Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued police officer under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 after the police officer deployed pepper spray in Plaintiff’s face. The district court concluded that Plaintiff was engaged in protest activity protected by the First Amendment, and that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the police officer used force against Plaintiff because she exercised her constitutional right to freedom of speech. Defendant appealed, and argued that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that there is no reversible error. The court explained that the district court’s determination that a reasonable jury could find that the police officer acted with retaliatory motive is a matter of evidence sufficiency that is not appealable at this juncture. The court further held that the police officer’s argument based on “arguable probable cause” fails for other reasons as well. Probable cause is a constitutional standard under the Fourth does not argue that this case involves a search or seizure, and he does not explain why the asserted existence of “arguable probable cause” would be dispositive as a matter of law on a claim alleging retaliatory use of force in violation of the First Amendment. View "Essence Welch v. Daniel Dempsey" on Justia Law

The School District includes four high schools. Groves, who is white, started at the District in 1991 as a teacher. In 2007 he became the Adams High School athletic director. In 2017 Groves applied to serve as Corporation Director of Athletics, a new, District-wide position. Superintendent Spells interviewed four applicants and recommended Gavin, who is Black, explaining that Gavin inspired confidence in his ability to repair the District’s relationship with the Indiana High School Athletic Association; Groves interviewed poorly and seemed to boast of firing 24 coaches during his tenure. Noncompliance with Association regulations occurred under Groves’s watch at Adams.Groves sued under Title VII, noting that Spells is also Black. The District later eliminated the Corporation Director of Athletics position and created a hybrid Dean of Students/Athletics position at each of the four high schools. Groves, Gavin, and seven other candidates applied for the four new positions. The Riley High School position went to Gavin. Groves added a claim of retaliation based on the elimination of his position. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary rejection of his claims. Groves was not substantially more qualified than Gavin. Both met the criteria that the District required for the position. The court rejected a claim of pretext. Although Gavin’s criminal background came to light after the challenged hiring decisions, the District interpreted its background check policy as applying only to external hires, not existing employees moving to new positions. View "Groves v. South Bend Community School Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, for double jeopardy purposes, the unit of prosecution for a violation of Minn. Stat. 243.166, subd. 3(a), which requires a predatory offender to register "with the corrections agent as soon as the agent is assigned to the person," is the assignment of a corrections agent, thus affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the court of appeals.Defendant was convicted and sentenced on seven separate occasions between 2004 and 2018 for failing to register under subdivision 3(a). In August 2019, Defendant refused to sign required paperwork presented by his new corrections agent. In September 2019, Defendant again refused to sign the paperwork presented by a special agent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension assigned by Defendant's corrections agent. The State charged Defendant with two counts of failing to register under subdivision 3(a). Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant's earlier convictions did not bar prosecution of the August 2019 offense; but (2) the September 2019 offense was barred. View "State v. Larson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of felony shoplifting after a jury trial, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.On appeal, Defendant argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that the district court abused its discretion by allowing a juror who inadvertently saw a video about the trial on social media to remain on the jury. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48 or the Sixth Amendment; and (2) Defendant waived any claim related to alleged juror impropriety by not objecting before the return of the verdict. View "Vlahos v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for aggravated murder with death specifications and her sentence of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant raised sixteen propositions of law. The Supreme Court rejected each proposition of law, holding, among other things, that (1) there was no prejudicial error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (3) although significant mitigating factors existed, the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the death sentence was appropriate and proportionate. View "State v. Drain" on Justia Law

