Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2017, the County initiated an administrative tax foreclosure against BSI. The County Board of Revision (BOR) issued its final adjudication of foreclosure in June 2019. Because the County had opted for the alternative right of redemption, BSI had 28 days to pay the taxes before the County took title to the property. Days later, BSI filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the BOR’s final judgment and 28-day redemption period. The bankruptcy court granted the County relief from the stay on January 17, 2020. The BOR determined that the statutory redemption period expired on January 21, 2020. On January 30, rather than sell the property, the County transferred it to its land bank (Ohio Rev. Code 323.78.1). When a county sells foreclosed property at auction, it may not keep proceeds beyond the taxes the former owner owed; if the county transfers the property to the land bank, “the land becomes ‘free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.’”BSI filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a significant difference between the appraised value of the property and the amount that the County alleged BSI owed meant that the County’s action violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The limitations period began to run when the redemption period ended on January 21, 2020. If BSI paid its delinquent taxes during that period, the County would have been prohibited from taking the property. View "Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual abuse in the third degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his convictions on his allegations of error.The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions but concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a nunc pro tunc order attempting to correct Defendant's sentence and remanding the case for the district court to correct the sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Defendant was previously convicted of an act of sexual abuse for purposes of the sentencing enhancement; (2) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's challenge brought under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and (3) any error in the court's decision to excuse a juror for cause did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Booker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, Rhode Island College and related individuals, on the grounds of qualified immunity, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Plaintiff brought this action seeking equitable relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 on the grounds that Defendants' conduct toward him during his Master of Social Work program violated his First and Fourteenth Rights. The superior court concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's arguments on appeal were unavailing. View "Felkner v. R.I. College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 lawsuit against several defendants, including agents of the Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force (“GFNTF”). Plaintiff alleged two Fourth Amendment violations: (I) the warrant was based upon deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth -- the use of the informant to develop and generate false evidence incorporated in an affidavit; and (ii) Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a preliminary hearing at which Plaintiff would have been discharged because the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing these claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the affidavit provided probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, even if corrected to include the information Plaintiff alleged was recklessly omitted. The court explained that there is no evidence any of the defendants knew about the false “murder-for-hire” allegations when the warrant affidavit was submitted. An agent does not “violate a clearly established constitutional right by omitting information from a warrant application that he does not actually know, even if the reason is his own reckless investigation.” As Plaintiff’s subsequent, lengthy investigation of the informant makes clear, minimal further investigation into the informant’s criminal history would not have exonerated Plaintiff. View "Henry Howe v. Steven Gilpin" on Justia Law

This case started more than fifty years ago when Minnie Liddell sued to desegregate the St. Louis public school system. The NAACP joined the lawsuit, and the State of Missouri (among others) became a defendant. The parties struck a deal that lasted until 1999 when they agreed to end Missouri’s remedial obligations. The Missouri Legislature ratified the parties’ settlement agreement and created a charter-school option. A group of charter schools complained to the Missouri Legislature, which altered the funding formula in 2006. The revised formula, part of Senate Bill 287, is what has led to the current dispute. The St. Louis Public School District and one of the plaintiffs asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement by having Missouri reimburse it for the special-sales-tax revenue it had lost under the new funding formula. The district court sided with Missouri, and both sides appealed. Plaintiffs continued to believe that the St. Louis Public School District should receive all the special-sales-tax revenue. And Missouri argued that the desegregation-spending condition finds no support in the settlement agreement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but vacated the part requiring charter schools to spend those funds on “desegregation measures.” The court explained that there has been no “disproportionate adverse financial impact” on the St. Louis Public School District because it never had a right to keep all the special-sales-tax revenue for itself. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that allowing charter schools to spend their money as they see fit is inconsistent with the “purpose” of the settlement agreement. View "Deric Liddell v. State of Missouri" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of capital murder and sentence of life imprisonment without parole, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury with the model verdict form on dispute accomplice status was reversible error under the third and fourth exceptions enumerated in Wicks v. State, 606 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1980). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his property; and (2) neither Wicks exception to the objection requirement applied under the circumstances of this case. View "Nowell v. State" on Justia Law

Addison was convicted, in absentia, of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a converted motor vehicle, forgery, and two counts of theft, arising out of his alleged use of counterfeit money to purchase a motorcycle, and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Having failed to appear for trial, he was subsequently arrested.Addison’s appellate counsel did not file a brief and determined that there are no meritorious issues, except concerning credit that should be applied toward the prison sentences. Addison filed a postconviction petition, contending that trial and appellate counsel were deficient. Appointed postconviction counsel filed an amended petition, alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based on improper Miranda warnings, for failing to object to expert testimony regarding counterfeit currency when no expert was disclosed, and for failing to argue sufficiency of the evidence where there were discrepancies; and that the court erred in giving an accountability instruction. The petition did not assert ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition.Addison appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance in failing to argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Addison did not forfeit collateral review of his conviction by failing to appear at trial. While any postconviction claims that could have been raised on direct appeal are generally forfeited that forfeiture could have been overcome by framing the issues as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal. The appellate court properly remanded for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) without considering the merits. View "People v. Addison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent more than twelve years in state prison because of his wrongful conviction for two murders. In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was released from prison. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state courts. His petition was denied because (1) it was not based on a finding that Plaintiff was “actually innocent,” (2) Plaintiff had not received a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. While Plaintiff was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in federal district court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.   The Fifth Circuit previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas Supreme Court in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In light of this clarified meaning of Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act, the court analyzed the district court’s grant of Defendants summary judgment motion and found that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit is barred by his acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation. View "Brown v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence.Defendant was a passenger in a single-vehicle car accident on the Maine Turnpike. Suspicion that the vehicle and/or its occupants were transporting drugs Maine police officers searched Defendant's bag and discovered narcotics. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the evidence was obtain in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant's arguments for suppression failed. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Virginia police responded to a 911 call seeking help to locate Plaintiff, who they were told was potentially armed and suicidal. After failing to find Plaintiff in his house, two officers and a K-9 searched the surrounding woods. The dog quickly caught Plaintiff’s scent, leading officers to find him lying in a shallow ditch. Bodycam footage shows the subsequent heated encounter, with officers demanding Plaintiff turn around and Plaintiff angrily ordering them to leave. After a two-minute impasse, an officer twice released the dog, who bit Plaintiff and caused a severe injury. The officers ultimately discovered Plaintiff didn’t have a gun. Plaintiff sued under state law and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging, among other things, violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the K-9 officer’s summary-judgment motion asserting qualified immunity, holding that the undisputed facts didn’t establish whether the officer had a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was armed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the K-9 officer on the excessive-force count and remanded with instructions that the court enters judgment for him on that count. The court explained that while the bodycam video alone may not illuminate whether the officer had a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was armed, the full record clarifies that this assumption was reasonable. Given that, the officer’s use of his dog to seize Plaintiff didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Dillard Putman v. Quentin Harris" on Justia Law