Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Dorsey, an Illinois state prisoner, was emptying a bucket in the prison laundry when he felt a pop in his lower back and felt pain shoot down his leg. He asked to see a nurse and was told to “go lay down.” Dorsey took ibuprofen and lay down for two hours, but his pain worsened. He again, unsuccessfully, requested permission to seek medical care. The next morning, Dorsey could barely move. Six days later, a nurse concluded that he was exaggerating his symptoms. Dorsey alleges that instead of being treated for back pain, he was prescribed psychiatric medications without his knowledge or consent and was disciplined for refusing to take those medications.Dorsey sued. The district court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and determined that Dorsey had improperly joined unrelated claims. His complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against 12 defendants. Two claims alleged Eighth Amendment violations based on the poorly maintained washing machines and deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, his back injury. The third alleged a due process violation, that Dorsey was prescribed medications without his consent. After deeming three amended complaints unsatisfactory, the district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Dorsey’s claims met both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), so joinder was legally permissible and the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected his other claims. View "Dorsey v. Varga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s estate sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (“Department”) and several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Virginia law, alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment and state law by failing to provide Plaintiff treatment for his chronic hepatitis C until it was too late.   Defendants in this appeal are Dr. A and Dr. W. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. A designed treatment guidelines for inmates with hepatitis C that unconstitutionally excluded Plaintiff from receiving treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. W failed to follow those guidelines and committed both medical malpractice and Eighth Amendment violations in denying him appropriate treatment. Defendants unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, alleging that they were protected by qualified immunity and, on Dr. W’s part, derivative sovereign immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity to Dr. W and denial of qualified immunity to Dr. A but affirm its denial of qualified immunity to Dr. W. The court declined to hold that Dr. A was clearly on notice that he should have ordered the Department’s primary care providers to prescribe this novel treatment rather than referring patients to specialists for treatment.  Further, the court explained a prisoner’s purported right not to be subjected to a treatment regimen that prioritized antiviral treatment to prisoners with the most advanced levels of fibrosis was not clearly established when Dr. A designed the Guidelines in 2015. Moreover, three of the four factors strongly weigh in favor of sovereign immunity, and one only moderately weighs against it. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred by rejecting Dr. W’s sovereign-immunity defense. View "Jacob Pfaller v. Mark Amonette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) inmate, is a validated member of a Security Threat Group (STG) and, pursuant to ADC’s policy, has been assigned to maximum custody confinement. Plaintiff first argued that ADC’s annual reviews of his maximum-security confinement are insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Defendant claimed that his removal from ADC’s Step-Down Program (SDP) violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court screened his complaint, dismissing his claim regarding ADC’s annual reviews for failure to state a claim. The district court later granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims regarding his removal from the SDP. Plaintiff appealed, challenging both orders.   The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s claim ADC’s annual reviews of his maximum-security confinement were insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) reversed the district court’s summary judgment for defendants and remanded on Defendant’s claims that his removal from the Department’s Step-Down Program.   The panel held that Plaintiff has a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to maximum custody as a consequence of his STG validation. Nevertheless, Plaintiff failed to state a claim for a due process violation under the three-prong framework set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. However, because Plaintiff was not given a meaningful opportunity to learn of the factual basis for his transfer from close custody to maximum custody or to prepare a defense to the accusations, Plaintiff was likely denied due process in the procedures that resulted in his return to maximum custody. View "RICHARD JOHNSON V. CHARLES RYAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of open container and driving under the influence (DUI) and imposing a suspended imposition of sentence, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Based on information obtained during a 911 call made by Defendant's daughter reporting that Defendant may be drinking and driving and providing Defendant's location officers conducted a traffic stop of Defendant's van and then arrested her for DUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was an unconstitutional search and seizure. The circuit court denied the motion and found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court properly concluded that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the stop. View "State v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Police Lieutenant deployed pepper spray into Plaintiff’s face, during a protest in St. Louis, Missouri. Plaintiff sued the police lieutenant and the City of St. Louis, alleging, federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for retaliatory use of force in violation of the First Amendment, as well as tort claims under Missouri law. The district court denied the lieutenant’s motion for summary judgment based on his defenses of qualified and official immunity and reserved ruling on whether the City is entitled to sovereign immunity on the state tort claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to the lieutenant, vacated, in part, the denial of summary judgment to the City, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court explained that the lieutenant contended that at the time he pepper-sprayed Plaintiff, it was “not clearly established that a use of force that does not violate the Fourth Amendment violates the First Amendment.” The lieutenant forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district court. In any event, the argument does not undermine the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s right to be free from a retaliatory use of force was clearly established at the time of the incident.  