Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

King, who was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to three heroin charges, sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), To establish the required “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” King cited intervening Seventh Circuit precedent (Ruth), which held that a conviction under an Illinois law does not count as a prior cocaine conviction for purposed of certain federal recidivist enhancements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. There is nothing “extraordinary” about new statutes or caselaw, or a claim that the sentencing judge erred in applying the Guidelines; these ordinary legal issues should be addressed by direct appeal or collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statements contemplate the release of prisoners afflicted by severe medical conditions or risks, experiencing a family emergency, or otherwise in unusual personal circumstances. They do not hint that the sort of legal developments routinely addressed by direct or collateral review qualify a person for compassionate release. That the First Step Act lowered sentences for some cocaine crimes, enabled prisoners to seek compassionate release on their own motions, and more, did not modify the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” threshold for eligibility. King’s effort to use “Ruth” as a door opener under the compassionate-release statute is foreclosed by other decisions. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Westfield amended its ordinance governing signs within city limits. Out of a stated concern for public safety and aesthetics, the ordinance requires those wishing to install a sign or billboard to apply for a permit. The ordinance exempts directional signs, scoreboards, particular flags, and notices on gas pumps and vending machines. It prohibits signs on poles and those advertising ideas, products, or services not offered on the same premises (off-premises signs). Those seeking to install a non-compliant sign may appeal the denial of a permit or, if necessary, request a variance. GEFT applied for a permit to build a large digital billboard on private property along U.S. Highway 31 in Westfield. Because of the proposed sign’s off-premises location and use of a pole, Westfield denied GEFT’s application and subsequent variance request.GEFT sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit previously upheld a restraining order compelling GEFT to cease all actions to install its proposed billboard pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court later granted GEFT summary judgment and permanently enjoined Westfield from enforcing many aspects of its ordinance. The Seventh Circuit remanded for consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in “City of Austin v. Reagan National;” the fact that the city must read a sign to evaluate its conformity with regulations is not alone determinative of whether the regulation is content-based. View "GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield" on Justia Law

Kingman, Rhinelander Wisconsin’s Director of Public Works, spoke at a City Council meeting with a declaration of no confidence in a colleague. Rhinelander investigated Kingman’s contentions and found them without merit. In the process, however, third-party investigators discovered that Kingman himself had not only mistreated his employees but also had gone so far as to retaliate against those who had complained about the toxic work environment he created in his department.Kingman was fired and filed a lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the termination reflected retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights at the City Council meeting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Rhinelander and individual defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the Council’s vote to fire Kingman reflected unlawful retaliation. Regardless of whether Kingman spoke to the council as a private citizen or in connection with his employment, Kingman’s behavior toward his subordinates is just the type of “significant intervening event” and seriously “inappropriate workplace behavior” that separates an employee’s protected activity “from the adverse employment action he receives.” View "Kingman v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to transmit national defense information to Chinese agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 794(c), and making materially false statements to FBI agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(2). On appeal, Defendant challenges the district court’s application during trial of the “silent witness rule” — under which sensitive evidence is disclosed to the jury and the trial’s other participants but not to the public — contending that it violated his right to a public trial, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and his right to present a complete defense, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. He also mounted two distinct challenges to the district court’s instruction of the jury.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s challenges and affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court wrote it does not suggest that the use of the silent witness rule could never implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, as reliance on the silent witness rule has the potential to interfere meaningfully with the public’s ability to understand what is happening in the proceedings, despite their physical presence in the courtroom. But it doubts that the limited use of the silent witness rule as it was applied in this case amounted to a sanctionable closure of the courtroom.   Further, in response to Defendant’s argument that the district court “watered down” the mens rea requirement for the conspiracy offense, the court found Defendant’s reasoning unpersuasive, as he focuses too narrowly on one small segment of the instructions without context. View "US v. Kevin Mallory" on Justia Law

