Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In July 2013, Koger began serving a 300-day sentence in Cook County Jail. While incarcerated, he received 42 books by mail. Per Jail policy, contained in the Inmate Information Handbook, inmates can keep no more than three books or magazines (excluding religious texts) in their cell at any time. Koger received a copy of the Handbook. Inmates with excess books can mail them out of the Jail using supplies available at the Jail commissary, can have someone outside the Jail pick up personal property, and are free to donate their books to other inmates. The policy was not strictly enforced during Koger’s stay.In October 2013, Jail administrators warned Koger they would soon search cells and take excess books. On October 5, officers searched the cells and took all but three books from Koger’s cell. Koger did not file a grievance. The Jail acknowledges the search but disputes whether any books were taken and what became of them. The Jail has no policy for dealing with confiscated books. The Jail released Koger on October 24, 2013; he died in 2020.Koger’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 has twice previously been before the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s summary judgment rejection of Koger’s claim that the county deprived him of his books without due process. Koger received constitutionally sufficient due process surrounding any property deprivation, and presented insufficient evidence to hold the county liable under “Monell.” View "Orozco v. Dart" on Justia Law

In a previous decision involving a reporter’s request for information concerning an investigation involving Sanford, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that SDCL 23A-35-4.1 permits a circuit court to “seal the contents of an affidavit in support of a search warrant upon a showing of reasonable cause, but only until the investigation is terminated or an indictment or information is filed.” The court may not prohibit the public disclosure of other specific records nor of the fact that a search warrant affidavit has been filed.” Certain personally identifying information within court records must be redacted as a matter of course.Following the completion of the state’s criminal investigation, the circuit court unsealed the search warrant affidavits related to the investigation. Sanford challenged the denial of his request to inspect and participate in redacting the affidavits before the records were unsealed. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The circuit court properly applied the provisions of SDCL 15-15A-13 and 23A-35-4.1 and thoroughly considered the statutory and constitutional grounds asserted by Sanford with respect to information that could conceivably be contained in the affidavits. The court appropriately exercised its discretion to “decide whether there [were] sufficient grounds to prohibit access” to the contents of the affidavits. View "Matter Of Implicated Individual" on Justia Law

In 2015, Nijmeddin was sentenced to an indeterminate life term, consecutive to a determinate term, for murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of narcotics. In 2023, the Department of Corrections recommended that the court recall Nijmeddin’s sentence under the new compassionate release provisions, Penal Code 1172.2, that apply to defendants who have “serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory,” creating a “presumption favoring recall and resentencing . . . which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”Nijmeddin has advanced incurable pancreatic cancer, biliary adenocarcinoma, and other medical conditions. Nijmeddin is foregoing chemotherapy treatment. Nijmeddin, 65 years old, has committed prison rules violations, including fighting and violent threats. Nijmeddin’s doctor testified Nijmeddin “is barely able to get out of" his wheelchair and estimated Nijmeddin has three-six months to live. Nijmeddin’s brother, an attorney, is willing to be Nijmeddin’s caregiver. The court observed, “Nijmeddin looks quite good. … the doctors may say that he is terminally ill, he is not on that far end.” The court characterized Nijmeddin as “able to use his mental capacity to commit offenses” and declined to recall Nijmeddin’s sentence, finding that he poses an unreasonable risk to public safety.The Attorney General conceded that the court erred and that Nijmeddin is entitled to relief. The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to immediately enter an order recalling Nijmeddin’s sentence. View "Nijmeddin v. Superior Court of Monterey County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Office of the Auditor lacked the authority to pierce the attorney-client privilege and obtain an audit's confidential communications and rejected the Office of the Auditor's jurisdiction and non-justiciability bars to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' (OHA) suit in this declaratory action.The OHA sued the Office of the Auditor after it was audited, seeking a declaratory judgment that neither Haw. Rev. Stat. 23-5 nor the Hawai'i State Constitution required OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment for OHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-5 did not require OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged attorney-client communications protected from disclosure pursuant to Haw. R. Evid. 503 and common-law principles. View "Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Kondo" on Justia Law

