Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

M.G. was detained in August 2022 for the 14-day confinement allowed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250 (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act). The 14-day period was set to expire September 4. On August 26, a Friday, M.G. sought habeas relief ordering her release, arguing that she was not mentally disordered, gravely disabled, or a danger to anyone. A hearing was set for the following Tuesday, August 30. M.G. is hearing impaired; she requested two sign language interpreters: an ASL interpreter and a certified deaf interpreter. Relay interpreting using both interpreters was necessary for M.G. to understand the proceedings and communicate with counsel. On Tuesday, the court informed the parties that neither interpreter was available that day. The hearing was continued to Thursday, September 1. On August 31, M.G. petitioned the appeal court.After the court issued an order to show cause, counsel indicated M.G. had been released. Unable to grant the relief requested—release from confinement—the court denied her petition as moot, noting that temporary confinement can last at most 14 days, so a challenge to its propriety will routinely evade appellate review. Welfare and Institutions Code 5276 imposes a mandatory duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days of a detained person’s request; failure to do so requires that the detainee be immediately released. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case in which the district court prohibited Father from encouraging his children to adopt the teachings of any religion without Mother's consent, holding that Father had a fundamental right to encourage his children in the practice of religion and that the district court's prohibition was not narrowly tailored to address the harms identified by the court.When they married, Father and Mother were both members of the Order, a polygamous religious community. Based on the parties' inability to agree on decisions regarding their four children, the district court granted sole legal custody to Mother and prohibited Father from encouraging the children to adopt the teachings of any religion. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court, holding (1) parents have a fundamental right to encourage their children in the practice of religion, and this right is not dependent upon legal custody; (2) strict scrutiny applies to this case; and (3) the district court's prohibition is not narrowly tailored to address the identified harms. View "Kingston v. Kingston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for second-degree sexual abuse, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to a public trial was violated when the trial court closed his trial during the COVID-19 pandemic.Defendant was set to stand trial on felony charges in March 2020, but his trial was repeatedly rescheduled due to COVID. The district court ultimately concluded that allowing anyone in to attend Defendant's trial, including his family and friends, violated COVID protocols previously set by the Supreme Court. The district court also rejected the option of live-streaming the trial. The jury subsequently convicted Defendant of second-degree sexual abuse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's exclusion of all members of the public from Defendant's trial violated Defendant's constitutional rights, requiring a new trial. View "State v. Brimmer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered as a result of a constitutionally-defective search warrant, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to the search of cell phones in this case.At issue was a constitutionally-deficient search warrant authorizing the search of cell phones found at the scene of a car crash. Nothing in the affidavit connected the cell phones to the accident except a police officer's averment that evidence of how the accident occurred may be found on the phones. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress for lack of probable cause, upholding the cell-phone search under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the warrant was constitutionally defective for want of probable cause in the warrant's supporting affidavit; and (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. View "State v. Schubert" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, firefighters and their union, alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. Mayor Copeland, a former firefighter of 26 years, had implemented cost-cutting measures, including freezing the firefighters' salaries and benefits. During Copeland’s reelection campaign, the firefighter’s political action committee endorsed Copeland’s opponent and other candidates who opposed Copeland’s policies. Copeland was reelected. Several firefighters protested at Copeland’s inauguration. Copeland vetoed an ordinance to restore some of the benefits and directed Fire Chief Serna to develop a new schedule. An 8/24 schedule, whereby a firefighter would work eight hours and then be off 24 hours was proposed. No other fire department in the country has adopted that schedule, which assigns firefighters to different shifts every day. In a secretly-recorded conversation, Serna said: “You can call it retaliation.” The defendants proposed to give up the schedule in exchange for the Union giving up its right to lobby the Common Council. The Union rejected the proposal; the city implemented the 8/24 schedule. The Council later returned the firefighters’ to a 24/48 schedule. Copeland sued the Council, alleging that the ordinance violated his executive power. The state court agreed with Copeland and struck the ordinance—leaving the 8/24 schedule in effect.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, ordering the city to immediately begin reinstating the old work schedule. There was no evidence that the 8/24 schedule would result in cost savings; the firefighters would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, Indiana" on Justia Law

The California Constitution directs that laws be made to exclude “persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes” from serving on juries. Former Code of Civil Procedure 203(a)), provided, “All persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except” “Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights have not been restored.” In 2019, Senate Bill 310 eliminated the exclusion of persons convicted of felonies from serving on juries. Section 203(a) now excepts from eligibility to serve as jurors “Persons while they are incarcerated. … Persons who have been convicted of a felony and are currently on parole, postrelease community supervision felony probation, or mandated supervision for the conviction of a felony. … Persons who are currently required to register as a sex offender … based on a felony conviction.”Plaintiffs alleged that the categorical exclusion of current sex offender registrants from jury service denied registrants equal protection under the California Constitution. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statutory disparity withstands rational basis scrutiny. Plausible reasons for the Legislature’s line-drawing include ensuring impartial juries by excluding those persons convicted of felonies deemed more likely to harbor anti-government bias. View "Doe v. Finke" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs distribute pamphlets to and try to engage with, women entering abortion clinics, hoping to persuade the women not to end their pregnancies. Louisville-Jefferson County ordinances provide that no one shall “knowingly obstruct, detain, hinder, impede, or block another person’s entry to or exit from a healthcare facility” and imposes a prophylactic 10-foot “buffer zone” around the entrance of any “healthcare facility,” forbidding any nonexempt individual from “knowingly enter[ing]” or “remaining . . . within” it “during [a] facility’s posted business hours.” The law exempts persons entering or leaving a healthcare facility persons using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to a healthcare facility solely for the purpose of reaching a destination other than the facility, municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment, and employees or agents of a healthcare facility acting within the scope of their employment.”The Sixth Circuit enjoined the enforcement of the buffer zone provision as likely violating the First Amendment. The County did not demonstrate that it was “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” One abortion clinic has reported problems but the ordinance covers every hospital, clinic, and dentist’s office in the area. The court noted that the “obstruction” provision of the ordinance addresses the same concerns. View "Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County., Kentucky Metropolitan Government" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for gross sexual assault but remanded for the court to determine the appropriate length and conditions of supervised release to be imposed, holding that there was otherwise no error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) because a principal and accomplice are not subject to different processes or analyses when a sentencing court applies the Hewey analysis set out in Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1602, the sentencing court did not err when it set the basic sentence at twenty years in compliance with Me. Rev. Stat. 17A-1252(4-E); and (2) remand was required for the district court to determine the length and conditions of supervised release to be imposed and to articulate its analysis and the factors that led to its decision. View "State v. Ringuette" on Justia Law

In this case where Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Massachusetts Constitution protects a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, thereby immunizing the practice from criminal prosecution, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the proposed right, as defined by Plaintiffs, was not supported in the relevant provisions of the Constitution.Plaintiffs were a licensed physician who wished to provide physician-assisted suicide and a retired physician who had been diagnosed with an incurable cancer. Plaintiffs brought a civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that terminally ill patients with six months or less to live have a constitutional right to receive a prescription for lethal medication in order to bring about death in a manner and time of their choosing. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not protect physician-assisted suicide; and (2) the law of manslaughter prohibits physician-assisted suicide without offending constitutional protections. View "Kligler v. Attorney General" on Justia Law