Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the public health department for the City of Madison and Dane County, Wisconsin issued a COVID-19 mask mandate, an owner of Helbachs Café posted a sign: “Mask Free Zone. Please remove mask before entering” and then took it down about 30 minutes later. Over the next few days, Madison’s public health officials cited Helbachs several times for violating its COVID-19 orders and set a hearing to revoke Helbachs’ food and drink license for cumulative violations. The dispute caught the public’s attention and the landlord decided not to renew Helbachs’ lease.Helbachs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The local citations were later dismissed, and the revocation hearing was not pursued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Helbachs has standing to bring this First Amendment retaliation claim because the record shows that Helbachs suffered injury-in-fact beyond the revoked citations and the threatened, but aborted, hearing. However, Helbachs’ First Amendment claim fails under “Monell” because the defendants’ actions were not part of a larger pattern or practice of retaliation. View "Helbachs Cafe LLC v. City of Madison, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

In 2020, Kansas City began restricting participation in its Minority Business Enterprises and Women’s Business Enterprises Program to those entities whose owners satisfied a personal net worth limitation. Mark One Electric Co., a woman-owned business whose owner’s personal net worth exceeds the limit, appeals the dismissal of its lawsuit challenging the Kansas City Program as unconstitutional because of the personal net worth limitation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to survive strict scrutiny, the government must first articulate a legislative goal that is properly considered a compelling government interest, such as stopping the perpetuation of racial discrimination and remediating the effects of past discrimination in government contracting. Here, Mark One does not dispute that the City has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of race and gender discrimination on City contract opportunities for minority- and women-owned businesses. And Mark One has conceded the 2016 Disparity Study provides a strong basis in evidence for the MBE/WBE Program to further that interest.The City’s program must be narrowly tailored, which requires that “the means chosen to accomplish the government’s asserted purpose are specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Mark One claims that its exclusion from the Program despite its status as a woman-owned business shows that the Program is unlawful Indeed, Mark One has declared that it has suffered past discrimination, as the Program requires for certification. But the City does not have a constitutional obligation to make its Program as broad as may be legally permissible, so long as it directs its resources in a rational manner not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. View "Mark One Electric Company v. City of Kansas City, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff regularly reports on local crime, missing persons, community events, traffic, and local government. Plaintiff published a story about a man who committed suicide and identified the man by name and revealed that he was an agent with the U.S. Border Patrol. Two arrest warrants were issued for Plaintiff for violating Texas Penal Code Section 39.06(c). According to Plaintiff, local officials have never brought a prosecution under Section 39.06(c) in the nearly three-decade history of that provision.Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her claims against the officials under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She also appeals the dismissal of her municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo, but not her claims against Webb County. The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments claims, as well as her civil conspiracy claims. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo. The court explained that it has no difficulty observing that journalists commonly ask for nonpublic information from public officials, and that Plaintiff was therefore entitled to make that same reasonable inference. Yet Defendants chose to arrest Plaintiff for violating Section 39.06(c). The court accordingly concluded that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the existence of similarly situated journalists who were not arrested for violating Section 39.06(c). View "Villarreal v. City of Laredo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on cross-motions for summary judgment and enjoining the Montana Secretary of State from placing House Bill (HB) 325 on Montana's 2022 general election ballot, holding that the referendum proposal violates the Montana Constitution.In approved, HB 325 will establish seven Supreme Court districts in Montana and requires that Supreme Court justices be elected district by district, rather than statewide. Plaintiffs brought this challenge to the constitutionality of the measure. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the question of the constitutionality of the referendum proposed by HB 325 is ripe for judicial resolution; and (2) the district court did not err in enjoining the Secretary from placing HB 325 on the ballot in the 2022 general election. View "McDonald v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on cross-motions for summary judgment and enjoining the Montana Secretary of State from placing House Bill (HB) 325 on Montana's 2022 general election ballot, holding that the referendum proposal violates the Montana Constitution.If approved, HB 325 will establish seven Supreme Court districts in Montana and requires that Supreme Court justices be elected district by district, rather than statewide. Plaintiffs brought this challenge to the constitutionality of the measure. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the question of the constitutionality of the referendum proposed by HB 325 is ripe for judicial resolution; and (2) the district court did not err in enjoining the Secretary from placing HB 325 on the ballot in the 2022 general election. View "McDonald v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

