Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought to build housing on their properties in an area that under the the City of Half Moon Bay’s (City) Land Use Plan (LUP) was designated for public recreation and which severely restricted housing development. Plaintiffs took the position that California Senate Bill 330 (SB 330), enacted in 2019 to increase the stock of affordable housing in the state, required the City to approve their proposed development plan. After rejecting Plaintiffs’ proposal, the City informed plaintiffs that it intended to acquire their properties through eminent domain and made a purchase offer based on the properties’ appraised values. Plaintiffs rejected the offer and filed this action in district court claiming, among other things, that the City effected a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by rejecting their building proposal and enforcing LUP’s restrictions on their property.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the City’s motion to abstain pending resolution of an eminent domain action in state court. The panel held that as an initial matter, neither Knick nor Pakdel, which address when a claim accrues for purposes of judicial review, explicitly limit abstention in takings litigation. Abstention allows courts to stay claims that have already accrued. The panel held that the requirements for Pullman abstention were met in this case. First, the complaint touched a sensitive area of social policy, land use planning. Second, a ruling in the state eminent domain action would likely narrow the federal litigation. View "THOMAS GEARING, ET AL V. CITY OF HALF MOON BAY" on Justia Law

In 2007, Jones was convicted of possessing a methamphetamine mixture with intent to distribute it. Because Jones had twice served time, in California and Nevada, for similar narcotics offenses the court sentenced Jones to 360 months in prison, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). In 2016, Jones filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. In 2021, Jones obtained dismissal of his prior California conviction and filed another section 2255 motion, arguing that dismissal of the California conviction triggered resentencing under the Supreme Court’s 2005 “Johnson” decision.Believing the motion second or successive, the district court transferred it to the Sixth Circuit. That court returned the case to the district court, concluding that the motion is neither second nor successive. When “the events giving rise” to a section 2255 claim have not yet occurred at the time of a prisoner’s first 2255 motion, a later motion predicated on those events is not “second or successive.” The events giving rise” to Jones’s Johnson claim occurred in 2021 when California dismissed and vacated Jones’s prior California conviction. View "In re: Ronald Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief.In 2016, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder, gross abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the aggravated murder. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence about neonaticide, as it is currently understood, as a mitigating factor. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's decision denying Appellant's postconviction petition was unreasonable and arbitrary and not based on competent and credible evidence. View "State v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding that decision of the trial court to deny Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered after a traffic stop, holding that there was no error.After executing the traffic stop at issue, a law enforcement officer ordered Defendant to step out of the car and opened the door for him to do so. Another officer later looked through the open door and spotted a marijuana cigarette on the floor. A subsequent search of the car led to the discovery of a pistol. Defendant pleaded no contest to firearm-related charges. On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by ordering Defendant to exit the car; (2) opening the door was not a search; (3) the second officer did not conduct a search; and (4) under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the discovery of the marijuana cigarette in plain view allowed the officers to search the car. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of, among other charges, seventeen counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under the age of twelve, holding that a search of Defendant's smartphone did not violate Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to reach its argument that the warrant supporting the search of his cellphone was overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) Defendant's remaining arguments on appeal were without merit. View "Maine v. Jandreaud" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing rape charges against Defendant due to prejudicial preindictment delay, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. In 2017, Defendant was indicted on a multiple-count indictment alleging that Defendant had raped the complaining witness in 2005. The trial court dismissed the charges. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant had demonstrated actual prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed reversed after clarifying that, in determining whether unconstitutional preindictment delay has occurred in a rape case in which consent is at issue, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has shown actual prejudice, holding that Defendant failed to show actual prejudice under the standard set forth in State v. Jones, 69 N.E.3d 688 (Ohio 2016). View "State v. Bourn" on Justia Law

YouTube, a video-sharing website, places “advertising restrictions” on certain videos to prevent the user who posted the video from realizing advertising revenues. Network administrators and individual subscribers can also elect to limit user access to YouTube videos using “Restricted Mode.” YouTube considers whether the content involves drugs, alcohol, sex, violence, tragedies, inappropriate language, and whether the content is "gratuitously incendiary, inflammatory, or demeaning towards an individual or group.” YouTube uses an “automated filtering algorithm.” Users whose videos have been restricted or demonetized may request human review. Prager has posted more than 250 YouTube videos and has been prohibited from monetizing over 50 of its videos. In some cases, other users have posted videos identical to Prager’s restricted videos; the copycat videos have not been restricted. Prager claims the restrictions are based on its political identity or viewpoints.After a district court dismissed its federal lawsuit, Prager sued in state court. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, for interactive computer service providers acting as “publishers or speakers” of content provided by others. The challenged conduct is the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, The court rejected arguments that the defendants are themselves information content providers, that their terms of service and public pronouncements subjected them to liability notwithstanding the Act, and that the Act, in immunizing defendants from Prager’s state law claims, is unconstitutional. View "Prager University v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Kirkland, a Maryville patrol officer, used her Facebook account to criticize the county sheriff. She belittled his public speaking abilities and referred to his supporters as “brainwashed minions.” Kirkland had previously worked as a Sheriff’s Office corrections officer. Kirkland had previous disciplinary issues. Kirkland’s supervisors became concerned that her posts would undermine the Department’s relationship with the Sheriff’s Office and asked her to stop. They also reprimanded her for other behavioral issues. Following Kirkland’s Facebook post claiming the sheriff had excluded her from a training event because she was female and opposed his reelection, Maryville fired Kirkland.Kirkland sued, citing First Amendment retaliation, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor. Although the statements were made in Kirkland’s capacity as a private citizen and Maryville did not show Kirkland made the post with knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, its falsity, the balance of interests favored the city. The court noted the heightened need for order, loyalty, and efficiency in law enforcement. The city has “legitimate and powerful interests” as a law enforcement agency in preserving its working relationship with the Sheriff’s Office that outweigh Kirkland’s speech rights. View "Kirkland v. City of Maryville" on Justia Law

In 2004, Enriquez-Perdomo a nine-year-old Honduran national, was ordered removed. INS signed a warrant of removal/deportation but never removed her. The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), program applied to persons who immigrated to the U.S. when they were under the age of 16 and were under age 31 in 2012 and meet other specific requirements. In 2013, USCIS approved Enriquez-Perdomo for DACA. She renewed her DACA status through January 2019. In 2017, Enriquez-Perdomo went to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for ICE detainees. Enriquez-Perdomo alleges that ICE officers (Defendants) confirmed that she had received DACA, but nevertheless arrested her without a warrant, motivated by her ethnicity and by her assistance of detainees. She claims that Defendants transported her between facilities and deprived her of sleep and food during her eight days in custody. Enriquez-Perdomo sued Defendants in their individual capacities, seeking money damages under “Bivens.”The district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g). The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. Notwithstanding her removal order, Enriquez-Perdomo was eligible for DACA relief and was granted affirmative relief from removal. Although the government could terminate that relief, it did not. Enriquez-Perdomo’s arrest and detention were unauthorized so 1252(g) does not preclude her claims; her removal order was not executable. There is no Bivens remedy for First Amendment retaliation claims; the court remanded Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal upholding the trial court's finding that trial may continue in Defendant's absence under Cal. Penal Code 1043(b)(2) because the absence was voluntary, holding that the trial court did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights by finding him to be voluntarily absent without conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of his absence.On appeal, the court of appeal concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Defendant voluntarily absented himself from trial and that the court's decision to proceed with trial rather than grant defense counsel's motion for a one-day continuance constituted harmless error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding of voluntary absence under the circumstances of this case. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law