However, the court vacated the denial of summary judgment on the state tort claims and instruct the district court on remand to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue. View "Alison Dreith v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Wallace and Santos, inmates at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Menard’s “double-ceiling” policy of housing two inmates in single-person cells violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Where a plaintiff is able to point to some evidence that administrative remedies were not “available” to him under the PLRA, as described by the Supreme Court in its 2016 Ross v. Blake decision, the district court must decide whether remedies were “available” before granting summary judgment on exhaustion. The plaintiffs claimed to have submitted grievances, offered some evidence that other inmates complained of the same issue with no response, and cited a mechanism by which prison officials can allegedly use state law to reject their grievances without any consideration of their merits. The court remanded for consideration of the exhaustion question as it applies to double-celling at Menard. If the district court finds that double-celling remedies were “available,” then the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies. The court affirmed a factual determination that Santos did not file a grievance regarding Menard’s double-celling policy. View "Wallace v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

After the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, Twitter banned President Donald Trump for life. Soon after Twitter announced the ban, the Texas Office of the Attorney General (OAG) served Twitter with a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) asking it to produce various documents relating to its content moderation decisions. Twitter sued Paxton, in his official capacity, in the Northern District of California, arguing that the CID was government retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. Twitter asked the district court to enjoin Paxton from enforcing the CID and from continuing his investigation and to declare the investigation unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the case as not ripe.   The Ninth Circuit amended its opinion filed on March 2, 2022; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court. The panel held that Twitter is not really making a pre-enforcement challenge to a speech regulation; Twitter does not allege that its speech is being chilled by a statute of general and prospective applicability that may be enforced against it. The panel, therefore, concluded that a retaliatory framework rather than a pre-enforcement challenge inquiry was appropriate to evaluate Twitter’s standing. The panel held that Twitter’s allegations were not enough to establish constitutional standing and ripeness because Twitter failed to allege any chilling effect on its speech or any other legally cognizable injury that the requested injunction would redress. Finally, Twitter had not suffered any Article III injury because the CID is not self-enforcing. Preenforcement, Twitter never faced any penalties for its refusal to comply with the CID. View "TWITTER, INC. V. KEN PAXTON" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting and sentencing Defendant for robbery, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel during his criminal trial. Defendant also argued, for the first time, that the district court compromised his right to a unanimous jury verdict by not giving a specific unanimity instruction requiring the jury to agree that either or both victims were in fear of immediate bodily injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel; and (2) this Court declines to exercise plain error review to address Defendant's second argument on appeal. View "State v. Winzenburg" on Justia Law

Warren, Ohio, police officers responded to a call about an unknown disturbance at a gas station in the early morning hours. They found Jones playing loud music from his SUV in the parking lot. Jones turned off the music. While the officers drove around the building to investigate, Jones drove away. Officers followed Jones, pulled him over, and told him that they had stopped him for a noise ordinance violation. The officers then smelled marijuana and searched the car, finding hidden compartments containing two firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Jones was convicted on four gun-and-drug-related counts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stop of Jones’s car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits officers to warrantlessly arrest—to seize—a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. The search of Jones’s SUV revealed loaded firearms in close proximity to drugs, plastic baggies, and a digital scale; sufficient evidence supports the conviction for possessing the firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The court rejected an argument that nine comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly established Defendant Utah Highway Patrolman Blaine Robbins violated Heather Leyva’s Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights by pulling her over without reasonable suspicion to do so and by sending her flirtatious texts about the administration of a commercial towing relationship between her employer and the Utah Highway Patrol. Leyva served as the liaison between the Utah Highway Patrol (“UHP”) and West Coast Towing (“WCT”)—one of three towing companies in the Heavy Duty Towing Rotation (“HDTR”). Over time their professional relationship developed into a personal one. Defendant texted Leyva one night asking about work-related matters. In response to one question, Leyva told Defendant to “standby” because she was on the freeway. Defendant asked where and said he would pull her over. Defendant spotted her, turned on his lights, and initiated an apparent traffic stop. Leyva pulled over, not knowing Defendant was the driver of the patrol car, and got her identification ready. Defendant claimed he pulled Leyva over as “a joke between friends.” A month later, Leyva reported to her boss she felt Defendant was sexually harassing her. Her boss contacted UHP to report Leyva’s complaints of sexual harassment. As a result, UHP conducted an investigation. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the investigation found Defendant did not improperly administer the HDTR but concluded his conduct revealed his desire to further his personal relationship with Leyva. It also determined that Defendant lacked reasonable suspicion when he stopped Leyva. The district court found that Defendant did not violate clearly established law. Defendant did not dispute for purposes of this appeal that he violated Leyva’s constitutional rights. He argued only that the district court correctly determined the law was not clearly established for either alleged violation. Plaintiff alleged, and the district court found, that a jury could find Defendant violated Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims insofar as they related to Defendant’s traffic stop of Leyva. But the Court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights arising in connection with the administration of HDTR, were not clearly established at the time of the violation. View "Shepherd v. Robbins" on Justia Law