Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that, for double jeopardy purposes, the unit of prosecution for a violation of Minn. Stat. 243.166, subd. 3(a), which requires a predatory offender to register "with the corrections agent as soon as the agent is assigned to the person," is the assignment of a corrections agent, thus affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the court of appeals.Defendant was convicted and sentenced on seven separate occasions between 2004 and 2018 for failing to register under subdivision 3(a). In August 2019, Defendant refused to sign required paperwork presented by his new corrections agent. In September 2019, Defendant again refused to sign the paperwork presented by a special agent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension assigned by Defendant's corrections agent. The State charged Defendant with two counts of failing to register under subdivision 3(a). Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant's earlier convictions did not bar prosecution of the August 2019 offense; but (2) the September 2019 offense was barred. View "State v. Larson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of felony shoplifting after a jury trial, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.On appeal, Defendant argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that the district court abused its discretion by allowing a juror who inadvertently saw a video about the trial on social media to remain on the jury. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48 or the Sixth Amendment; and (2) Defendant waived any claim related to alleged juror impropriety by not objecting before the return of the verdict. View "Vlahos v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for aggravated murder with death specifications and her sentence of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant raised sixteen propositions of law. The Supreme Court rejected each proposition of law, holding, among other things, that (1) there was no prejudicial error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (3) although significant mitigating factors existed, the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the death sentence was appropriate and proportionate. View "State v. Drain" on Justia Law

Runkel worked as the assistant purchasing agent for Springfield, Illinois. The purchasing agent announced that he planned to leave the position. Runkel, who is white, unsuccessfully sought a promotion to that job. The city promoted a Black candidate, Wilkin, who had worked under Runkel’s supervision. Runkel was offered a $5,000 per year raise but nonetheless stated that she believed the hiring was discriminatory; she caused a disturbance in the office. Runkel filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC. Runkel was disciplined and the promised raise was revoked. She retired and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a), and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The city told incompatible stories about how and why Wilkin was chosen for promotion and Runkel was not. One version relied explicitly upon race as a factor. Regarding Runkel’s retaliation claim, the explanation for disciplining Runkel and taking away the promised raise also involves genuine questions of material fact. Her disruptive response to the denial of the promotion could warrant discipline, but giving Runkel the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences from it, a reasonable jury could find that Springfield’s stated nondiscriminatory justifications for the promotion decision are pretextual and that it retaliated against Runkel for claiming discrimination. View "Runkel v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Gussie was charged with fraud. Virgin Islands prosecutors later learned one of the grand jurors might have been a victim of Gussie’s scheme. The government obtained a superseding indictment from a new grand jury about a year later. A jury convicted Gussie, who was sentenced to 45 months in prison.The Third Circuit affirmed. The superseding indictment cured any potential defect, making any error harmless. Gussie suffered no prejudice facing charges under the validly returned superseding indictment. The court rejected Gussie’s arguments that allowing an alleged victim to sit on the grand jury considering an indictment against her was “so prejudicial” that it caused the grand jury “no longer to be a grand jury,” requiring dismissal with prejudice and that the superseding indictment exceeded the statute of limitations because the original indictment was not validly pending when the superseding indictment returned. While Gussie claimed the government knew the juror was a possible victim and permitted the juror’s participation, the district court found no supporting facts for that assertion. View "United States v. Gussie" on Justia Law

Lucas was living at the Aranda, a residential hotel that provides supportive housing to formerly homeless individuals. The management company sought a workplace violence restraining order (Code Civ. Proc. 527.8) against Lucas with affidavits from four employees, alleging that Lucas had been very aggressive and confrontational toward other tenants and Aranda employees.The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Lucas filed a response, denying all of the allegations. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing. Only a janitor (Yee) and Lucas provided testimony. The trial court questioned Yee, who affirmed that each of the allegations in his affidavit was correct. Lucas then testified, answering questions posed by his attorney. Lucas’ counsel requested an opportunity to cross-examine Yee and any of the other witnesses. The trial court stated it had no authority to allow cross-examination at such a hearing and granted a three-year workplace violence restraining order, based on “clear and convincing evidence” that had “been supported” and was “logical” and “believable.” The court of appeal reversed. The court’s failure here to allow Lucas to cross-examine Yee was contrary to section 527.8(j) and raised due process concerns. View "CSV Hospitality Management v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Rodriguez was arrested for domestic violence. He gave the police his brother’s name and date of birth. He was convicted and sentenced to probation. Although the court had learned Rodriguez’s real name, the judgment of conviction listed “Ely M. Martinez” as an alias for Rodriguez and listed Martinez’s date of birth. Rodriguez failed to report for probation. An arrest warrant was issued with the same information as the judgment. Years later, police arrested Martinez for an unrelated offense and booked him in the Milwaukee County Jail on a Wednesday. The next day, the district attorney decided not to press charges but a warrant check revealed the outstanding warrant for Rodriguez. Although jail officials made efforts to positively identify the detainee, he was not released until Tuesday morning.Martinez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming due process violations. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Martinez’s detention was relatively brief and Martinez could not show that the defendants failed to investigate or ignored evidence of his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the defendants could have improved aspects of their investigation, Martinez has not provided evidence showing that they were deliberately indifferent to his claims of mistaken identity. View "Martinez v. Santiago" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to modify his sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6628(c), which requires courts to modify sentences if certain sentencing provisions are found to be unconstitutional, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a sentencing modification.In 1999, Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to a hard forty sentence. After a retrial in 2005, Appellant was again convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. Before sentencing, Appellant filed a motion arguing that the hard forty sentencing scheme violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The sentencing court denied the motion and again imposed a hard forty life sentence. In 2016, after the Supreme Court decided State v. Soto, 322 P.3d 344 (Kan. 2014), Appellant filed a motion for a sentencing modification under section 21-6628(c). The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied the motion. View "State v. Albright" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of all counts in a 41-count indictment charging him with sexual exploitation of a child and possessing, promoting, and distributing child pornography and sentencing him to a term of eighty years' imprisonment, holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal were unavailing.On appeal, Defendant argued that the total length of his term-of-hears sentence violated the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant's eighty-year sentence for dozens of child pornography offenses did not reach the level of gross disproportionality. View "United States v. Raiche" on Justia Law

Oakland County took title to the plaintiffs’ homes under the Michigan General Property Tax Act, which (after a redemption period) required the state court to enter a foreclosure judgment that vested “absolute title” to the property in the governmental entity upon payment of the amount of the tax delinquency or “its fair market value.” The entity could then sell it at a public auction. No matter what the sale price, the property’s former owner had no right to any of the proceeds.In February 2018, under the Act, Oakland County foreclosed on Hall’s home to collect a tax delinquency of $22,642; the County then conveyed the property to the City of Southfield for that price. Southfield conveyed the property for $1 to a for-profit entity, the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, which later sold it for $308,000. Other plaintiffs had similar experiences.The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The “Michigan statute is not only self-dealing: it is also an aberration from some 300 years of decisions.” The government may not decline to recognize long-established interests in property as a device to take them. The County took the property without just compensation. View "Hall v. Meisner" on Justia Law