Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendant both work for the State of Iowa. Plaintiff is a urologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics; Defendant is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. After Defendant criticized Plaintiff’s expert testimony in a case unrelated to this one, Plaintiff sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on multiple grounds, including that Plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that Linder’s conduct was under color of state law.  Plaintiff argues that his complaint contains ample facts that together plausibly allege that Defendant acted under color of state law. These include that Defendant (1) identified himself as a state employee when he criticized Plaintiff in the newspaper articles, (2) relied on “the prestige of his official position with [UI] to gain credibility with his audience,” and (3) “used the instrumentalities and resources of the State of Iowa to facilitate his retaliatory conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to plead adequately that Defendant’s retaliatory actions were under color of state law. Contrary to Plaintiff’s insistence, our case law is clear that a state employee, merely by publicly identifying himself as such, does not act under color of state law. Further, even assuming that a public university professor acts in his official capacity or within the scope of his employment when he comments on public affairs, it would not necessarily follow that he acts under color of state law. View "James Brown v. Marc Linder" on Justia Law

Defendant, the School Board of St. Johns County (the “School Board”), is responsible for providing “proper attention to health, safety, and other matters relating to the welfare of students” within the St. Johns County School District (the “School District”). Plaintiff, is a transgender boy. The case involves the practice of separating school bathrooms based on biological sex. This appeal required the court to determine whether separating the use of male and female bathrooms in public schools based on a student’s biological sex violates (1) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sections 1, and (2) Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. The district court enjoined the School Board from prohibiting Plaintiff’s use of the male bathrooms and granted Plaintiff $1,000 in compensatory damages.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s order. The court explained that commensurate with the plain and ordinary meaning of “sex” in 1972, Title IX allows schools to provide separate bathrooms on the basis of biological sex. That is exactly what the School Board has done in this case; it has provided separate bathrooms for each of the biological sexes. And to accommodate transgender students, the School Board has provided single-stall, sex-neutral bathrooms, which Title IX neither requires nor prohibits. Nothing about this bathroom policy violates Title IX. Further, the court wrote that whether Title IX should be amended to equate “gender identity” and “transgender status” with “sex” should be left to Congress—not the courts. View "Drew Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida" on Justia Law

O’Connor is the parent of John. When John was 14 years old, O’Connor allegedly “supplied excessive amounts of alcohol to her son and his minor friends to the point where minors would vomit, be unable to stand, and fall unconscious. When these minors were extremely intoxicated from the alcohol, she encouraged them to engage in sexual activity with each other, facilitated sexual encounters, and watched some of these sexual encounters.” O’Connor also helped the minors leave their homes at night without their parents’ knowledge, communicating with them via Snapchat or text message and picking them up down the street from their homes.O’Connor is currently held in pretrial custody on charges of 39 offenses involving 15 minor victims. The trial court denied release on bail due to the seriousness of the charged offenses, which include 12 counts of felony child endangerment (Penal Code 273a(a)), along with evidence showing that less restrictive conditions of release on bail would not protect the public or the minor victims. O’Connor filed a habeas petition, contending that she was entitled to bail as a matter of law. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal again denied the petition, concluding that O’Connor was charged with qualifying felony offenses involving an act of violence on another person within the meaning of California Constitution, article I, section 12(b). View "In re O'Connor" on Justia Law

A police officer (Officer) in Los Angeles, shot and killed a man during a failed arrest in the men’s locker room of a gym. Before the district court, the Officer maintained that he killed the man because the man was pummeling the Officer’s partner, and the Officer feared the man’s next blow would kill her. The Officer also claimed that he yelled “stop” before shooting, but no such warning can be heard on the officers’ body-cam recordings. The man’s mother sued the Officer for his allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. The district court denied the Officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and the Officer timely appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying, on summary judgment, qualified immunity to the Officer. The court held that the district court properly denied the Officer’s request for qualified immunity for two reasons. First, the district court recognized that a reasonable jury could reject the police officer’s account of the shooting because there were significant discrepancies between their versions of events and other evidence in the record. Second, the court wrote that it has long held that the Fourth Amendment requires officers to warn before using deadly force when practicable. The defense cannot argue that it was not possible for the Officer to give the man a deadly force warning because the Officer’s sworn statements show that he had time to tell Dorsey to “stop.” Therefore, the district court correctly ruled that a jury could decide that the Officer’s use of deadly force violated clearly established law. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate questions of search-and-seizure rights under the Nevada Constitution but that a qualified immunity defense does not apply to such an action.Appellant filed a civil rights action in federal district court against Respondents, the warden and then-director of the Nevada Department of Corrections, asserting that her federal and state constitutional rights were violated when she went to High Desert State Prison to visit an inmate and was strip searched and interrogated and refused visitation. The district court denied summary judgment on the state law claims. Upon reconsideration, the district court reconsidered its order and certified four questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Court elected to reframe and answer some of the certified questions, holding (1) Nev. Const. art. I, 18 contains an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief; and (2) qualified immunity is not a defense to an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief under Nev. Const. art. I, 18. View "Mack v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.393(3)(c) violates due process, holding that the statute does not infringe on the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in the care and custody of his or her child and thus does not violate due process.Section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves a child welfare services agency from its duty to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her parent if a court finds that the parents' parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to the child's sibling. A court master recommended that the district court find section 432B.393(3)(c) unconstitutional because, for purposes of terminating the parent-child relationship, it could lead to a presumption that the parent is unfit without any consideration of present circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) insofar as section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves an agency of making reunification efforts it does not infringe on a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her child and therefore does not violate due process; and (2) although the district court erred, the petition must be denied as moot. View "Washoe County Human Services v. District Court" on Justia Law

