Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder and two counts of attempted murder, holding that the jury permissibly resolved the issues of fact raised on appeal against Defendant.On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence did not support his convictions because the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to identify Defendant as the shooter; (2) the doubts Defendant raised about the evidence presented factual disputes that the jury was entitled to resolve; and (3) the jury could reasonably have resolved an inconsistency in the evidence in the State's favor. View "Young v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder after denying his motion to suppress, holding that the district court erred in determining when Defendant's interrogation became custodial, and that error required reversal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in ruling that Defendant was not in custody during his police station interview until he was directed to remain in an interview room; (2) it was not harmless error to admit incriminating statements Defendant made after his interrogation became custodial; and (3) the record supported the district court's conclusion that Defendant's confession was voluntary. View "Mills v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate term holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of harassment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to the victim that her children "were going to get a bullet in their heads" and that he was going to firebomb her home and kill her and her family were serious and unequivocal threats of physical harm. The appellate term concluded that Defendant's speech did not constitute a violation of the second-degree harassment statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Defendant threatened the victim with physical contact of a serious nature, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm her. View "People v. Lagano" on Justia Law

Bergman crossed the center line, drove into an oncoming truck, and killed its two occupants. Scientists testified that she had prescription drugs (oxycodone, a muscle relaxer, and Adderal) in her system, along with alcohol, at the time of this crash (and at the time of several prior accidents). The state’s expert opined that these drugs impaired her driving. The state relied on her prior incidents to prove that she knew the risks of getting behind the wheel after taking prescription drugs. Bergman claimed that she should have been provided an expert toxicologist at her trial for driving on a suspended license, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and second-degree murder. In its 1985 “Ake” decision, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide psychiatric experts to indigent defendants who have a credible insanity defense.A Michigan court held that Ake did not require the state to provide Bergman with a defense toxicologist because she failed to show a sufficient need for one notwithstanding the state’s expert evidence. The Sixth Circuit rejected Bergman’s federal habeas petition as not meeting the stringent standards for relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), given the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity over Ake’s scope. View "Bergman v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the juvenile court finding true that Minor had committed one count of violating Cal. Penal Code 288.5 and order probation, thus rejecting Minor's claims that a community service provision of the disposition violated separation of powers principles and infringed his due process rights, holding that there was no error.In affirming, the appellate court acknowledged that a juvenile court may not delegate to a probation officer the authority to determine that a minor is in violation of probation but held that, in this case, the juvenile court's order permitting the probation officer to offer Minor the option of community service for an alleged violation did not permit the probation department to decide if and when a violation of probation had occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court order authorizing the probation officer to offer Minor on probation the option of performing community service, in an amount chosen by the probation officer up to a maximum set by the court, in the event Minor was alleged to have violated a term of probation, did not violate due process or separation of powers principles. View "In re D.N." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate, a Native American tribe—asked the Dysart School District (“District”) to accommodate her religious practice by allowing her to wear an eagle feather on her cap during high-school graduation. The District declined the request on the ground that the policy permitted no exceptions. Plaintiff arrived at graduation wearing an eagle feather, and District officials prohibited her from attending. But that same day, as alleged in the complaint, the District permitted other students to wear secular messages on their graduation caps.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, asserting, among other things, that the District violated her rights to free exercise of religion and free speech by selectively enforcing its policy of prohibiting students from decorating their graduation caps.   The panel held that Plaintiff plausibly alleged, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that the District selectively enforced its policy, in violation of her First Amendment rights. As to the claim brought pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to assert that the District enforced its policy to permit the secular and forbid the religious. As alleged, the District’s policy was not enforced evenhandedly and, therefore, was not generally applicable.   Plaintiff also carried her burden at this stage to show that the District’s selective enforcement of its policy constituted impermissible viewpoint or content discrimination, in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The panel rejected the District’s argument that the restrictions were necessary in order for the District to comply with the Establishment Clause. View "LARISSA WALN, ET AL V. DYSART SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellants J.K. and Mr. Electric (jointly “Mr. Electric”) challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in favor of Defendants-Appellees, and the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (together “the Department”). Two Mr. Electric employees provided the Department with copious amounts of Mr. Electric’s data, particularly printouts of cell site location information that provided GPS coordinates for company vehicles which showed all movement of electricians in the field. The Department used the data to write citations and assess administrative fines against Mr. Electric for violations of Washington’s electrical code stemming from improper supervision of journeymen electricians in Clark County.   Appellants argued that Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), and Wilson v. United States, 13 F.4th 961 (9th Cir. 2021), foreclosed the Department’s use of Appellants’ location information because, when read together, the cases extinguished the applicability of the private search exception to the Fourth Amendment to location information.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Appellees. The panel noted that although Carpenter held that the third-party doctrine does not apply as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when the government seeks cell site location information, the private search exception is an altogether separate exception to the Fourth Amendment. View "JAMES KLEISER, ET AL V. BENJAMIN CHAVEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court to deny Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the police officer in this case did not have particularized reasonable suspicion that a crime or traffic violation took place before performing the traffic stop at issue.Officer Alexis Meier was told to be on the lookout for a Harley-Davidson motorcycle driving erratically and speeding. Officer Meier spotted a motorcycle that showed to be a Harley-Davidson registered to Defendant. Without seeing any erratic driving, speeding, or other traffic violations, Officer Meier performed a traffic stop. Officer Meier subsequently developed evidence supporting an arrest for Defendant's eighth operating while intoxicated offense. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Meier lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the stop. View "State v. Richey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued various officials of the State of Arkansas, alleging that these officials (collectively, “ADHS defendants”) violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the ADHS Defendants argued that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by individuals brought against a state or its agencies or departments, regardless of the relief sought.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ ARChoices benefits must be reassessed each year and, according to Plaintiffs’ allegations, “ADHS has no plans to switch to a different assessment tool, allocation methodology, or notice of action than those now used.” The very harm alleged remains likely to recur barring a change in the state’s operation of the program or judicial intervention. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that sovereign immunity does not bar this suit.   Further, the court concluded that beneficiaries have a clearly established right to be provided adequate notice of reduction, loss, or termination of benefits. No fundamental difference exists between this case and Jacobs: in both cases, beneficiaries suffered a loss of benefits under ARChoices. Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that ADHS violated their right to notice. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs have also alleged involvement by each ADHS defendant in creating, applying, or interpreting this policy. Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged facts to survive a dismissal motion raising the defense. View "Ginger Elder v. Cindy Gillespie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the State, the Iowa Department of Corrections, and the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections (collectively, Defendants) and against Plaintiff on his claims of employment discrimination, holding that Plaintiff's constitutional claims failed.Plaintiff sued Defendants under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. On the morning of trial, Plaintiff objected to the composition of the jury venire, arguing that the jury venire did not represent a fair cross section of the community. The district court denied the challenge, ruling that the fair-cross-section requirement does not apply to civil jury trials. Thereafter, the jury found that Plaintiff failed to prove any of his claims. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Fifth and Seventh Amendments of the United States Constitution require that civil juries be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's federal claims failed. View "Savala v. State" on Justia Law