Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires sex offenders who study, work, or reside in Indiana to register with the state. Indiana residents who committed sex offenses either before the Indiana General Assembly enacted SORA or before the Assembly amended SORA to cover their specific offense challenged, under the Equal Protection Clause, SORA’s “other-jurisdiction” provision. That provision requires them to register under SORA because they have a duty to register in another jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit previously rejected arguments that SORA violated the constitutional right to travel and the Ex Post Facto Clause and concluded that the district court incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to the equal protection claim, remanding for a determination of whether the other-jurisdiction provision survives rational basis review. On remand, the district court concluded that requiring the registration of pre-SORA sex offenders who have a registration obligation in another jurisdiction is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and granted the plaintiffs summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Indiana has a legitimate interest in seeking to register as many sex offenders as the state constitution permits; SORA’s other-jurisdiction provision is rationally related to advancing that interest. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that when an offender is already obligated to register elsewhere, requiring registration in Indiana merely extends that existing duty, which is not punitive and does not offend Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction" on Justia Law

Plaintiff saw Defendant, an officer, pointing a firearm at her 12- and 14-year-old sons down the street from their family’s home. When Plaintiff approached to ask what happened, Defendant repeatedly ordered her to “get back.” After Plaintiff questioned the order, Defendant briefly pointed his taser at her. Plainitff then complied with his orders. Her sons were eventually cleared of any wrongdoing. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against Defendant, claiming he used excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the claim after concluding he was entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant was placed in a position where he had two possibly armed suspects detained in front of him and a third unknown individual approaching from behind, creating a potentially serious safety risk. Adding to the circumstances, when Defendant ordered Plaintiff to “get back,” she moved to the side, but she did not immediately comply by moving backward. Rather, she questioned the order and moved sideways. Ordered to get back a second time, she again questioned the order and remained where she was until after the taser was drawn. Accordingly, the court wrote that under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant momentarily pointing his taser at Plaintiff to gain control of the scene was not unreasonable. View "Casondra Pollreis v. Lamont Marzolf" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement forced open a lacked box during an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle, holding that the district court did not err.During an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle, the police forced open a locked box and discovered suspected illegal drugs. The State charged Defendant with felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of heroin. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the box, arguing that opening the box exceeded the scope of a permissible inventory search in violation of the Wyoming Highway Patrol's (WHP) inventory policy, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument that the inventory search violated WHP policy was unavailing. View "Beckwith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's motion for remand under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure after a jury convicted him of aggravated robbery, holding that the court of appeals did not err.On appeal of his conviction, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by not supporting his mistaken identity defense with evidence that Defendant had prominent tattoos on his hands that were not visible in surveillance images of the robber. Defendant moved under rule 23B to supplement the record with facts concerning his trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. The court of appeals denied Defendant's rule 23B motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's rule 23B motion did not allege that the arresting officers would provide favorable testimony; and (2) therefore, Defendant failed to offer nonspeculative facts that, if true, would have established that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to question the officers about Defendant's tattoos or comment on that evidence in closing argument. View "State v. Samora" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for one count of first-degree rape and four counts of first-degree sexual abuse but vacated the trial court's judgment sentencing Defendant to an aggregate sentence of life plus twenty years, holding that Defendant's sentence was unlawful.During sentencing, the jury recommended a sentence of life on the rape conviction and five years on each of the sexual abuse charge running consecutively. The trial court sentenced Defendant in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) there was no error in the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting other bad acts evidence pursuant to Ky. R. Evid. 404(b); and (3) the sentence of life plus twenty years was unlawful under this Court's holding in Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993). View "Hernandez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of one count each of murder, receiving stolen property - firearm, and tampering with physical evidence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Appellant did not act consistently with someone who truly acted in self-defense; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motions for a directed verdict on the murder and tampering with physical evidence charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Appellant was potentially affiliated with a gang; (4) the Commonwealth's attorney did not commit prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) there was no cumulative error. View "Leavell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and circuit court affirming the decision of the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Historic Landmarks & Preservation Districts Commission to approve the application of the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government to remove a certain statue, holding that the lower courts erred.In 2018, Louisville Metro filed an application to move a statue located in the historic Cherokee Triangle Preservation District. The application was deemed denied. On appeal, the Commission voted to approve the application. The parties opposing the application filed a complaint and appeal. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that certain members of the Commission had a patent conflict of interest in the underlying decision, resulting in a denial of procedural due process. View "Friends of Louisville Public Art, LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Historic Landmarks & Preservation Districts Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court did not err in determining that all of Defendant's claims were either insufficiently pled or affirmatively refuted by the record.Defendant, in inmate who was serving consecutive sentences for three convictions, including a life sentence for first degree murder, brought this motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct appeal. The district court denied the motion after determining that all of Defendant's claims were either insufficiently pled or affirmatively refuted by the record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Defendant's claims warranted an evidentiary hearing and that the district court properly overruled Defendant's motions to add exhibits and to appoint counsel. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law

independent-expenditure political action committees (super PACs) do not give money directly to candidates, party committees, or ballot-initiative movements. They spend money themselves to advocate for or against candidates, parties, or initiatives. The Fund wants to operate as an Indiana independent-expenditure PAC but fears that the state’s Election Code does not allow it to accept unlimited donations from corporations, in violation of the First Amendment. Indiana’s election officials say they do not believe their laws could be enforced that way.Indiana’s campaign finance laws allow corporations to make contributions "to aid in the election or defeat of a candidate or the success or defeat of a political party or a public question.” Section 4 imposes limits on direct corporate contributions to candidates and party committees but imposes no cap on contributions to committees unaffiliated with a political party, such as PACs. Section 5 ensures that corporations cannot use PACs as a loophole to avoid contribution caps by requiring corporations to designate their contributions to PACs “for disbursement to a specific candidate or committee listed under section 4.” Section 5 does not address how or whether a corporation could earmark a contribution for a PAC's independent expenditure for or against a candidate or party.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court Does the Indiana Election Code—in particular, sections 3-9-2-3 to -6—prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to PACs or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures? View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a Florida death-row prisoner who is scheduled to be executed on May 3, 2023, at 6:00 p.m. Barwick brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing that the Governor of Florida and several other state officials violated his constitutional right to due process because they did not adequately consider his candidacy for executive clemency. He also moved for an emergency stay of execution. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. Plaintiff then moved in this Court for a stay of execution pending appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. The court explained that here Plaintiff argued that the State violated his due-process rights because it did not provide any standards that would govern the clemency decision. But under the Eleventh Circuit’s binding precedent, the court wrote it cannot agree that the Due Process Clause requires the State to provide any such standards. An initial problem with Plaintiff’s argument about the State’s lack of standards is that it runs counter to Supreme Court authority. Further, the court held that it cannot agree with Plaintiff’s argument that his clemency proceeding was arbitrary because the Commission allegedly “provided false guidance” when it said it was not concerned with his guilt but then “myopically focused on [his] crime.” Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s due-process claim does not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. View "Darryl Barwick v. Governor of Florida, et al" on Justia Law