Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Police arrested Davis, a convicted felon, on a state warrant for three counts of aggravated battery by discharge of a firearm, just outside of his residence. While being arrested, Davis stated that there were children in the house. Officers entered the house to conduct a limited sweep of areas where a person could be hiding, finding an eight-year-old child and a 19-year-old. An officer observed a rifle, upright in plain view, in an open bedroom closet. About 45 minutes later, after the sweep had concluded, Antionette, a woman with whom Davis was living and the owner of the house, arrived and gave the officers oral and written consent to search the home, acknowledging that she had been advised of her rights.Davis, charged with illegally possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle on the basis that no valid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry or the later search. The district court found that three separate exceptions applied: a protective sweep following Davis’s arrest, exigent circumstances because a child was in the home, and Antoinette's voluntary consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Davis did not dispute that Antoinette’s consent was voluntary and not tainted by the initial entry into the house. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Brookline and its Selectmen and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims of unconstitutional mistreatment by the Town's "deliberate indifference" to complaints of racial discrimination by Brookline police, holding that Plaintiffs' claims on appeal were unavailing.The five named plaintiffs here claimed that Brookline police officers violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause by treating them differently because they are Hispanic. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the record evidence did not support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Baez v. Town of Brookline, Mass." on Justia Law

Towne was the LaSalle County State’s Attorney, 2006-2016. Donnelly worked as a legal intern with that office in 2012 and impermissibly accessed a file about the ongoing prosecution of her son. Towne locked the file to prohibit her continued access. A few years later, Donnelly applied for a position with the State’s Attorney’s Office. Towne did not hire her. Donnelly defeated Towne in the 2016 election for State’s Attorney, then launched an investigation into Towne’s conduct as State’s Attorney; she enlisted assistant state’s attorneys and Ottawa police officers to investigate. For seven months, they interviewed witnesses, allegedly concealing exculpatory portions of the interviews, and fabricating inculpatory testimony. A grand jury indicted Towne, who successfully moved to have a special prosecutor appointed. The special prosecutor did not act on the charges. After 10 months with no development, Towne successfully moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds.Towne filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the prosecution was retaliation for his campaign for state’s attorney and violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely, applying a two-year statute of limitations that began to run when Towne was indicted, not when he was acquitted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. First Amendment retaliation claims accrue when the underlying criminal charge is brought; the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in McDonough v. Smith did not change that rule. View "Towne v. Donnelly" on Justia Law

In 2016, Thompson was accepted a position as the Education Unit Supervisor for the Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families (DSCYF) with a one-year probationary period. Thompson’s predecessor, Porter, successfully contested her termination. In 2017, Thompson was informed that Porter would be reinstated as Education Supervisor and that Thompson would become the Transition Coordinator. DSCYF did not permit Thompson to pursue a grievance. Thompson worked as the Transition Coordinator for several weeks, then had emergency surgery in May 2017. Thompson’s probationary period was set to end in July 2017. Unbeknownst to Thompson, her probationary period was extended. Thompson returned to work in October 2017. DSCYF demoted Thompson to a teaching position. Thompson was not allowed to contest the demotion. Thompson lacked the necessary special education certifications for her new position. Porter recommended in April 2018 that Thompson be terminated for failure to obtain special education certifications. Thompson filed a grievance. Thompson was terminated from DSCYF on July 2, 2018.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Thompson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of her due process rights. As a former probationary employee at DSCYF, Thompson did not have a protected property interest in her employment. Thompson’s claim under the Delaware Whistleblowers’ Protection Act was dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment precluded the claim. View "Thompson v. State of Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families" on Justia Law

Defendant, El Paso found Plaintiff’s son in the process of hanging himself from a basketball hoop. But it was dark, Defendant was afraid the man might have a weapon, and the man did not respond to Defendant’s orders to show his hands. So Defendant tased the man once, took down his body, and performed CPR. To no avail. The man soon after died in the emergency room from the hanging. His parents sued Defendant for using excessive force, the district court denied qualified immunity, and Defendant appealed.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and rendered judgment granting Defendant qualified immunity. The court explained that the district court and Plaintiffs rely on cases holding that officers may not use force against arrestees who are already subdued and in police custody. This case is markedly different. The reason Defendant tased the man was that he was not in custody and Defendant was afraid he might have a weapon. Even if that fear turned out to be groundless—something the court wrote it cannot decide here—Defendant still did not transgress any clearly established law. View "Ramirez v. Escajeda" on Justia Law

