Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff contends that the social media company Twitter Inc. and California’s Secretary of State, Shirley Weber, violated his constitutional rights by acting in concert to censor his speech on Twitter’s platform. He alleged that the Secretary of State’s office entered into a collaborative relationship with Twitter in which state officials regularly flagged tweets with false or misleading information for Twitter’s review and that Twitter responded by almost invariably removing the posts in question. Plaintiff further alleged that Twitter limited other users’ ability to access his tweets and then suspended his account. The district court determined that Twitter’s interactions with state officials did not transform the company’s enforcement of its content-moderation policy into state action.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims against Twitter. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Secretary of State Weber because her office did not violate federal law when it notified Twitter of tweets containing false or misleading information that potentially violated the company’s content-moderation policy.   The panel held that Twitter’s content-moderation decisions did not constitute state action because (1) Twitter did not exercise a state-conferred right or enforce a state-imposed rule under the first step of the two-step framework set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, and (2) the interactions between Twitter and the Secretary of State’s Office of Elections Cybersecurity did not satisfy either the nexus or the joint action tests under the second step. View "ROGAN O' HANDLEY V. SHIRLEY WEBER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Two Yellowstone Park rangers received an alert that a park employee had spotted Michael Bullinger, a fugitive wanted for allegedly shooting and killing three women in Idaho. The report said Bullinger was leaving the park in a white Toyota with a Missouri license plate. But the employee was mistaken—he had instead spoken with Brett Hemry, a man on vacation with his wife, Genalyn, and his seven-year-old daughter. The rangers spotted the white Toyota leaving the park and trailed it. Hemry noticed the rangers and pulled over near a campground sixteen miles east of the park entrance. Waiting for reinforcements, the rangers exited their patrol car and from a distance held the Hemrys at gunpoint until county law enforcement arrived. Once county law enforcement arrived, the rangers moved Mr. and Mrs. Hemry to separate police cruisers. After examining Mr. Hemry’s driver’s license, they set the couple free. The Hemrys sued the rangers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating their Fourth Amendment rights. On a motion to dismiss, the district court denied the rangers qualified immunity for Mrs. Hemry’s false-arrest claim and for Mr. and Mrs. Hemry’s excessive force claims. The rangers appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed: in the context presented, the Court found the law did not clearly establish this investigative stop amounted to (1) an arrest of Mrs. Hemry without probable cause, or (2) excessive force against the Hemrys. View "Hemry, et al. v. Ross, et al." on Justia Law

In 2018, Escamilla was stationed at Fort Drum. During an on-base medical appointment, he complained of hearing voices that were telling him to commit suicide. He agreed to seek treatment at Samaritan Hospital, where he was admitted to the inpatient mental health unit under New York State Mental Hygiene Law, 9.39(a), which permits the director of a hospital to “receive and retain therein as a patient for a period of fifteen days any person alleged to have a mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others.” Escamilla was discharged 11 days later, with diagnoses of mild depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and autism spectrum disorder.A year later, Escamilla attempted to purchase a handgun from an online retailer, who shipped the gun to a federal firearm licensee in Wisconsin. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System generated a response denying the firearm transfer. Escamilla was prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), as a person who “has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for the government. Escamilla’s admittance to Samaritan constituted a “commitment” under section 922(g)(4). The court rejected Escamilla’s argument that his hospitalization did not qualify as a commitment because he was there on a voluntary, informal basis. View "Escamilla v. United States" on Justia Law

Scott was suspected of shooting and killing Bishop. Scott claims he asked for an attorney during his arrest, but no questioning occurred at that time. Approximately four hours later, Scott was taken for an interview. After the detectives read Scott his Miranda rights, he admitted in a recorded interview to murdering Bishop. Four attorneys worked on Scott’s case before trial; one moved to exclude Scott’s confession on the basis of intoxication. The judge denied the motion, doubting Scott’s testimony. The jury heard the confession and convicted Scott.In a postconviction motion, Scott unsuccessfully alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress his confession on the theory that, because he requested an attorney during his arrest, his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Scott's second unsuccessful postconviction motion claimed his first postconviction counsel deficiently pleaded his claim by failing to marshal facts showing he informed his trial counsel of his request for an attorney.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, in which he claimed both his trial and first postconviction attorneys were ineffective. The Wisconsin appellate court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, which has never extended Miranda beyond the context of custodial interrogation to permit an accused to request an attorney at the time of his arrest so as to cut off questioning before any attempt at questioning. View "Scott v. Hepp" on Justia Law

GEFT, a billboard company, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because Monroe County did not allow the installation of a digital billboard along I-69. Receiving a sign permit required compliance with size limits, height restrictions, setback requirements, a ban on changeable-copy (or digital) signs, and a prohibition on off-premises commercial signs, The ordinance provided exceptions to the permit requirement for government signs and certain noncommercial signs. If a proposed sign was ineligible for a permit, the applicant could apply for a use variance, which required specific findings.The district court granted GEFT summary judgment and enjoined the permitting scheme and the variance procedures. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first declining to extend the injunction to encompass the entire ordinance. Monroe County’s substantive sign standards do not need a permitting scheme to function. Indiana law provides that local government entities can enforce their own ordinances through civil penalties or injunctions. The court reinstated the variance procedure. That procedure is a “prior restraint” but is not unconstitutional; it does not involve consideration of content, permits ample alternatives for speech, including displays of messages on signs, and it does not give the Board of Zoning Appeals so much discretion that it violates the First Amendment. View "GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County Indiana" on Justia Law

