Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The issue before the en banc court was whether the current version of Miss. Const. art. 12, Section 241 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. This provision was upheld in Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), which was binding on the district court and the panel decision here, but the court voted to reconsider Cotton en banc.   Plaintiffs are black men in Mississippi who were convicted, respectively, of forgery and embezzlement. Both are disenfranchised under current Mississippi law because of their convictions. They filed suit against the Mississippi Secretary of State under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to restore the voting rights of convicted felons in Mississippi. They contend that the crimes that “remain” in Section 241 from the 1890 Constitution are still tainted by the racial animus with which they were originally enacted.   The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that the current version of Section 241 superseded the previous provisions and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the provision adopted in 1890. Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391–92. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to establish the 1968 reenactment of Section 241 was motivated by racism. The court explained that contrary to Plaintiffs’ principal assertion, the critical issue here is not the intent behind Mississippi’s 1890 Constitution, but whether the reenactment of Section 241 in 1968 was free of intentional racial discrimination. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Section 241 as it currently stands was motivated by discriminatory intent or that any other approach to demonstrating the provision’s unconstitutionality is viable. View "Harness v. Watson" on Justia Law

Inmate Munson developed sensitivity in two teeth because of poorly-fitted partial dentures. In April 2014 he went to the prison’s dental unit. One tooth was extracted. Munson declined a second extraction, so treatment was postponed. Munson’s next regular dental examination had to be rescheduled because of a lockdown. Munson asserts that on July 15, he sent a letter to Dr. Newbold, the prison’s chief dentist, complaining of pain and seeking treatment. Newbold cannot recall receiving the letter, nor did he record any such letter. Because of successive lockdowns, Munson’s regular exam was repeatedly rescheduled. Dr. Henderson saw him on August 5 but Munson left to take a call before treatment began. Munson says he wrote Newbold another letter on September 20. Newbold cannot recall receiving it. In February 2015, Henderson treated the tooth. Munson eventually received new partial dentures after his 2017 transfer.Munson brought Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Dr. Newbold and Wexford, the corporation that provides inmate medical services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The evidence could not support an inference that Munson’s dental problems were a serious medical need, that Dr. Newbold knew of his requests for treatment, or to attribute any delay in treatment to Dr. Newbold. Wexford could not be held liable for damages without evidence that Munson experienced any constitutional harm. View "Munson v. Newbold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and that remand to the superior court was required for Defendant to receive a new trial.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and firearm offenses. During the trial, defense counsel disclosed confidential information to the Commonwealth regarding the location of "key incriminating evidence." Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because he had not given his counsel his informed consent to disclose the information. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding (1) because defense counsel did not present Defendant with any other option than disclosing the existence of the incriminating evidence Defendant's purported consent to the disclosure was neither adequately informed nor voluntary; and (2) because trial counsel mistakenly believed he had a duty to disclose the incriminating evidence and did not obtain Defendant's prior consent to making that disclosure, an actual conflict of interest existed rendering the representation constitutionally ineffective. View "Commonwealth v. Tate" on Justia Law

Indianapolis Police Officers went to Mikie’s Pub in Indianapolis. Both officers were off duty and in plain clothes. Bohanon argued with the bartender about his bill. The officers intervened and brutally beat Bohanon in the parking lot. Bohanon sued Indianapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the officers used excessive force and that his injuries were caused by the city’s policies, which prohibit off-duty officers with any alcohol in their blood from performing law-enforcement functions subject to a narrow exception. An officer may do so only in an “extreme emergency situation[]” where police “action is required to prevent injury to the off duty [officer] or another, or to prevent the commission of a felony or other serious offense.” Bohanon argued that the city was deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk of constitutional violations. A jury awarded Bohanon $1.24 million. The judge granted Indianapolis judgment as a matter of law.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For the city to be liable, a municipal policy or custom must have caused Bohanon’s constitutional injury. The narrow exception in the city’s substance-abuse policy did not present a policy “gap” that made it glaringly obvious that off-duty officers would use excessive force. Because no extreme emergency situation existed at the time of the incident, those policies expressly prohibited the officers’ conduct and were not the “moving force” cause of Bohanon’s injury. View "Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

