Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he was detained without probable cause for driving while intoxicated. He brought suit under Section 1983, seeking damages from the officers who submitted an affidavit and incident reports to a magistrate to support his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court determined that fact issues precluded summary judgment, specifically, whether the officers made false statements that Plaintiff was “operating a motor vehicle” in violation of Texas law.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under Texas law, the inquiry when determining whether a person caused a vehicle to move must take into account “the totality of the circumstances [regarding whether] the defendant took action to affect the functioning of his vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle’s use.” The court explained that the officers' allegedly false statements pertained to how far the vehicle moved rather than whether it moved at all. Even if a vehicle only moved six inches, that may be sufficient to establish the operation element. View "Garcia v. Orta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and life sentences for first-degree murder, robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, and drug-related offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error during jury selection; (2) the trial judge was neither biased nor prejudiced against Defendant nor his counsel during voir dire; (3) as to Defendant's claims of error during the guilt phase of his trial, he failed to establish that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct rendering Defendant's trial fundamentally unfair; and (5) as to the penalty phase issues raised by Defendant, there was no prejudicial error. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a transgender youth, their parents, and two healthcare professionals, sought to enjoin Arkansas Act 626, which prohibits healthcare professionals from providing gender transition procedures to any individual under the age of 18 or from referring any such individual to any healthcare professional for gender transition procedures. The district court enjoined the Act, and the State appealed.The Eighth Circuit held that because a minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law, Act 626 discriminates on the basis of sex. Thus, to be valid, the Act must be supported by an exceedingly persuasive justification. The Eighth Circuit determined that the Act prohibits medical treatment that conforms with the recognized standard of care for adolescent gender dysphoria and that the purpose of the Act is not to ban a treatment but to ban an outcome the State deems undesirable. Thus, the district court did not err in granting an injunction. View "Dylan Brandt v. Leslie Rutledge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, and Defendant's remaining allegations of error were unavailing.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) because law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Defendant, the court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in determining that there was no violation of the court's sequestration order; (3) there was no obvious error in the instructions given to the jury; and (4) there was no illegality in the sentence or in the court's procedure. View "State v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his convictions and sentences, including three convictions for first-degree murder and three sentences of death, holding that Defendant was entitled to neither postconviction relief nor a writ of habeas corpus.In 2014, Defendant pleaded guilty to murdering his girlfriend and her two children. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed the court's decision and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two claims. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) as to Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, Defendant failed to demonstrate error, deficiency, or prejudice as to any of his claims; and (2) as to Defendant's habeas corpus petition, Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims. View "Covington v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983 alleging that Defendants violated her son’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by unlawfully detaining him for years. The complaint also contends that, at one point, the Sheriff held Defendant down and forced him to take unwanted medication. As to Clay County, Plaintiff argued that Sheriffs were final policymakers, making the county liable under Monell. Defendants sought summary judgment; Plaintiff responded with a motion for partial summary judgment.   After summary judgment, the following claims remained: the detention claim against the Sheriffs and Clay County; the forced medication claim against Clay County alone. The Sheriffs and Clay County appealed. The Fifth Circuit, in treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing, granted the petition for panel rehearing. The court dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.   The court explained that this is not a case about jailers following court orders that turned out to be unconstitutional. These Sheriffs held Plaintiff’s son in violation of a court order that followed Jackson’s commit-or-release rule. The court wrote that it cannot be that the initial detention order in a case overrides subsequent release orders and allows jailers to indefinitely hold defendants without consequence. Thus, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated Plaintiff’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and qualified immunity thus does not protect the Sheriffs. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

The issue before the en banc court was whether the current version of Miss. Const. art. 12, Section 241 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. This provision was upheld in Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), which was binding on the district court and the panel decision here, but the court voted to reconsider Cotton en banc.   Plaintiffs are black men in Mississippi who were convicted, respectively, of forgery and embezzlement. Both are disenfranchised under current Mississippi law because of their convictions. They filed suit against the Mississippi Secretary of State under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to restore the voting rights of convicted felons in Mississippi. They contend that the crimes that “remain” in Section 241 from the 1890 Constitution are still tainted by the racial animus with which they were originally enacted.   The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that the current version of Section 241 superseded the previous provisions and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the provision adopted in 1890. Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391–92. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to establish the 1968 reenactment of Section 241 was motivated by racism. The court explained that contrary to Plaintiffs’ principal assertion, the critical issue here is not the intent behind Mississippi’s 1890 Constitution, but whether the reenactment of Section 241 in 1968 was free of intentional racial discrimination. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Section 241 as it currently stands was motivated by discriminatory intent or that any other approach to demonstrating the provision’s unconstitutionality is viable. View "Harness v. Watson" on Justia Law

Inmate Munson developed sensitivity in two teeth because of poorly-fitted partial dentures. In April 2014 he went to the prison’s dental unit. One tooth was extracted. Munson declined a second extraction, so treatment was postponed. Munson’s next regular dental examination had to be rescheduled because of a lockdown. Munson asserts that on July 15, he sent a letter to Dr. Newbold, the prison’s chief dentist, complaining of pain and seeking treatment. Newbold cannot recall receiving the letter, nor did he record any such letter. Because of successive lockdowns, Munson’s regular exam was repeatedly rescheduled. Dr. Henderson saw him on August 5 but Munson left to take a call before treatment began. Munson says he wrote Newbold another letter on September 20. Newbold cannot recall receiving it. In February 2015, Henderson treated the tooth. Munson eventually received new partial dentures after his 2017 transfer.Munson brought Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Dr. Newbold and Wexford, the corporation that provides inmate medical services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The evidence could not support an inference that Munson’s dental problems were a serious medical need, that Dr. Newbold knew of his requests for treatment, or to attribute any delay in treatment to Dr. Newbold. Wexford could not be held liable for damages without evidence that Munson experienced any constitutional harm. View "Munson v. Newbold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and that remand to the superior court was required for Defendant to receive a new trial.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and firearm offenses. During the trial, defense counsel disclosed confidential information to the Commonwealth regarding the location of "key incriminating evidence." Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because he had not given his counsel his informed consent to disclose the information. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding (1) because defense counsel did not present Defendant with any other option than disclosing the existence of the incriminating evidence Defendant's purported consent to the disclosure was neither adequately informed nor voluntary; and (2) because trial counsel mistakenly believed he had a duty to disclose the incriminating evidence and did not obtain Defendant's prior consent to making that disclosure, an actual conflict of interest existed rendering the representation constitutionally ineffective. View "Commonwealth v. Tate" on Justia Law

Indianapolis Police Officers went to Mikie’s Pub in Indianapolis. Both officers were off duty and in plain clothes. Bohanon argued with the bartender about his bill. The officers intervened and brutally beat Bohanon in the parking lot. Bohanon sued Indianapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the officers used excessive force and that his injuries were caused by the city’s policies, which prohibit off-duty officers with any alcohol in their blood from performing law-enforcement functions subject to a narrow exception. An officer may do so only in an “extreme emergency situation[]” where police “action is required to prevent injury to the off duty [officer] or another, or to prevent the commission of a felony or other serious offense.” Bohanon argued that the city was deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk of constitutional violations. A jury awarded Bohanon $1.24 million. The judge granted Indianapolis judgment as a matter of law.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For the city to be liable, a municipal policy or custom must have caused Bohanon’s constitutional injury. The narrow exception in the city’s substance-abuse policy did not present a policy “gap” that made it glaringly obvious that off-duty officers would use excessive force. Because no extreme emergency situation existed at the time of the incident, those policies expressly prohibited the officers’ conduct and were not the “moving force” cause of Bohanon’s injury. View "Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law