Following an investigation by the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission and the testing of DNA evidence, a state court vacated Plaintiffs-brothers’ convictions, finding significant evidence of innocence. North Carolina Governor Patrick McCrory granted each a “Pardon of Innocence.” When they were released, they had served 31 years in prison. Through appointed guardians, the two commenced this action against six law enforcement officers, the town of Red Springs, and Robeson County under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of their due process rights. The jury awarded Plaintiffs a total of $62 million in compensatory damages and $13 million in punitive damages.   On appeal, Defendants challenged (1) the district court’s conduct of the trial on several procedural grounds, arguing that they were denied a fair trial and that the district court, therefore, erred in denying their motion for a new trial; (2) the court’s refusal to reduce the jury’s verdict by the $11.5 million that the Plaintiffs had received from others as redress for their injuries prior to the verdict; (3) the court’s addition of $36 million in prejudgment interest to the jury’s award; and (4) the reasonableness of the court’s award of attorneys fees.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial; vacated its order denying Defendants’ motion to reduce the jury’s compensatory damages award, and directed that the court reduce the award by $10 million and determine whether the award should be reduced by another $1.5 million; reversed the court’s order awarding prejudgment interest; and affirmed the court’s award of attorneys fees and costs. View "J. Gilliam v. Leroy Allen" on Justia Law

Perry died from gunshot wounds sustained during a fight with Shirley. In 2008, Shirley was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide. Shirley uses a prosthetic device below his knee. Although he can walk, during his trial Shirley was in a wheelchair with his legs shackled. To prevent the jury from observing the shackles, fabric was draped over both counsel tables. During voir dire, Juror 34 stated, if he’s in cuffs, "he did something.” Juror 34 separately confirmed he had seen the restraints, had not mentioned them to other jurors, and that his observations did not bias him. Shirley and his counsel said they were satisfied with those responses and did not request accommodations to muffle the noise of the shackles while Shirley was on the witness stand.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected claims that his presumption of innocence was violated because Juror 34 noticed his restraints, that being shackled inhibited his right to present a complete defense because it limited his ability to approach exhibits, make demonstrations and show the jury which leg his prosthesis was on. The court could not locate an explanation in for the restraint decision but found Shirley “had little difficulty communicating” in an “intelligent and articulate” manner from the witness stand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shirley’s petition for habeas relief. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that the decision to shackle a criminal defendant while testifying violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. View "Shirley v. Tegels" on Justia Law

Under California law, certain political advertisements run by a committee must name the committee’s top contributors. The City and County of San Francisco adds a secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement that compels certain committees, in their political advertisements, also to list the major donors to those top contributors. Plaintiffs—a political committee that runs ads, the committee’s treasurer, and a contributor to the committee— seek to enjoin enforcement of San Francisco’s ordinance.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The panel first determined that even though the June 2022 election had occurred, this appeal was not moot because the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review. The panel held that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Applying exacting scrutiny, the panel held that San Francisco’s requirement was substantially related to the governmental interest in informing voters of the source of funding for election-related communications. The panel next held that the ordinance did not create an excessive burden on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights relative to the government interest and was sufficiently tailored. Thus, the panel was not persuaded that the secondary-contributor requirement was an impermissible burden on speech because the size of the disclaimer was excessive with respect to larger ads. The district court was within its discretion to conclude that the secondary-contributor requirement had a scope in proportion to the City’s objective. View "NO ON E, SAN FRANCISCANS OPPOSING THE AFFORDABLE, ET AL V. DAVID CHIU, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the county court neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.In 1985, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape and other offenses. In 2005, the Sex Offender Registration Board issued a decision ordering Petitioner to register as a level three sex offender, thereafter denying Petitioner's motion for relief from the registration requirement. In this petition, Petitioner brought, among other claims, constitutional challenges to both federal and state sex offender registration laws. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that no exceptional circumstances were present in this case warranting extraordinary relief. View "Rancourt v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court against Plaintiffs and directed the court to enter a judgment declaring the "public comment policy" of the town of Southborough unconstitutional,holding that the town's public comment policy violated rights protected by articles nineteen and sixteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.At issue was the policy of the board of selectmen of Southborough that outlines the public comment portion of its meetings where town residents may address the board ("public comment policy"). Plaintiffs argued, among other claims, that the policy violated their constitutionally-protected right under article nineteen "to assemble, speak in a peaceable manner, and petition...town leaders for redress." The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court's decision rejecting the argument that the town's public comment policy was unconstitutional, in violation of articles nineteen and sixteen, holding that the town's civil restraints on the content of speech at a public comment session in a public meeting were forbidden under both articles nineteen and sixteen. View "Barron v. Kolenda" on Justia Law