Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Coby Lee Paugh died from complications related to alcohol withdrawal while being held in pretrial detention at Uintah County Jail in Vernal, Utah. His estate sued Uintah County and several of its jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of Paugh’s constitutional rights. The County and its jail officials moved for summary judgment, with the jail officials asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted qualified immunity for one but not all defendants. It also denied the County’s motion for summary judgment. The Individual Defendants and the County filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, and the County asked the Tenth Circuit to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction and reverse the court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. We hold that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Individual Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and did not consider the County’s appeal, because it lacked jurisdiction to do so. View "Paugh, et al. v. Uintah County, et al." on Justia Law

At a barbecue at Brown's home. K.M. and Brown became inebriated and had a physical altercation. K.M.’s wife, Rebecca, got K.M. to his car, in front of Brown’s house. According to Rebecca, K.M. was standing in the street when Brown approached and swung a knife at K.M.. K.M. swung back with a piece of wood that Brown had thrown at K.M. earlier. Brown claims K.M. came up the driveway toward him holding pieces of wood and raised his hands as if to strike Brown, so Brown picked up a knife from the grill and swung it. He did not realize he had stabbed K.M. until K.M. collapsed in the street. Brown did not call 911 but made statements such as “that will teach him.” In recorded telephone calls from the jail, Brown made statements attributing the stabbing to anger rather than fear. K.M.’was struck three times; the knife’s blade penetrated his skull and passed through the brain. K.M. survived but has cognitive and physical impairments and will require care for the remainder of his life.Brown was convicted of first-degree reckless injury. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Brown’s habeas petition. Even if he was deprived of due process when the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the “castle doctrine” as part of his self-defense theory, any error was harmless. It is unlikely that a properly instructed jury would have accepted Brown’s factual account. View "Brown v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Barney’s wife got a restraining order against him and temporary custody of their son. She was subsequently found dead near their son’s daycare, her throat cut open. Barney was charged with murder. Barney had a rocky relationship with his defense lawyer, Riley, and claims that he told Riley of his plan to represent himself on July 14, 2005, then wrote the judge a letter. Though Barney had dated the letter July 21, the judge did not get it until August 10, the day before the trial began. In court, the judge held up the letter, explained that he had not read it, and handed it to Riley. Riley promised Barney that he would “deal with” Barney’s request. He never did.After a two-week trial, Barney was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction was affirmed. In habeas proceedings, the New Jersey Superior Court found that Barney did not “clearly and unequivocally” tell the court or Riley that he wanted to represent himself. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court ruling was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Barney did not establish prejudice in his ineffective assistance claim; the trial court did not get Barney’s request until the eve of jury selection. View "Barney v. Administrator New Jersey State Prisons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the death of his wife, holding that the prosecutor improperly commented on Defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent following his arrest and advisement of rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes of conviction and that the prosecutor improperly commented on his post-Miranda silence. The Supreme Court reversed his convictions, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; but (2) the prosecutor's remarks impermissibly used Defendant's post-Miranda silence against him, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), rendering the trial "fundamentally unfair," and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Patrick M." on Justia Law

Texas City’s “permit officer” handles applications for ambulance permits for the City. One day, he spotted an ambulance without a permit. He knew he was powerless to issue citations to the drivers himself, so he summoned someone who could (the Fire Marshal). While waiting for the Fire Marshal to show up, the officer repeatedly told the ambulance drivers that they were detained, that they could not leave, and that they must stay. He did not have that power, but he did it anyway. The Fire Marshal showed up about thirty minutes later and issued them citations. The ambulance drivers sued, claiming this violated their Fourth Amendment rights.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part finding that because the officer acted beyond the scope of his discretionary duties as “permit officer,” he is not entitled to qualified immunity. But the claim against the City fails because the officer did not have final policymaking authority. The court explained that the officer was not acting within the scope of his discretionary authority because state law does not give a permit officer the authority to conduct stops of any kind.   However, the court wrote, that the City cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because Wylie does not have any final policymaking authority. Section 1983 allows suits against persons for violating federal rights. That term includes municipalities like Texas City. But a city cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory of liability. Rather, a city can be liable only if one of its policies or customs caused the injury. View "Sweetin v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

