Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for drug-trafficking and firearms charges, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or in finding Defendant eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924 (e).Reports of a parking-lot confrontation following a road-rage incident led law enforcement to stop Defendant in his vehicle the next day. The ensuing searches of Defendant's car and motor home led to the discovery of evidence supporting drug-trafficking and firearms charges. Defendant pleaded guilty. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) there was no error in the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) Defendant's sentence under the ACCA was lawfully imposed. View "United States v. Mulkern" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant on two charges of aggravated furnishing of cocaine, which were merged for sentencing, holding that the trial court erred when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress, and the error was not harmless.At issue was the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained when police officers stopped him after receiving an anonymous tip and searched his belongings outside a bus station. The trial court concluded that the officers had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant had been engaged in criminal activity when they stopped they stopped him. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that the evidence regarding the anonymous tip and the police's efforts to confirm its reliable failed to establish an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop. View "State v. Barclift" on Justia Law

Johnson was a Dyess Air Force Base firefighter from 2017-2019. In 2018, Johnson’s mother came to live with Johnson's family. She took around 13 pills to treat health issues; Johnson was taking “seven or eight” pills. The Air Force subsequently selected Johnson for a mandatory random drug test. He tested positive for oxycodone and oxymorphone. Johnson told his supervisor, Ranard, that he had accidentally taken his mother’s pills instead of his own prescribed medication. Ranard proposed that Johnson be fired. The deciding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher, fired Johnson, explaining that he could not “risk the possibility of Johnson] coming to work again under the influence of illicit drugs.” At an arbitration hearing, Fletcher testified that he “just [didn’t] believe” that Johnson accidentally took his mother’s pill, having consulted his wife, a registered nurse, and his brother-in-law, a nurse practitioner, who “confirmed that the likelihood of that happening is slim to none.” The arbitrator denied Johnson’s grievance, affirming his termination.The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Fletcher’s ex parte communications violated Johnson’s right to due process. When Fletcher’s relatives allegedly “confirmed” that the chances of Johnson taking his mother’s pill were “slim to none,” they were not confirming information in the record; they were providing new opinions on the evidence. View "Johnson v. Department of the Air Force" on Justia Law

Sittenfeld, a former Cincinnati City Council member, was charged with honest-services wire fraud, bribery, and attempted extortion under color of official right. The jury trial comprised nine days. The court did not sequester the jurors but admonished them repeatedly against discussing the case or considering extraneous information. On the third day of jury deliberations, a court employee informed the judge that “Juror X” had been posting to her private Facebook page, which was visible only to Juror X’s Facebook friends, of whom the court employee was one. The court obtained printouts of Juror X’s private posts and comments and called the parties to chambers to discuss the situation. In the meantime, the jury reached a verdict. The parties and court accepted the verdict with the possibility of a post-verdict “Remmer” hearing on possible extraneous influences on the jury. The jury convicted Sittenfeld on two counts. The court discharged the jury, questioned Jurors X and Y in chambers, denied Sittenfeld’s motion for a forensic examination of Juror X’s electronic devices, and concluded that Sittenfeld was not prejudiced by the Facebook postings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A court’s inherent or statutory authority in conducting a Remmer hearing does not include an unlimited, inquisitorial power to order jurors to surrender their personal possessions, such as their electronic devices, or to divulge their passwords; the district court had no power to order a forensic examination of the juror’s devices. View "In re: Sittenfeld" on Justia Law

