Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction and that the sentence imposed upon Defendant was not unconstitutionally cruel.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the conviction; and (2) a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of release is not unconstitutionally cruel under Minn. Const. art. I, section 5 when imposed on a twenty-one-year-old defendant who has been convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. View "State v. Hassan" on Justia Law

A man detained at the Yazoo County Detention Center died after bleeding internally for hours. His survivors alleged that law enforcement officials knew that the man had been assaulted with a metal pipe and that he was vulnerable to internal bleeding if injured, yet they ignored requests for help from the man his family, and his fellow detainees, and left the man to suffer in his cell until it was too late. In rejecting the officials’ qualified immunity defense at summary judgment, the district court found numerous factual issues that, if resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor, would establish their liability on the federal denial-of-care claim. It did not, however, consider whether that constitutional violation was clearly established at the time of the man’s death.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Yazoo City’s appeals for lack of jurisdiction, affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the federal denial-of-medical-care claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it has granted qualified immunity when law enforcement misconstrued the symptoms of a serious medical condition for intoxication, or a less serious illness. Here, however, the officers’ knowledge of risk was based on much more than just symptoms: They also knew that the man had a life-threatening condition and had suffered trauma of the type that would trigger that condition. Those additional factors distinguish this case from the symptoms-only scenarios in Roberts and Cheney. Further, is clearly established that an official who refuses to treat or ignores the complaints of a detainee violates their rights. View "Williams, et al v. City of Yazoo, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of thirteen felony counts of aggravated harassment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Defendant's jury-trial waiver.At issue on appeal was whether, in a case where a criminal defendant's competency has been put at issue, a trial court must make a specific finding of heightened competency before determining that the defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) Arizona law does not require a finding of heightened competency for a jury-trial waiver where a defendant's competency has been put at issue; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. View "State v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

While awaiting trial a woman began tapping her hairbrush on the cell door. One of the two primary jailers asked the woman to turn around to be handcuffed. When she did not obey, the jailer used pepper spray which caused her to retreat toward the far wall. While the woman remained at the back of her cell facing away from the jailers, one of the jailers sprayed the woman with pepper spray three more times.   The struggle resulted in the woman lying flat on her stomach with her hands handcuffed behind her back, and one of the jailers, who weighed 230 pounds, sitting atop of her with his knee on her back. The other jailer, who weighed 390 pounds, pressed his forearm against her neck for over two minutes. The jailers rolled the woman over to find her unresponsive and she was declared dead. The woman’s parents filed a section 1983 suit against the county and the jailers. At summary judgment, the district court held that the jailers’ use of force was reasonable.   The Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that a jury could conclude that the jailers used excessive force. Further, the jailers’ continuing to apply that force for more than two minutes after the woman was subdued would violate clearly established law. The court explained any reasonable officer would see that the woman represented a low threat at the moment when the jailer threw her to the floor and applied continuous force. Further, the woman did not actively resist at these critical stages of the encounter. Finally, the amount of force was not proportional to the need for force. View "Fairchild, et al v. Coryell Cty, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree arson, entered after a jury trial, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the district court did not commit plain error by allowing a police officer to testify that gasoline is an accelerant.On appeal, Defendant argued that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his attempted first-degree arson conviction and that a police officer improperly opined as an expert that a liquid he identified as gasoline found in Defendant's home was an accelerant despite not being qualified to testify as an expert under Wyo. R. Evid. 702. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported the conviction; and (2) as to his remaining assignment of error, Defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of plain error review. View "Esquibel v. State" on Justia Law

