Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Lemasters run a Lawrence County, Kentucky towing business, which was on the county’s “rotation list” of companies to call when it needed to order a tow. Both as fire chief and in his towing business, Lemaster sparred with Carter, Lawrence County’s “judge-executive,” the elected head of its executive branch. Lemaster criticized Carter on Facebook. Five days later, the 911 Center sent an email to dispatchers; its subject identified Lemaster Towing and the Cherryville Fire Department. Its body stated in all caps: “Per Judge Carter do not tone them out on any fire calls[;] use nearest department[;] . . . Lemaster Towing is no longer on the rotation list[.]”The Lemasters sued Carter and Lawrence County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that Carter violated the First Amendment by removing Lemaster Towing from the rotation list in retaliation for Lemaster’s criticisms. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Monell claims against the county; Lemaster did not tie the actions to any county policy. The court reversed as to Carter. Carter conceded that his communications with dispatch employees could constitute an adverse action. The record would allow a rational jury to find that Lemaster’s Facebook post motivated Carter’s decision to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. View "Lemaster v. Lawrence County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of employing a minor in an obscene performance in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-196a, sexual assault in the first degree, and other offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to sever the sexual offenses with the nonsexual offenses and in joining the informations for trial; (2) the obscene performance statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant's conduct, and the First Amendment did not require the Court to undertake an independent appellate review of that conviction; (3) the trial court's potentially incorrect rulings, including those relating to the excludion from evidence video recordings of forensic interviews of the victim, were harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions of assault in the third degree, criminal violation of a protective order, and stalking in the first degree. View "State v. Michael R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question of law concerning the applicability of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-37 to this case, concluding that section 53-37 did not apply because Plaintiff's complaint did not allege any speech constituting an "advertisement."Plaintiff brought this reenforcement action challenging 53-37, which provides that "[a]ny person who, by his advertisement, ridicules or holds up to contempt any person or class of persons, on account of the creed, religion, color, denomination, nationality or race of such person or class of persons, shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor." Plaintiff alleged that the statue violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sought declaratory and injunctive relief seeking permanently to enjoin the enforcement of the statute. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action because he had failed to allege an injury in fact. The Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding the issue by answering that the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that section 53-37 was not intended to encompass the type of personal, noncommercial speech alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. View "Cerame v. Lamont" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under: 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68; and Oklahoma state law, challenging an allegedly unconstitutional scheme to collect “court debts” from impoverished Oklahoma citizens. The Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SACAC”) named numerous “Defendants,” which fell into three broad categories: (1) individual Oklahoma sheriffs, the Oklahoma Sheriff’s Association (“OSA”), and officials of Tulsa and Rodgers Counties (collectively, “Sheriffs”); (2) state court judges (collectively, “Judges”); and (3) Aberdeen Enterprises, II, Inc. and its principal officers (collectively, “Aberdeen”). Plaintiffs alleged Aberdeen, a debt-collection company, acting in concert with other Defendants, used actual or threatened incarceration to coerce indigent Oklahomans into paying court debts, without any inquiry into ability to pay. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, broadly holding that three independent doctrines prevented Plaintiffs from proceeding on any claim against any Defendant. Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that none of the doctrines identified by the district court deprived federal courts of the ability to reach the merits of the claims listed in the complaint. To this, the Tenth Circuit agrees the district court erred in dismissing the SACAC. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Graff, et al. v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, et al." on Justia Law

Dr. Bounds was hired for one year beginning in July 2019 as an at-will employee. In February 2020, Dr. Scott stated that Scott would recommend that Bounds's contract be renewed. Scott notified Bounds and others on March 24 that she would email approved contracts and that they had until March 31 to sign and return the contracts. Upon receiving the contract, Bounds noted that her vacation days had been reduced. Scott told Bounds to contact the Board. Later that day, Bounds became ill and was advised to quarantine for 14 days. Bounds testified that she made inquiries to the Board but never received a reply. On April 1, Scott telephoned Bounds, who had not returned the signed contract. Bounds replied that she wanted her attorney to review the agreement. Scott warned that the Board previously had released another administrator who did not sign her contract by the deadline. The following day, Scott advised Bounds that the Board had requested that her position be posted as vacant. On April 14, Bounds was notified that her position had been posted.Bounds filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the Board had deprived her of procedural due process by rescinding her contract and posting her position without notice or the opportunity to be heard. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Bounds did not have a property interest subject to due process protections. Bounds had no enforceable expectation as to her continued employment. View "Bounds v. Country Club Hills School District 160" on Justia Law