After Appellant, a ticketing agent ordered a non-ticketed individual off of the bus, the two women got into a physical altercation. When DC Metropolitan Police officers arrived, they grabbed Appellant, pressed her against the wall, and then forced her to the floor. The police charged her with simple assault on the non-ticketed individual and with assaulting a police officer while resisting arrest.   Appellant sued the District of Columbia and the police officers, alleging civil rights violations during this arrest and a second arrest that occurred two months after the first. Appellant appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and its officers.   The DC Circuit agreed in part and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the District and its officers on Appellant’s Section 1983 wrongful arrest, common law false arrest, and respondeat superior claims. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Appellant’s other claims. The court explained that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether probable cause for the simple assault charge dissipated before Appellant was handcuffed a second time and taken involuntarily to the police station. Second, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of probable cause to arrest Appellant for assaulting a police officer. View "Xingru Lin v. DC (REDACTED)" on Justia Law

In 2011 Sanders drove a truck into his sister and her boyfriend. He was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Sanders suffered from schizophrenia and was not taking his medication. Sanders was initially found to lack the capacity to proceed or to assist in his defense. Sanders received treatment, was reevaluated, and a second report suggested he was “malingering.” Sanders entered into a plea agreement, stating he had read and understood the criminal complaint and understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Sanders’s cognitive abilities and educational level were considered, as was whether Sanders could have pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.The day after receiving a seven-year sentence, Sanders gave notice of his intent to pursue postconviction relief and was appointed new counsel. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected that attorney’s no-merit report but dismissed the appeal, reasoning that Sanders relied on facts outside the record. On remand, Sanders moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he did not understand the offenses to which he pleaded and that his attorney was ineffective. The court denied both motions, making extensive findings that Sanders’s trial counsel was credible and Sanders was generally not credible but was intelligent and understood the proceedings and issues. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sanders’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally defaulted. It plainly appears from Sanders’s petition and attached exhibits that he is not entitled to relief on his claim that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. View "Sanders v. Radtke" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals concluding that Appellant had waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, holding that Appellant did not waive his right to appeal the suppression ruling.After he had been convicted of a crime of violence Appellant was indicted on charges of possessing a regulated firearm. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the gun and the loaded magazine recovered by law enforcement officers while conducting a warrantless search of his hotel room. Thereafter, the State filed a superseding indictment under a new case number to add additional charges. Appellant subsequently renewed his motion to suppress in the new case. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant was convicted of first-degree assault and other crimes. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Appellant waived his challenge to the denial o this motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consideration, holding that defense counsel did not waive Appellant's right to appellate review of the denial of his motion to suppress. View "Huggins v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second-degree arson stemming from a fire that occurred in Defendant's home, for which she submitted a claim to her insurer seeking to recover for the damage to her home, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal and that she was denied her fundamental right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's factual findings were legally sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree arson; (2) the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) Defendant was not denied her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial. View "State v. Krouse" on Justia Law

Defendant, a prison guard, shot Plaintiff with three sponge-tipped plastic rounds during a prison fight, breaking Plaintiff’s leg and injuring his butt and thigh. Following the fight, prison nurse assessed Plaintiff’s injuries and transferred him to an emergency room without fully completing her notes or conducting a full body examination.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants in Plaintiff’s action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The panel first held that the district court correctly concluded that there was no constitutional violation. The guard’s decision to shoot Plaintiff with sponge rounds was not excessive use of force. He had a duty to keep prison staff and the prisoners in his care safe and he used the lowest level of force available to him. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there was no evidence showing that Arnett had any improper motive, let alone that he acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”   As to the nurse, rather than deliberate indifference, her actions seemed to reflect the conduct of a medical professional who quickly and successfully ensured that her patient received the appropriate level of care. The court held that Defendants were therefore entitled to protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity and summary judgment was properly entered in their favor. View "KEVIN SIMMONS V. G. ARNETT" on Justia Law