Dunn was convicted in Indiana state court for the Torres murder. The case against Dunn was based largely on the testimony of two pathologists. In a state court post-conviction proceeding, Dunn argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with any forensic pathologist. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a state court post-conviction hearing, a board-certified forensic pathologist, Dr. Sozio, testified that the autopsy was substandard, missed a great deal, and that Torres’s injuries were more consistent with a fall than with being bludgeoned by a blunt object. If the defense had presented Sozio's testimony, the jury would have been presented with conflicting expert testimony regarding whether the fall alone caused the injuries. The state conceded that blood evidence effectively ruled out the use of a bat; no other weapon was found. Two eyewitnesses testified consistently that Torres was not beaten after his fall. Sozio's testimony was critical in this case to create reasonable doubt because it countered the state's scientific evidence and gave the jury reason to doubt that Torres was beaten. Dunn demonstrated prejudice under Strickland. View "Dunn v. Neal" on Justia Law

The District of Columbia’s Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) regulates childcare facilities, including by setting minimum qualifications for their workers. OSSE issued a rule requiring many childcare workers to obtain an associate’s degree or its equivalent in a field related to early childhood education. Two childcare workers and a parent filed a lawsuit to challenge the new college requirements. They allege violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights, as well as of the nondelegation doctrine.On remand, the district court dismissed, this time on the merits. In rejecting Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection claims, the court concluded that the college requirements are rational, including in the distinctions they draw between different classes of daycare workers. And in rejecting Plaintiffs’ nondelegation doctrine claim, the court held that the statute granting regulatory authority to OSSE bears an intelligible principle to guide the agency’s work.The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under rational-basis review, the policy choices of the political branches are “not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. And here, as Plaintiffs acknowledge in their complaint, OSSE issued its regulations in part based on a report from the National Academies recommending a bachelor’s degree requirement for all educators of children ages zero to eight. Thus, the court found that a conceivably rational justification for the college requirements is readily apparent, and, in this context, that is all due process requires. View "Altagracia Sanchez v. Office of the State Superintendent of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing two of the charges against Appellant, which arose under Wichita Municipal Ordinances (W.M.O.) 3.06.030.A and 3.30.030.A, holding that W.M.O. 3.06.030.A is overbroad.The district court fully vacated Appellant's convictions, finding W.M.O. 3.06.030.A unconstitutionally overbroad because it intrudes on several examples of "Constitutionally protected behaviors." The court of appeals reversed the lower court's conclusion that W.M.O. 3.06.030.A was unconstitutionally overbroad and sua sponte reversed the dismal of the charge arising under W.M.O. 3.30.030.A. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) W.M.O. 3.06.030.A is unconstitutionally overbroad; and (2) the court of appeals erred by sua sponte dismissing the second municipal charge. View "City of Wichita v. Trotter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Florida LLC, sued a Canadian company, Teck Resources Limited, alleging that it had illegally trafficked in property to which Plaintiff says it has a claim. The district court granted Teck’s motion, holding that Florida’s long-arm statute didn’t provide jurisdiction over Teck and, additionally, that Teck lacked the necessary connection to the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).The Eleventh Circuit affirmed holding that courts should analyze personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment using the same basic standards and tests that apply under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court wrote that applying the minimum-contacts test here is relatively straightforward. The court held that Teck doesn’t have contacts with the United States sufficient to establish either specific or general personal jurisdiction over it. Plaintiff’s suit doesn’t arise out of or relate to any of Teck’s ties with the United States. And because a relationship between the defendant’s conduct within the forum and the cause of action is necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction, the lack of any such relationship here dooms Plaintiff’s effort to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Teck. View "Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Resources Limited" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed her employment was terminated in retaliation for complaining she was going to be paid late. She filed a complaint against a department head within the Texas A&M Engineering Station in his individual capacity (“DH”), alleging he violated the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)  DH moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, and in the alternative, that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court determined that neither immunity applied.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the rejection of sovereign immunity as a defense, affirmed the denial of the defense of sovereign immunity and vacated the judgment denying the defense of qualified immunity. The court held that holding public officials individually liable for retaliation under the FLSA also is consistent with the court’s prior holdings regarding individual liability in other FLSA contexts. However, the court wrote it discovered no Fifth Circuit opinion that holds qualified immunity is a defense under the FLSA. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s claim would be barred by qualified immunity because she does not allege that DH violated a clearly established law. However, the antecedent question is whether qualified immunity applies to the FLSA to begin with. The court, therefore, remanded for the district court to decide this question in the first instance. View "Stramaski v. Lawley" on Justia Law