In 2020, three individuals opposed the Kentucky Governor’s COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings and on interstate travel. They obtained preliminary injunctions against the orders. The case was eventually dismissed as moot. The district court awarded them $272,142.50 in attorney’s fees as prevailing parties, 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the fees award.A preliminary injunction may suffice to establish “prevailing party” status if it mainly turns on the likelihood-of-success inquiry and changes the parties’ relationship in a material and enduring way. These injunctions measure up favorably in terms of the nature of the injunctions, the longevity of the relief, and the irrevocability of the relief. The court also rejected challenges to the amount of the award. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

This case arises out of a sober home’s battle to rezone its property. When its efforts came up short, the sober home sued the county in federal court, alleging disability discrimination. As discovery got underway, the sober home served a notice of deposition in which it sought to depose one of the county commissioners who voted down its rezoning request. The county opposed the deposition, arguing that the commissioner was shielded from discovery by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. But the commissioner never objected to the deposition request or otherwise appeared before the district court. The district court found that the immunity didn’t apply. At that point, the county and the commissioner appealed. Their sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred by denying the commissioner quasi-judicial immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court first held that the county may not appeal because it lacks appellate standing under Article III. To appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the district court’s order. But it’s the commissioner—not the county—who has the (alleged) immunity. So the county has suffered no injury and cannot challenge the district court’s denial of the immunity on appeal. Second, the commissioner may not appeal because he was not a named party to this case and did not become a party through intervention, substitution, or third-party practice. While a nonparty may sometimes appeal when he has participated before the district court, the commissioner didn’t participate at all. View "Kimberly Regenesis, LLC, et al v. Lee County" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns the scope of a landlord’s duty under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 to make “reasonable accommodations” for the “handicap” of a tenant. The City of Dubuque approved a measure allowing the local public housing authority to provide residents of mobile-home parks with housing choice vouchers that could be used to supplement their rent payments. Under this voucher program, the federal government provides funds to local public housing agencies, which in turn may distribute them to low-income tenants. As the rent on Plaintiff’s lot increased, she received a voucher and sought to use it to supplement her rent payments, but the companies declined to accept the voucher. Plaintiff requested an injunction requiring the companies to accept her housing choice voucher, and she sought damages for alleged emotional distress. Plaintiff also brought claims under state laws.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the injunction. The court concluded that while the statute requires a landlord to make reasonable accommodations that directly ameliorate the handicap of a tenant, the obligation does not extend to alleviating a tenant’s lack of money to pay rent. The court wrote that the term “reasonable accommodation” is not defined in the statute, but it was adopted against the backdrop of a predecessor statute and must be viewed in the context of a law that forbids discrimination “because of a handicap.” View "Suellen Klossner v. IADU Table Mound MHP, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, in his individual capacity and official capacity as sheriff, violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and falsely arrested him. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, finding the Complaint still fails to state a claim under the Twobly and Iqbal standard and does not cure the deficiencies that made the first amended complaint a shotgun pleading. Plaintiff appealed this order.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff carries the burden of pointing to what intentionally or recklessly false information went into the warrant affidavit. Otherwise, the presumption that the warrant was validly issued, and thus that probable cause existed, must stand. Here, the court explained that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plausibly allege an absence of probable cause for his arrest, and Plaintiff failed to satisfy either of the two exceptions to carry that burden or a plausible connection between his election announcement and teleserve reassignment. View "Bryan Turner v. Mike Williams, et al." on Justia Law

Gilbert, on parole for a state conviction, was arrested for printing false identifications and credit cards and was returned to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Federal authorities charged Gilbert with identity theft crimes. Wolf was Gilbert's appointed counsel. Gilbert consented to federal detention pending trial. Gilbert pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4) and 1028A(a)(1). After reviewing Gilbert’s PSR, Wolf realized that he had mistakenly led Gilbert to believe that the time Gilbert had spent in federal detention would be credited against his federal sentence. Wolf acknowledged the error. The court offered Gilbert the opportunity to withdraw his plea but Gilbert decided to continue with sentencing. The court sentenced Gilbert to 15 months on Count 1, concurrent to the undischarged Michigan term, and 24 months on Count 2, “consecutive to Count 1 and all other terms of imprisonment.”Gilbert filed a habeas motion. Wolf admitted that he gave Gilbert erroneous advice and that because of his incorrect understanding of the law he did not expedite Gilbert’s guilty plea and sentence; did not seek a downward adjustment under USSG 5G1.3; and did not object when the court ruled that the aggravated identity theft sentence had to run consecutive to all other undischarged sentences. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if Gilbert could demonstrate that counsel’s performance—initial error followed by correction—was deficient, he failed to present evidence of prejudice. Sentences imposed under the aggravated identity theft statute must run consecutive to all other (including state) sentences and are not subject to USSG 5G1.3 adjustments. View "Gilbert v. United States" on Justia Law