On November 17, 1997, an Ashtabula Police dispatcher advised officers that Jones, who had outstanding felony warrants, had been spotted. Days earlier, Jones had told his cousin that he “was facing a lot of time” and “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest him.” Officer Glover found Jones, who pulled a revolver from his pocket and fired several shots at Glover. Jones kicked Glover in the chest, then fled the scene. Officers apprehended Jones and recovered the weapon, which used hollow-point bullets. Officer Glover died the following morning.Jones was convicted of murder. During the penalty phase, Jones’s counsel presented testimony from a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Jones with Antisocial Personality Disorder and testified that Black men with this disorder (including Jones) would commit more murders—he claimed that about one in four “African-American urban males” suffered from the disorder, and the only treatment was to “throw them away, lock them up.” The jury recommended and the court imposed the death penalty. The district court denied Jones’s petition for habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The issue of whether Jones received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because his attorneys failed to prepare expert witnesses properly, as shown by the psychologist’s racialized testimony, was not procedurally defaulted. On de novo review of the merits, the court held trial counsel performed ineffectively and Jones is entitled to a new sentencing. View "Jones v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

After the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against three Hispanic women during jury selection, Petitioner raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The trial court denied the challenge, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a California state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition raising a Batson challenge to a jury conviction. The panel held that, even if a combined race and gender class such as Hispanic women is a cognizable group for purposes of Batson, that new rule would not apply to Petitioner’s case. The panel concluded that, under circuit precedent in Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001), and Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), the recognition of a mixed race and gender class would be a new rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), bars the application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases that were final before the new rule was announced.   The panel further held that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race alone because the totality of the circumstances, including a comparison between the prospective jurors the prosecutor struck and those he did not, did not raise an inference that race motivated the prosecutor to exercise a strike. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision on Batson step one was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of facts. View "GIANG NGUYEN V. SCOTT FRAUENHEIM" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding plaintiff Elba I. Falto De Roman only nominal damages against the Municipal Government of Mayguez and against its mayor, Jose Guillermo Rodriguez, on her complaint filed after was terminated from her position without having been afforded a due process hearing, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this action alleging, among other things, that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by terminating her without a hearing. After a trial on the issue of whether Plaintiff was entitled to damages as a result of not receiving a hearing, the jury found Defendants not liable for damages and awarded nominal damages of $1 in favor of Plaintiff. The district court denied Plaintiff's subsequently-filed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her challenge to the district court's denial of her motion for judgment; and (2) Plaintiff did not meet the high bar for a new trial. View "Falto-de Roman v. Municipal Government of Mayaguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired from his position as the Chief of Investigation of the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman (Parchman) about three months after he testified at a probable cause hearing on behalf of one of his investigators. Rogers sued the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), then-MDOC Commissioner, and MDOC’s Corrections Investigations Division Director, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on sovereign and qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.   The court explained that to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that the defendants violated a right that was not just arguable, but “beyond debate.” And he fails to “point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority that either answers the question Lane left open regarding sworn testimony given by a public employee within his ordinary job duties, or clearly establishes that Plaintiff’s testimony was outside his ordinary job duties as a law enforcement officer (or was otherwise protected speech). Nor does Plainitff point to record evidence demonstrating that his testimony was undisputedly outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities, as was his burden to do. View "Rogers v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding the revocation of Defendant's probation, holding that Defendant's confrontation argument under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1345(e) was not preserved.Defendant pleaded guilty to discharging a weapon into occupied property and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Later, Defendant's probation was revoked following a determination that he had committed new criminal offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him at the probation hearing. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in this case. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the judgment below, holding (1) a defendant's arguments under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1345(e) are preserved when a defendant lodges a proper objection or the trial court does not permit confrontation and fails to make a finding of good cause; and (2) the condition requiring a finding of good cause was not satisfied in this case. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court denying Nation Ford Baptist Church Inc.'s (Church) motion to dismiss the underlying complaint with respect to Pastor Phillip R.J. Davis's claim for a declaratory judgment, holding that certain claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Pastor Davis filed a complaint against the Church and Nation Ford's Board of Directors, arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under the Church's corporate bylaws when it purported to terminate him by vote of the Board because the governing bylaws allowed termination only by vote of the Church's congregation at a special general meeting. The trial court denied the Church's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Pastor Davis's claim for a declaratory judgment regarding the various bylaws can proceed; and (2) First Amendment principles required the dismissal of Pastor Davis's other claims. View "Nation Ford Baptist Church, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law