Petitioner Quincy Allen, a formerly death-sentenced inmate housed at Broad River Correctional Institution, appealed to the Administrative Law Court (ALC) the denial by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) of his grievance concerning visitation with persons not known to him prior to his incarceration. Following the ALC's dismissal of Petitioner's appeal, Petitioner appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the ALC. Petitioner now sought certiorari review by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, dispensed with briefing, and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The Court determined the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the issue as one of "subject matter jurisdiction" when it affirmed the ALC's decision. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the denial of Petitioner's visitation with persons not known to him prior to incarceration did not implicate a state-created liberty interest, and the Supreme Court agreed with the result of the court of appeals' decision to affirm the dismissal of Petitioner's appeal by the ALC. View "Allen v. SCDC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights suit against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He alleged that the police captain retaliated against him in various ways—including placing him in disciplinary/segregated confinement—because of complaints he made and grievances he filed. He also alleged that co-defendant officers beat him while he was handcuffed and held him down, and failed to intervene during the assault. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the captain and officers all of Plaintiff’s claims.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment except for one of the alleged instances of retaliation. The court explained that Plaintiff’s testimony directly contradicts the captain’s assertion that the initial search was “random.” The evidence—when viewed in Plaintiff’s’ favor—shows a causal connection between the submission of complaints and grievances and the initial search and trashing of the cell. Summary judgment was therefore not warranted with respect to the alleged retaliatory search and trashing of Plaintiff’s cell. Further, the court explained that a reasonable jury could find that the amount of force used against Plaintiff violated the Eighth Amendment. If Plaintiff’s version of events is believed, the evidence supports “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain”—the officer repeatedly struck a handcuffed, restrained, and unarmed prisoner several times because he “raised his voice.” View "Quincy A. Williams v. Correctional Officer Radford, et al." on Justia Law

On behalf of her son’s estate, Plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and North Carolina law against an officer and the City of Charlotte (“City”) in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment for both Defendants after concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and the City was not responsible for the officer’s conduct under federal or state law. Plaintiff appealed both aspects of the district court’s decision.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions granting summary judgment for the City on Franklin’s § 1983 and negligent training claims. The court vacated the decisions granting summary judgment for the officer on the Section 1983 and assault and battery claims and granting both defendants summary judgment on the wrongful death claim. The court explained that a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s son did not pose an imminent threat to the officers or anyone else. Under those circumstances, the court concluded that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s 1983 claim against her.   Moreover, Plaintiff’s son’s death is not traceable to a subordinate’s decision that may be approved as final by a city policymaker. Instead, as the district court concluded, “the City Manager’s post-facto approval of an internal shooting investigation cannot possibly have caused the constitutional violation.” Reversing the City Manager’s decision cannot undo what is done. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that the City is not liable under Section 1983 for the officer’s shooting. View "Deborah Franklin v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former New York State prisoner, sued defendants-appellants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for purportedly violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when they denied his judicially ordered enrollment in New York's Shock Incarceration Program, thereby potentially extending his period of confinement. The district court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated clearly established law.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, reversed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Eighth Amendment claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails at the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: it was not clearly established at the time of Defendants' conduct that denying a prisoner the opportunity to obtain early release from his sentence of confinement by denying judicially ordered entry into the Shock program would violate the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that given the liberty interest at stake and the clarity of the statutory law, Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants' actions were egregious, shocking to the conscience, and unreasonable. View "Michael Matzell v. Anthony J. Annucci et al." on Justia Law

A fight erupted during a house party; someone fired multiple shots into the bedroom through the door, striking and killing Walker. Police obtained statements from more than 25 individuals. Eyewitness descriptions identified the shooter as a black male who used his right hand, but descriptions were otherwise very inconsistent. After the party, rumors circulated on Facebook accusing Smyth of the shooting. The police later turned their attention to Harris and, ultimately, to Mull, who was identified as the shooter by several witnesses. At Mull’s jury trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses. The defense did not call any witnesses. Convicted of first-degree reckless homicide, Mull was sentenced to 25 years' confinement.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed an order granting Mull a new trial, rejecting Mull’s argument that his attorney was ineffective for "failing to file a third-party perpetrator motion regarding any one of the viable alternate suspects.” Counsel testified he thought a reasonable doubt defense was preferable to a third-party perpetrator defense because it was difficult to locate witnesses, even using an investigator, and that there were credibility issues and inconsistent accounts. Counsel objected to a line of questioning relative to out-of-court messages and attempted to discredit that testimony on cross-examination; he did not move to strike a statement made during cross-examination because he did not want "too much attention." The court concluded that the controversy was fully tried, and it is not probable that justice has miscarried. View "State v. Mull" on Justia Law

An Ohio tax lien on real property is enforced through a foreclosure action, which may result in a sale of the property at auction. If such a sale occurs and the price exceeds the amount of the lien, the excess funds may go to junior lienholders or the owner. If the tax-delinquent property is abandoned, an auction may not be required; the property may be transferred directly to a land bank, free of liens. When that happens, the county gives up its right to collect the tax debt, and any junior lienholders and the owner get nothing. The properties at issue were transferred directly to county land banks. US Bank owned one foreclosed property and claims to have held mortgages on the other two. US Bank alleges that at the time of the transfers, the fair market value of each property was greater than the associated tax lien and that the transfers to the land banks constituted takings without just compensation.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the dismissals of the suits. US Bank lacks standing in one case; it did not hold the mortgage at the time of the alleged taking. As to the other properties, US Bank had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law. It could have redeemed the properties by paying the taxes; it could have sought transfers of the foreclosure actions from the boards of revision to the common pleas courts; it could have appealed the foreclosure adjudications to those courts. View "US Bank Trust, National Association v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law