Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this case considering whether unprovoked flight in a high-crime area should no longer be considered a factor that gives rise to rebate articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, the Court of Appeals held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's rights under either the Fourth Amendment or Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights were not violated.Defendant, who was standing in an high-crime area in Baltimore City, fled when he saw an unmarked vehicle. Ultimately, detectives stopped Defendant and found a gun in his waistband. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him based solely on his unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that, under under the totality of the circumstances analysis, a court may consider whether unprovoked flight is an indication of criminal activity that, together with evidence of a high-crime area and any other relevant factors, establishes reasonable suspicion for a stop, or whether unprovoked flight, under the circumstances of the case, is a factor consistent with innocence that adds little or nothing to the reasonable suspicion analysis. View "Washington v. State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants - several public school officials, the Town of Chelmsford, and the local school committee - and dismissing the First Amendment retaliation and state law claims brought by Plaintiff - a public school teacher and former president of her local teachers' union - holding that there was no error.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated her First Amendments rights and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H by retaliating against her in reaction to her union advocacy efforts while she was president of the Chelmsford Federation of Teachers, a local chapter of the American Federation of Teachers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the district court's summary judgment ruling or two other rulings from the pleading and discovery stages of this case. View "Salmon v. Lang" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cornelius Emily and Earnest Rhoney, Department of Corrections officers, and dismiss Plaintiff's claims of cruel and unusual punishment, holding that Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim survived summary judgment.Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the Stillwater correctional facility, suffered serious injury in both of his wrists when Officers Emily and Rhoney improperly applied overtightened handcuffs on Plaintiff for three and one-half hours. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the officers did not act maliciously or sadistically. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the conduct of the officers should be assessed under the deliberate indifference standard applicable to conditions of confinement and medical care; and (2) qualified immunity did not bar Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim. View "Welters v. Minn. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding that Senate Bill 824 (S.B. 824), the statute enacted to require that every voter present one of a few specific forms of photo identification, was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, holding that the trial court's findings of fact were supported by competent evidence showing that the statute was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.In challenging S.B. 824, Plaintiffs alleged that the law was enacted at least in part with the intent to discriminate against African-American voters. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's finding that S.B. 824 was motivated by racial discrimination was supported by competent evidence in the record; and (2) the trial court correctly applied the factors set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) when it found that the law was enacted at least in part with racially discriminatory intent. View "Holmes v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court determining that Defendant's behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant the forfeiture of her right to counsel, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial.Defendant was charged with attempting to possess a firearm while subject to an ex parte Domestic Violence Protection Order prohibiting the same. After a trial, at which Defendant proceeded pro se, the jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that Defendant waived her right to counsel or alternatively forfeited her right to counsel. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the issue of waiver was inapposite because Defendant expressly requested the appointment of counsel; and (2) the trial court erred in its alternate determination that Defendant's behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant the forfeiture of the right to counsel. View "State v. Atwell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the complaint in this case involving the removal of a Confederate monument with prejudice, holding that dismissal should have been without prejudice.After the City of Winston Salem decided to remove a Confederate monument from the grounds of the former Forsyth County Courthouse Plaintiff, the United Daughters of the Confederacy, North Carolina Division, Inc., filed a complaint against the City and County seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from taking affirmative action to remove or relocate the monument prior to full adjudication of the respective rights of the parties. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiff failed establish standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by dismissing the amended complaint for lack of standing; but (2) erred by dismissing the complaint with, rather than without, prejudice. View "United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Division v. City of Winston-Salem" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to suppress two statements to Warwick police detectives in the course of their investigation, holding that the superior court abused its discretion.The trial justice suppress statements based on its findings that Defendant was in custody when he voluntarily accompanied the police detectives in an unmarked vehicle to search for evidence, that Defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and that Defendant's video-recorded statement was inadmissible in accordance with Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order, holding (1) one of the statements at issue was admissible in evidence; and (2) remand was required for limited factual determination by the trial justice as to whether the other statement was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. View "State v. Morillo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Ohio Rev. Code 2152.84(A)(2)(b) was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R., the juvenile in this case, and thus violated his right to procedural due process, holding that the court of appeals did not err.D.R. was adjudicated delinquent for sexually assaulting his friend when he was sixteen years old. The juvenile court suspended D.R.'s commitment and placed him on probation with conditions. The court classified D.R. as a Tier I offender and notified him that he had a duty to register as a sex offender. At the end of D.R.'s disposition, the magistrate terminated D.R.'s probation but continued his Tier I classification on the grounds that it lacked the statutory authority the terminate the classification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R. and violated due process. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded this matter for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in proceeding to a trial without a jury on Plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and unjust enrichment.Plaintiff's brought this complaint against Defendants for, among other causes of action, forcible entry and detainer. The district court granted relief on the forcible entry and detainer claim, ordering restitution. After a bench trial, the district court heard the remaining causes of action and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff's remaining causes of action were legal in nature, and the issues of fact that arose thereunder entitled Defendants to a jury trial unless waived; and (2) there was no waiver of Defendants' right to a jury trial. View "132 Ventures, LLC v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC" on Justia Law

Five days after Carter was booked into the Macon County Jail, he died of diabetic ketoacidosis. In the hours preceding his death, Carter exhibited symptoms commonly associated with diabetic ketoacidosis: confusion, lethargy, and labored breathing. He was denied timely medical care because the jail nurse thought he was faking his condition. She assured the corrections officers tasked with transferring Carter out of the medical unit that his vitals were within a normal range. Relying on the nurse’s medical judgment, the officers declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate Carter, believing that his failure to follow orders stemmed from deliberate refusal, not medically induced incapacity.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including claims against five corrections officers, the district court denied the officers’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding there to be a material factual dispute over whether they had reason to know that Carter was receiving inadequate medical care, creating a duty to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Established circuit precedent entitles a corrections officer to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. That is what the officers did here; they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "McGee v. Parsano" on Justia Law