Runkel worked as the assistant purchasing agent for Springfield, Illinois. The purchasing agent announced that he planned to leave the position. Runkel, who is white, unsuccessfully sought a promotion to that job. The city promoted a Black candidate, Wilkin, who had worked under Runkel’s supervision. Runkel was offered a $5,000 per year raise but nonetheless stated that she believed the hiring was discriminatory; she caused a disturbance in the office. Runkel filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC. Runkel was disciplined and the promised raise was revoked. She retired and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a), and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The city told incompatible stories about how and why Wilkin was chosen for promotion and Runkel was not. One version relied explicitly upon race as a factor. Regarding Runkel’s retaliation claim, the explanation for disciplining Runkel and taking away the promised raise also involves genuine questions of material fact. Her disruptive response to the denial of the promotion could warrant discipline, but giving Runkel the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences from it, a reasonable jury could find that Springfield’s stated nondiscriminatory justifications for the promotion decision are pretextual and that it retaliated against Runkel for claiming discrimination. View "Runkel v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Gussie was charged with fraud. Virgin Islands prosecutors later learned one of the grand jurors might have been a victim of Gussie’s scheme. The government obtained a superseding indictment from a new grand jury about a year later. A jury convicted Gussie, who was sentenced to 45 months in prison.The Third Circuit affirmed. The superseding indictment cured any potential defect, making any error harmless. Gussie suffered no prejudice facing charges under the validly returned superseding indictment. The court rejected Gussie’s arguments that allowing an alleged victim to sit on the grand jury considering an indictment against her was “so prejudicial” that it caused the grand jury “no longer to be a grand jury,” requiring dismissal with prejudice and that the superseding indictment exceeded the statute of limitations because the original indictment was not validly pending when the superseding indictment returned. While Gussie claimed the government knew the juror was a possible victim and permitted the juror’s participation, the district court found no supporting facts for that assertion. View "United States v. Gussie" on Justia Law

Lucas was living at the Aranda, a residential hotel that provides supportive housing to formerly homeless individuals. The management company sought a workplace violence restraining order (Code Civ. Proc. 527.8) against Lucas with affidavits from four employees, alleging that Lucas had been very aggressive and confrontational toward other tenants and Aranda employees.The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Lucas filed a response, denying all of the allegations. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing. Only a janitor (Yee) and Lucas provided testimony. The trial court questioned Yee, who affirmed that each of the allegations in his affidavit was correct. Lucas then testified, answering questions posed by his attorney. Lucas’ counsel requested an opportunity to cross-examine Yee and any of the other witnesses. The trial court stated it had no authority to allow cross-examination at such a hearing and granted a three-year workplace violence restraining order, based on “clear and convincing evidence” that had “been supported” and was “logical” and “believable.” The court of appeal reversed. The court’s failure here to allow Lucas to cross-examine Yee was contrary to section 527.8(j) and raised due process concerns. View "CSV Hospitality Management v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Rodriguez was arrested for domestic violence. He gave the police his brother’s name and date of birth. He was convicted and sentenced to probation. Although the court had learned Rodriguez’s real name, the judgment of conviction listed “Ely M. Martinez” as an alias for Rodriguez and listed Martinez’s date of birth. Rodriguez failed to report for probation. An arrest warrant was issued with the same information as the judgment. Years later, police arrested Martinez for an unrelated offense and booked him in the Milwaukee County Jail on a Wednesday. The next day, the district attorney decided not to press charges but a warrant check revealed the outstanding warrant for Rodriguez. Although jail officials made efforts to positively identify the detainee, he was not released until Tuesday morning.Martinez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming due process violations. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Martinez’s detention was relatively brief and Martinez could not show that the defendants failed to investigate or ignored evidence of his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the defendants could have improved aspects of their investigation, Martinez has not provided evidence showing that they were deliberately indifferent to his claims of mistaken identity. View "Martinez v. Santiago" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to modify his sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6628(c), which requires courts to modify sentences if certain sentencing provisions are found to be unconstitutional, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a sentencing modification.In 1999, Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to a hard forty sentence. After a retrial in 2005, Appellant was again convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. Before sentencing, Appellant filed a motion arguing that the hard forty sentencing scheme violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The sentencing court denied the motion and again imposed a hard forty life sentence. In 2016, after the Supreme Court decided State v. Soto, 322 P.3d 344 (Kan. 2014), Appellant filed a motion for a sentencing modification under section 21-6628(c). The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied the motion. View "State v. Albright" on Justia Law