Braun suffered a seizure and crashed into a telephone pole while driving. Palatine Officer Licari and other officers responded. Braun could not remember what happened. Licari suspected that Braun was intoxicated. The crash occurred late at night. Braun had slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and difficulty balancing; he stated that he lived in “Chicago-Miami” and that he had consumed a beer earlier. After observing Braun struggle with field sobriety tests, Licari arrested him. Though an ambulance had been dispatched to the scene, Braun said he was fine and declined medical assistance. At the police station, Licari administered a Breathalyzer test. Braun passed but, based on other indicators of intoxication, Licari took him to a hospital to collect blood and urine samples for more sensitive testing. When the booking process was completed, Braun was released. He suffered another seizure while at the station.Braun sued Licari and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest and failure to provide medical care. The district judge dismissed a “Monell” claim about widespread police misconduct and later entered granted the defendants summary judgment on the other claims. The court found that Licari had probable cause to arrest Braun for DUI; Licari's failure to provide medical care was not objectively unreasonable. The medical-care claim against the village failed for lack of evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Licari neither knew nor had reason to know of Braun’s initial seizure or other medical needs. View "Braun v. Village of Palatine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer's act of shining a spotlight for illumination does not ipso facto constitute a detention under the Fourth Amendment, but rather, the proper inquiry requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the use of the spotlight.Defendant was charged with drug offenses after a law enforcement officer conducted a search of the car he was driving. At issue was whether the officer engaged in a consensual encounter when he pulled behind Defendant's car and turned on his spotlight. The court of appeal concluded that spotlight illumination and approach on foot did not "manifest a sufficient show of police authority to constitute a detention." The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not detained by the officer's use of a spotlight; and (2) remand was appropriate for a new factual finding as to whether the officer's detention of the vehicle's female passenger effectuated a detention of Defendant. View "People v. Tacardon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-time teacher in the Evergreen School District #114 (District) in Vancouver, Washington. Before the 2019–2020 school year began, he attended two days of teacher training and brought with him a MAGA hat. The question, in this case, is whether the First Amendment was violated when a principal told Plaintiff he could not bring his Make America Great Again (MAGA) hat with him to teacher-only trainings on threat of disciplinary action and when the school board affirmed the denial of the teacher’s harassment complaint filed against the principal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The panel first concluded that Plaintiff was engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment because the undisputed facts demonstrated that his MAGA hat conveyed a message of public concern, and he was acting as a private citizen in expressing that message. The record failed to establish, however, that the school district’s Chief Human Resource Officer, took any adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and for this reason, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against that defendant failed as a matter of law.   Further, any violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by the principal was clearly established where longstanding precedent held that concern over the reaction to controversial or disfavored speech itself does not justify restricting such speech. For these reasons, the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the principal. View "ERIC DODGE V. EVERGREEN SCHOOL DISTRICT #114, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that In re T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 2018) applies only to juvenile sex offenders whose cases are prosecuted and resolved in juvenile court and declined Defendant's invitation to apply its holding to a juvenile offender who is prosecuted and convicted in district court.At age seventeen, Defendant confessed to sexually abusing three children. Defendant was convicted on four class B felony counts and, at age twenty, was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The court suspended the prison sentences, placed Defendant on probation, and imposed the special sentence of lifetime parole applicable to class B felonies under Iowa Code section 903B.1. The court further required Defendant to register as a sex offender under Iowa Code 692A.103(1). Defendant appealed, arguing that it is unconstitutional under In re T.H. to require a juvenile to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) In re T.H. does not apply to juvenile sex offenders prosecuted in district court; (2) registration under chapter 692A is not part of the "sentence" that can be suspended under section 901.5(13); and (3) Iowa Code 901.5(13) allowsed the district court to suspend Defendant's Iowa Code 903B.1 special sentence in whole or in part. View "State v. Hess" on Justia Law