To dispute a property tax assessment under Detroit ordinances and Michigan state law, taxpayers “make complaint on or before February 15th" before the Board of Assessors. Any person who has complained to the Board of Assessors may appeal to the Board of Review. For the Michigan Tax Tribunal to have jurisdiction over an assessment dispute, “the assessment must be protested before the board of review.” On February 14, 2017, Detroit mailed tax assessment notices to Detroit homeowners, including an “EXTENDED ASSESSORS REVIEW SCHEDULE” that would conclude on February 18, just four days later. At a City Council meeting on February 14, the city announced: “The Assessors Review process will end this year February the 28th.” News outlets reported the extension and that Detroit had waived the requirement of appearance before the Board of Assessors so residents could appeal directly to the Board of Review. Detroit did not distribute individualized mailings to so inform homeowners.Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violations of their due process rights; asserting that Michigan’s State Tax Commission assumed control of Detroit’s flawed property tax assessment process from 2014-2017 so that its officials were equally responsible for the violations; and claiming that Wayne County is “complicit” and has been unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act and the principle of comity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that a state remedy is uncertain. View "Howard v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Abade Irizarry, a a YouTube journalist and blogger, was filming a DUI traffic stop in Lakewood, Colorado. Officer Ahmed Yehia arrived on the scene and stood in front of Irizarry, obstructing his filming of the stop. When Irizarry and a fellow journalist objected, Officer Yehia shined a flashlight into Irizarry’s camera and then drove his police cruiser at the two journalists. Irizarry sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Yehia violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the complaint alleged a First Amendment constitutional violation based on prior restraint and retaliation. Although the Tenth Circuit had not previously recognized a First Amendment right to record police officers performing their official duties in public, the district court, relying on out-of-circuit decisions, held that the First Amendment guaranteed such a right, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The district court nonetheless held that Officer Yehia was entitled to qualified immunity because Irizarry had not shown a violation of clearly established law. The Tenth Circuit found the complaint alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim under clearly established law, so Officer Yehia was not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Irizarry v. Yehia" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's habeas petition, holding that the Massachusetts state court reasonably applied federal law in deeming the Commonwealth's proof constitutionally adequate.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on a theory of felony murder based on a predicate of armed robbery and sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment on the felony murder charge. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the conviction. Petitioner sought federal habeas review in the federal district court. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's application for habeas relief. View "Webster v. Gray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder and his sentence of life imprisonment as well as the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, holding that sufficient evidence supported the conviction and that Defendant's constitutional and ineffective assistance of counsel challenges failed.After he was convicted Defendant filed a direct appeal. The Supreme Court stayed the appeal to allow Defendant to pursue postconviction relief. The district court denied the petition following an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court lifted the stay, consolidated Defendant's appeal, and affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) Defendant's arguments related to a witness's identification testimony failed; (3) Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated; and (4) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Arizona Department of Corrections issued Order 914, under which the Department may prohibit inmates from receiving mail containing “sexually explicit material.” The Department invoked the order to redact several issues of Prison Legal News, a monthly journal for prison inmates that covers developments in the criminal justice system. The publisher of Prison Legal News sued the Department under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing that Order 914 violates the First Amendment on its face and as applied to Prison Legal News. The district court granted summary judgment to the publisher and entered a permanent injunction requiring the Department to amend its order and allow distribution of the issues that had been censored.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the permanent injunction in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that most of the order’s relevant prohibitions are facially constitutional under the First Amendment and that most of the as-applied challenges lack merit.   The court held that the penological interests in jail security and rehabilitation were legitimate and the order was neutral in the sense relevant to the analysis set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The court determined, however, that one aspect of the order swept more broadly than could be explained by the Department’s penological objectives: section 1.2.17’s ban on content that “may” cause sexual arousal or be suggestive of sex. That provision was not rationally related to the Department’s interests. As to one portion of the May 2017 issue, the court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for the Department. View "PRISON LEGAL NEWS V. CHARLES RYAN" on Justia Law