In New Jersey for a family party, Saint-Jean was driving home to Massachusetts with his uncle. Palisades Interstate Park Police stopped the vehicle for driving too slowly and for having tinted windows. In response to questions, Saint-Jean stated that he was originally from Haiti but was a U.S. citizen. Officers ordered the men out of the car, frisked them, and requested to search the vehicle. Saint-Jean signed a consent-to-search form. In a compartment between the front seats, they found small plastic bags containing heart-shaped objects that looked like Valentine’s Day candies. The officers suspected that the items were actually MDMA or ecstasy. Saint-Jean stated that they were Valentine’s Day candies from his coworker and offered her contact information. The officers declined, arrested Saint-Jean, and took him to a police station. The objects were not tested. The officers issued a traffic summons and a criminal summons for possessing a controlled substance, later downgraded to a disorderly persons offense. Many weeks later, the objects were determined to be candy. The prosecution continued for four more months.In Saint-Jean’s subsequent civil rights suit, the district court rejected the officers’ request for qualified immunity for Fourth Amendment claims but dismissed one constitutional claim against the officers and all of the claims against the prosecutor and the governmental entities. Before the officers appealed, Saint-Jean amended his complaint. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal. Due to the prior amendment, the district court’s order was not final and there was no basis for appellate jurisdiction. View "Saint-Jean v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found as a result of and during a protective sweep, holding that a protective sweep does not require a prior arrest.In granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court determined that the officers did not have an appropriate basis for the protective sweep and that the sweep was per se unconstitutional because it was not preceded by an arrest. The district court concluded that the search was not a lawful protective sweep because it was not based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that the premises harbored a dangerous individual. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that because the district court did not indicate the specific evidence that was improperly seized as a result of the protective sweep or as its fruit, remand was required for clarification of the evidence that fell within the scope of the suppression order and which items were properly seized by law enforcement. View "State v. McCall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his sentences were illegal.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to eighty years' imprisonment. In his petition to correct an illegal sentence, Appellant asserted that the application of Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-501(c) to enhance his sentence was illegal and that the enhanced sentence violated the prohibition against the ex post facto application of criminal statutes. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his enhanced sentence was an illegal sentence pursuant to section 16-90-111. View "Rainer v. State" on Justia Law

In 1993, Kastman was charged with misdemeanor offenses based on acts of public indecency involving children and disorderly conduct. The state’s attorney initiated a civil commitment proceeding against Kastman under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01). Evidence indicated that Kastman suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, exhibitionism, and alcohol dependency. Kastman was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and the circuit court granted the petition. In 2016, Kastman was granted conditional release from institutional care.In 2020, he sought financial assistance. Kastman asserted that he was unemployed, disabled, and could not afford his $300 monthly treatment costs and the $1800 monthly rent for housing that complied with the Sex Offender Registration Act. The circuit court of Lake County ordered the Department of Corrections to pay a portion of Kastman’s monthly expenses. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statutes indicate that a sex offender’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding who should bear the expense of treatment costs; without a clear statutory directive, the legislature is not presumed to have intended that only financially stable individuals are eligible for conditional release. Financial instability and the need for supervision to protect the public are not the same things. View "People v. Kastman" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. After the jury returned its signed verdict forms in open court, Jackson’s attorney asked the court to poll the jury. The circuit court then asked 11 of the 12 jurors whether the verdicts reflected on the verdict forms were their verdicts. All of the 11 jurors who were questioned confirmed that the signed verdict forms accurately reflected their verdicts. The circuit court dismissed the jury without polling the twelfth juror. Jackson’s attorney failed to object to the error and did not include the error in a posttrial motion.Jackson raised the error for the first time on direct appeal. The appellate court held that the error in polling the jury constituted structural error that called into question the integrity of the judicial process, excused the forfeiture under the second prong of Illinois’s plain error rule, and reversed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. A procedure that is not required in every criminal jury trial cannot be logically categorized as an essential element of every criminal jury trial on par with the jury trial oath; no U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests that a criminal defendant is denied the fundamental right to juror unanimity when jury polling does not take place or when there is an error in the jury polling process. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment for his convictions of two counts of manslaughter in the second degree, driving under the influence of controlled substances first offense, and persistent felony offender first degree, holding that Defendant's claims of error did not warrant reversal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court was correct in declining to suppress Defendant's statements statements he made at the accident scene, and suppression of Defendant's blood test was not required in this case; (2) the trial court did not err in excusing a prospective juror for cause; and (3) while certain statements were not properly admissible during the Commonwealth's examination of detective Brandon McPherson, they did not rise to the level of palpable error resulting in manifest injustice. View "Simpson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law