Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff moved under state law for an order permitting him to conduct DNA testing and fingerprint analysis on evidence found at the crime scene more than forty years ago. The superior court denied relief in an October 21, 2022 order. Plaintiff sought a review of this order via a special action petition in the Arizona Supreme Court. The state supreme court accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the superior court's ruling. Plaintiff then commenced this federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He sought a declaratory judgment that the Arizona statutes providing for forensic testing of DNA and other evidence are unconstitutional as applied to him as well as an injunction ordering defendants to permit him to conduct the forensic testing. He moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting his execution until he obtains this relief. The district court denied the injunction, and he appealed.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because this action amounted to an improper appeal of the state court's judgment. View "MURRAY HOOPER V. MARK BRNOVICH, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint making a claim for statutory damages against the Board of County Commissioners pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-3-625(1) and equal protection, takings, and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that the district court erred.In granting the Board's motion to dismiss, the district court determined that Plaintiff's section 76-3-625(1) claims were barred by a thirty-day statute of limitations and its section 1983 claims failed to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the section 76-3-625(1) claim was subject to a thirty-day statute of limitations and was therefore time-barred; and (2) erred in concluding that Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims lacked a sufficient protected property interest and were insufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Tai Tam, LLC v. Missoula County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (the Estate) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the named Defendants. This appeal stems from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s son's detention and death at the Charlotte County Jail.  The Estate brought a seven-count complaint against the named Defendants. The district court granted each of the summary judgment motions in full, finding that the Estate failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on any of the claims, and entered final judgment for the Defendants.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Sherriff of Charlotte County, the jail’s health care provider, and the jail’s medical personnel. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the jail’s corrections officers. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Estate failed to carry its burden of establishing a reasonable dispute of material fact regarding whether either the prison or the Sheriff advanced an unconstitutional policy or custom. Specifically, the district court found that Ireland’s Estate presented “no evidence” of an unconstitutional policy or custom and, at most, that the  Estate pointed to isolated incidents by the prison and the Sherriff.   Further, because there is no evidence in the record from which the court can infer that the officers were aware of the man’s need for medical aid at any time during the encounter before he ultimately lost consciousness, the deliberate indifference to medical treatment claims against the officers fail and summary judgment in their favor was proper. View "Thomas B. Ireland v. Bill Prummell, et al." on Justia Law

Reho, proceeding pro se, moved for an extension of time to apply for a certificate of appealability and to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, 83 days after the district court entered judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was three weeks late, 28 U.S.C. 2107(b)(1); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i).The Sixth Circuit remanded. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was time-barred. However, the motion, which repeatedly asks for an extension of time and offered an explanation for his delay, is better construed as a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(c); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(A); the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal based on “excusable neglect or good cause” if the petitioner moves for an extension within 30 days of the expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal. On remand, the district court must determine whether Reho has shown excusable neglect or good cause so as to merit an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. View "Reho v. United States" on Justia Law

Bennett contends that Division 10 of Cook County Jail does not satisfy the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act because it lacks grab bars and other fixtures that disabled inmates need in order to use showers and toilets safely. Bennett cited a regulation providing that as of 1988, "construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)(1). UFAS requires accessible toilets with grab bars nearby and accessible showers with mounted seats, Division 10 was constructed in 1992.In 2020, the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of class certification, stating that Bennett “proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply (and were violated, to detainees’ detriment).” On remand, the district court certified a class. More than two years later, the judge decertified the class, reasoning that some class members, although using aids such as wheelchairs, may not be disabled under the statutes.The Seventh Circuit again reversed. The 2020 decision identified an issue relevant to every Division 10 detainee. Class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) resolves the issue, not the whole case. Class members could receive the benefit of a declaratory judgment on the issue but would need to proceed in individual suits to seek damages; if the class loses, every detainee would be bound by issue preclusion. The application of UFAS can be determined class-wide while leaving to the future any particular inmate’s claim to relief. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of fifth-degree marijuana possession against him for lack of probable cause, holding that the evidence was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.This case arose when law enforcement officers discovered a plant substance in Defendant's car during a traffic stop. While the State did not test the concentration of THC in the substance before charging gate case, a field test of the substance detected the presence of THC. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that chemical testing establishing the THC concentration of substance was not required when there is other sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's admission that the material in the vehicle was marijuana was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the charge of fifth-degree marijuana possession. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress his breath test because no interpreter was available and the advisory was read to him in English, holding that the police officer discharged his duty by making all reasonable efforts to obtain a Tigrinya interpreter before reading the advisory to Defendant in English.Defendant was from Eritrea, and his primary language was Tigrinya. Defendant, who was pulled over for traffic violations, agreed to do a preliminary breath test, which came back over the legal limit. He was then arrested and transported to a law enforcement center. The arresting officer contacted a commercial service known as Language Line to obtain an on-demand Tigrinya interpreter for the implied consent advisory, but not such interpreter was available. The officer then read Defendant the advisory. Defendant was subsequently charged with operating while intoxicated second offense. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of his blood alcohol content from the DataMaster test on the grounds that he did not give consent. The district court sustained the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer complied with Iowa Code 321J.8 by making reasonable efforts and using reasonable methods to convey to Defendant the implied consent advisory. View "State v. Baraki" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petitions for postconviction relief challenging his convictions in a rape case and a jail case, holding that there was no error.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape and kidnapping. While he was being held in jail on the rape charges, Appellant and two other inmates attacked one of their cellmates. A jury found Appellant guilty of felonious assault and kidnapping for the attack. Appellant later filed petitions for postconviction relief challenging his convictions in both cases. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) postconviction claims alleging a denial of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel are not procedurally barred if they cannot meaningfully be reviewed without resorting to evidence outside the trial record; and (2) all of Appellant's claims were either barred by res judicata or failed to set forth a substantive claim for relief. View "State v. Blanton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion to allow withdrawal of his guilty plea and dismiss the underlying matter on double jeopardy grounds, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss and the criminal endangerment and criminal mischief charges in Jefferson County.Jefferson County charged Defendant with criminal endangerment, fleeing from or eluding a peace officer, and criminal mischief. The next month, Gallatin County charged with him criminal endangerment and fleeing from or eluding a peace officer. Defendant pled guilty to both charges. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the Jefferson County charges, arguing that they violated constitutional double jeopardy protections. The district court allowed the motion as to the fleeing from or eluding a peace officer charge and otherwise denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as to the criminal endangerment and criminal mischief charges. View "State v. Dunne" on Justia Law

After completing a minimum sentence, Pennsylvania inmates are eligible to serve the rest of their sentence on parole. The decision to grant parole is discretionary. Most parolees first rely on halfway houses. Public houses have only 700 spaces, and private contract facilities have 2,100 spaces statewide but each year, about 9,000 Pennsylvania inmates are released on parole. The State Police must notify each resident, school district, day-care center, and college about nearby registered violent sex offenders, making it difficult to place sex offenders into community halfway houses because of community backlash. Sex offenders also tend to linger in halfway houses longer than other parolees because of the difficulties in finding alternate housing. The Department of Corrections considers 13 factors before placing a parolee in a halfway house, including community sensitivity to a criminal offense or specific criminal incident.In a class action challenge, the district court held that paroled sex offenders are similarly situated to other paroled offenders and that there could be no rational basis to delay their placement into halfway houses because of “community sensitivity.” The Third Circuit reversed. A discretionary grant of parole cannot erase the differences between sex crimes and other crimes. DOC’s halfway house policy considering “community sensitivity,” among many other factors, is rationally related to legitimate government interests. View "Stradford v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law