Thurston was convicted of felony rape after his DNA was matched to cigarette butts found in the park that was the scene of the crime. Thurston claimed that his attorney did not object to the admission of a report summarizing the DNA analysis of the cigarettes because the defense attorney did not notice that the report also identified Thurston’s DNA as matching a “sperm fraction” collected in “case IP06051889”—another rape for which Thurston was charged. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, reasoning that the reference to the sperm fraction was “too vague” to “support the forbidden [propensity] inference.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, finding that the Indiana decision was not an “unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s Strickland decision. The Indiana Court of Appeals was entitled to presume that the jury would not disobey its instructions and speculate about the reference to case ‐889. View "Thurston v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Green Bay Police Department officers arrested Tubby and transported him to jail for booking. In the jail’s secure entryway, Tubby became non-compliant, refusing to exit the squad car and concealing one hand under his shirt while threatening to “do it” if officers came any closer. The officers called for backup. Tubby was eventually forced out of the car with pepper spray. He kept one hand under his shirt in a manner that, to officers, indicated he had a weapon. Exiting the squad car, Tubby refused to surrender but instead rushed toward the exit in an apparent escape attempt. An officer heard a “pop” that he believed to be a gunshot coming from the weapon he presumed Tubby was hiding and discharged his firearm eight times, hitting Tubby with five shots. Tubby died. His estate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officer’s conduct did not violate Tubby’s constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures; qualified immunity shields the officer from liability. The officer’s conduct was reasonable, given that Tubby intentionally led the officers to believe he was armed and ready to “do it.” View "Doxtator v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in Cook County Jail, Thomas was assaulted by another inmate. Seventeen months later, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal statutes against Sheriff Dart, Cook County, and other Jail personnel, including corrections officers to whom he allegedly reported the inmate’s threat of violence. All of his claims were either dismissed or resolved against Thomas on summary judgment.Years after litigation began, Thomas sought to amend his complaint for a third time to name as defendants intake clerks who screened him at the Jail; he alleged they purposely omitted from intake forms that he suffered from mental health problems and that this omission led to his assault. The court denied the motion to amend. Thomas challenged the denial of that motion, asserting that the ruling demonstrated the court’s bias against him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment Thomas sought would have been futile and no bias against Thomas can reasonably be inferred from the district court’s adverse rulings. Thomas did not state a viable claim. Without more, simply being housed in the Jail’s general population, even while suffering from PTSD, is not a particular enough risk in the failure-to-protect context. View "Thomas v. Dart" on Justia Law

In 2006, an ATF agent posed as a drug courier and recruited Blitch and others to steal cocaine from a fictional drug cartel stash house. On the night the robbery was planned to take place, an ATF team arrested the men. On retrial, a jury found them guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms, 21 U.S.C. 846; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and being felons in possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1). Blitch was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.In 2016, Blitch moved, pro see, to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, challenging the application of a sentencing enhancement based on his prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. More than a year after the denial of that petition, Blitch moved to reopen judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The district court denied the motion, finding it to be in substance a successive 2255 petition, which could only be brought if the Court of Appeals certified that it rested on newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even without the additional restrictions applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions, Blitch’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion, alleging mistake, was subject to a one-year time constraint. View "Blitch v. United States" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) has denied prisoner requests to hold religious gatherings for the Nation of Gods and Earths (“the Nation”).   In response, Plaintiff, brought this suit against the TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Volunteer Services and Special Populations, in the hope of vindicating the rights of the Nation’s adherents to congregate. The suit was initially filed pro se over half a decade ago. But Tucker began receiving the aid of pro bono legal counsel a few years later. The State now says that it has promulgated a new policy to govern congregation requests on behalf of the Nation’s adherents. As a result, the State contends that this suit is now moot.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment to the congregation claim, holding that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to “whether the state’s ban: (1) advances a compelling interest (2) through the least restrictive means.” Tucker v. Collier (Tucker I), 906 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2018). After adopting the changes, TDCJ sought summary judgment on the grounds that Tucker’s case was. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim as moot.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found that the case is not moot. The court explained that TDCJ’s policy change gives Plaintiff nothing more than the right to apply for a congregation—to date TDCJ has never approved the Nation for congregation. And it is the latter that this suit seeks to obtain. View "Tucker v. Gaddis" on Justia Law