The United States Government seized $69,940.50 in cash from Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff and his girlfriend challenged the seizure, claiming that the cash was not subject to forfeiture. To forfeit the seized cash, the Government bore the burden of establishing a connection between the cash and the illegal activity—in this case, illegal drug trafficking. The district court, in granting summary judgment, found that the facts painted a picture that definitively established that the cash was drug money.   The Fourth Circuit reversed finding that the record is unclear regarding whether a reasonable jury might well decide that the painting of these facts shows the cash came from drug trafficking. The court explained that summary judgment in a forfeiture proceeding is like summary judgment in any other civil case. Applying those standards correctly ensures that the Government must prove its case before depriving citizens of their private property based on an allegation of wrongdoing. Here, the Government has the burden of proof. The Government lacks any direct evidence of a drug transaction or involvement in the drug trade beyond Plaintiff’s possession of a single marijuana blunt and medical marijuana cards. The Government would have the court rely on its own inferences from its circumstantial evidence, which the court may not do. View "US v. Dereck McClellan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff s an inmate at United States Penitentiary (“USP”) Hazelton who filed a pro se civil action in United States district court alleging violations under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for denied and delayed medical care of his chronic illnesses. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Following the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the district court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion on the grounds that he did not meet the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception.Plaintiff appealed and the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court explained that a plain reading of the statute requires that litigants allege sufficient specific facts to demonstrate a nexus between the claims presented and the imminent danger alleged. Here, both parties agree that it is a “commonsense requirement that a prisoner’s allegation of imminent danger must relate to their underlying claims.” Moreover, the Government concedes that “a fairly traceable relationship exists between Plaintiff’s alleged imminent danger and the claims set forth in his FTCA complaint, as they both arise from his allegations of delay and denial of medical treatment.” Plaintiff has passed this threshold because he alleged that the prison’s continued denial and delay in providing medical treatment are directly causing his worsening physical and medical conditions which present an imminent danger of serious physical injury.Finally, since the district court did not have access to Defendant’s medical records and, thus, did not have a complete record to determine whether Defendant satisfied the “imminent danger” exception based on the court's clarified standard, the court remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Marc Hall v. US" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—a collection of organizations and individuals interested in petitioning in Montana—alleged that both of these restrictions violated their speech and association rights under the First Amendment. In upholding both restrictions, the district court held that strict scrutiny did not apply because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that either restriction imposed a severe burden on their rights. It went on to find that both restrictions sufficiently furthered Montana’s important regulatory interest to survive less exacting review.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s holding with regards to the residency requirement because it (1) imposed a severe burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights and therefore was subject to strict scrutiny, and (2) was not narrowly tailored to further Montana’s compelling interest.The court affirmed the district court’s holding with regards to the pay-per-signature restriction because it concluded that (1) on the basis of the record produced here, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the pay-per-signature ban imposed a severe burden on First Amendment rights and therefore less exacting review applied; and (2) the state had established that an important regulatory interest was furthered by this restriction. View "NATHAN PIERCE V. CHRISTI JACOBSEN" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant and the Maricopa County Community College District (the “College District”). Plaintiffs allege that a module on Islamic terrorism within a course in world politics taught by Defendant at Scottsdale Community College (the “College”) violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant’s disparaging treatment of Islam was part of an official policy embraced by the College District. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint, and the Plaintiffs appealed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. The court held that Plaintiffs could not sustain a claim for municipal liability against the College District. First, Plaintiffs abandoned their municipal liability claim on appeal by failing to address it in their Reply Brief even after the College District raised the argument in its Answering Brief on appeal.But even on the merits, the claim could not survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant has taught his World Politics class for 24 years, they did not allege that the course in other years contained the same content that offended Plaintiff, or that Defendant’s views or teaching methods were so persistent and widespread as to constitute part of the College District’s standard operating procedure. Further, the court held that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause and Free Exercise claims. View "MOHAMED SABRA V. MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLL" on Justia Law

Corrections officer Johnson found Zakora in his bunk, dead from accidental fentanyl toxicity. Earlier, another prisoner allegedly told Johnson and/or Mobley to check on Zakora. Mobley worked the night shift before Johnson’s shift started. Both officers stated in unrebutted affidavits that they had no knowledge that Zakora possessed, ingested, or intended to ingest illegal drugs. Mobley stated that he did not speak with Zakora during his shift, and no one advised him to check on Zakora; Johnson stated he discovered Zakora only seconds after a prisoner said that Zakora was not “doing too good.” Two other prisoners in the small unit were hospitalized from drug overdoses in the days before Zakora’s death, but no immediate investigation was undertaken. After Zakora’s death, a drug-detection dog gave positive indications of contraband in the unit.Zakora’s overdose, according to his Estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, was the consequence of a longstanding problem of drug smuggling into Lakeland, orchestrated by an unidentified female corrections officer; an unidentified prisoner allegedly informed inspectors about the drug-smuggling ring. The estate claimed failure to protect Zakora, failure to promptly investigate other drug overdoses, and deliberate indifference to Zakora’s serious medical needs. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint, in part, The allegations state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim and a claim for supervisory liability against two defendants. The court did not consider qualified immunity. View "Estate of Zakora v. Chrisman" on Justia Law