Elam retrieved the weapon.McCallister was indicted for illegal possession of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), and possessing an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion that all of the men were smoking marijuana, justifying the detention, and reasonable suspicion that McCallister was armed and dangerous, justifying the search. View "United States v. McCallister" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit challenging both the residency and voter-registration requirements under Maine law the First Circuit affirmed the order issuing a preliminary injunction preventing the residency requirement and voter-registration requirement from being enforced, holding that there was no error.In 2020, Plaintiffs brought this action against the Secretary of State of Maine and the Deputy Secretary of State of Maine for the Bureau of Corporations in their official capacities, alleging that, by restricting who may be a circulator, Maine's residency and voter-registration requirements violate the First Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs established that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. View "We The People PAC v. Bellows" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree premeditated murder, after which the trial court sentenced him to death. Defendant challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court failed to ensure that all available mitigation was developed and presented and failed to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify death and outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no fundamental error in the trial court's rulings regarding mitigation; (2) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea, was made aware of the consequences, and was apprised of the constitutional rights he was waiving; and (3) Defendant's remaining claim was unavailing. View "Fletcher v. State" on Justia Law

Mangine, serving a 35- year sentence for federal drug and firearm offenses, sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, contending that the sentencing court mischaracterized him as a career offender and that the error resulted in his ineligibility for a discretionary sentence reduction he would like to pursue under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). His previous post-conviction motions under sections 2266 and 2241 had been unsuccessful. He had previously been denied a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2); Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which retroactively reduced by two levels the offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes. did not change his Guidelines range as originally calculated.The district court denied relief, concluding that such ineligibility does not amount to a miscarriage of justice—thereby precluding Mangine from satisfying the conditions for pursuing post-conviction relief under section 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mangine could no longer be designated as a career offender in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions but that is not what drove his sentence. Even without the designation, his Guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. Mangine did not receive “far greater punishment than that usually meted out for an otherwise similarly situated individual who had committed the same offense.” He did not suffer a miscarriage of justice. View "Mangine v. Withers" on Justia Law

After the police saw Ayon commit two minor traffic violations, they stopped him in his car and detained him until a narcotics dog arrived, 12 minutes and 45 seconds into the stop. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the police searched the car, wherein they found cocaine, methamphetamine, currency, and a scale. The trial court denied Ayon’s motion to suppress, rejecting his argument that the police unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.The court of appeal reversed. “A careful reading of the record shows the stop was actually part of a preexisting drug investigation, and the police used the traffic infractions as a pretext for the stop.” While that fact does not by itself render the search unconstitutional, based on the evidence in the record viewed objectively—including police body camera videos of the stop—the police unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. One officer’s body camera continued to record for a total of 61 minutes, at which time the stop and search were still underway. View "People v. Ayon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cl.G., on behalf of his minor son, C.G., appealed a district court’s dismissal of his case against Defendants-Appellees Cherry Creek School District (District or CCSD) and various employees for alleged constitutional violations stemming from C.G.’s suspension and expulsion from Cherry Creek High School (CCHS). In 2019, C.G. was off campus at a thrift store with three friends. He took a picture of his friends wearing wigs and hats, including “one hat that resembled a foreign military hat from the World War II period.” C.G. posted that picture on Snapchat and captioned it, “Me and the boys bout [sic] to exterminate the Jews.” C.G.’s post (the photo and caption) was part of a private “story,” visible only to Snapchat users connected with C.G. on that platform. Posts on a user’s Snapchat story are automatically deleted after 24 hours, but C.G. removed this post after a few hours. He then posted on his Snapchat story, “I’m sorry for that picture it was ment [sic] to be a joke.” One of C.G.’s Snapchat “friend[s]” took a photograph of the post before C.G. deleted it and showed it to her father. The father called the police, who visited C.G.’s house and found no threat. Referencing prior anti-Semitic activity and indicating that the post caused concern for many in the Jewish community, a CCHS parent emailed the school and community leaders about the post, leading to C.G.'s expulsion. Plaintiff filed suit claiming violations of C.G.'s constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the First Amendment limited school authority to regulate off-campus student speech, particularly speech unconnected with a school activity and not directed at the school or its specific members. Defendants maintained that C.G. was lawfully disciplined for what amounts to off-campus hate speech. According to Defendants, although originating off campus, C.G.’s speech still spread to the school community, disrupted the school’s learning environment, and interfered with the rights of other students to be free from harassment and receive an education. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff properly pled that Defendants violated C.G.’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his post; the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s first claim was reversed in part. The Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff’s further facial challenges to CCSD’s policies. Questions of qualified and absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim were remanded for further consideration. View "C1.G v. Siegfried, et al." on Justia Law