Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a stop and frisk, holding that the circumstances of this case did not warrant a level three stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976).Defendant, who was stopped and frisked after he existed a parked car and walked down the street, filed a motion to suppress drugs found on his person as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and directed that the indictment be dismissed, holding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk of Defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the minimum standard required to justify a stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976), was not met in this case. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant at a Chicago home, forcibly entering the residence after nobody answered. Inside, officers saw Ramirez descending from the second floor. Ramirez was detained but allowed to return upstairs, where he retrieved his shoes from one of the bedrooms. Police searched the house and recovered a 20-gauge Benelli shotgun, a Mossberg shotgun, a 9-millimeter handgun, and ammunition. The Benelli shotgun was recovered from under the mattress of the single bed in the room where Ramirez had retrieved his shoes. From the same bedroom, police recovered mail bearing Ramirez’s name and the home's address. Ramirez was taken into custody, provided Miranda warnings, and made a statement that he bought the Benelli shotgun from a coworker for $100.Ramirez was charged with possession of a Benelli shotgun whose serial number had been “changed, altered, removed or obliterated” (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b)). The state did not present any direct evidence that Ramirez knew that the shotgun’s serial number was defaced. Ramirez did not testify or call any witnesses. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed his conviction. Section 24-5(b)’s implied mens rea of knowledge must apply to both elements of the offense, possession and defacement. The court remanded for a new trial. At the time of trial, binding precedent from an appellate court provided that the state did not have to present evidence that a defendant knew a firearm was defaced. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In 2008, Graefnitz went with Wilson and Moore to buy drugs. Graefnitz was shot in the back and died from his wounds. Wilson was then 14 years old. The court granted a transfer motion, concluding that charging Wilson in the juvenile justice system “with the hope that this minor will somehow be transformed into a non-violent law-abiding citizen ready for release in society at age 21” would not serve the public interest nor the interest of justice. Wilson was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury found that Wilson did not personally discharge the weapon that caused Graefnitz’s death. The PSI consisted of more than 200 pages of reports and supporting documents, including information about Wilson’s troubled background, mental disabilities, substance abuse, criminal history, and medical diagnoses. The court sentenced Wilson to 55 years’ imprisonment for murder (which included a 15-year firearm enhancement), to be served at 100%, and a consecutive four years for attempted armed robbery.Wilson sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging his sentence as violating the eighth amendment by imposing a de facto life sentence without a finding of permanent incorrigibility or specifically addressing the attendant characteristics of youth discussed in the Supreme Court’s 2012 "Miller" decision. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed a decision that vacated Wilson’s sentence. The sentencing court reviewed the entire PSI, which contained extensive evidence regarding Wilson’s developmental age, maturity, and other circumstances, and announced several times that Wilson was young. Wilson received the constitutionally required procedure under Miller. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 1983, Prante was convicted of a strangulation murder. The appellate court rejected Prante’s claim that the state’s expert testimony concerning bite marks should not have been admitted. In 1993, Prante filed a postconviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process claim concerning “material misrepresentation of evidence” relating to blood found at the crime scene.” The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely. In 2002, Prante filed an unsuccessful petition arguing that his sentence violated Apprendi. In 2017, Prante successfully sought DNA and fingerprint testing (725 ILCS 5/116-3). No interpretable DNA profiles were obtained, and no match was found for the fingerprint.In 2018, Prante sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition that argued actual innocence, a due process claim alleging that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of bite mark analysis evidence, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Prante asserted that recent scientific studies had discredited the forensic bite mark opinion testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Prante is not entitled to file either the due process or the actual innocence claim. Without any allegation that the state knowingly used the false bite mark testimony or failed to exercise diligence to discover that the testimony was false, Prante has not pled a cognizable due process claim under Illinois law. Prante has not met the high standard for setting forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. View "People v. Prante" on Justia Law

Moore and Williams, both sentenced to life in prison without parole for separate murders committed when they were 19 years old, appealed from judgments denying them leave to file successive postconviction petitions challenging their sentences. The Fourth District affirmed the judgment against Moore; the Second District reversed the judgment against Williams.The Illinois Supreme Court held that neither Moore nor Williams sufficiently pled cause for filing their successive postconviction petitions. The Supreme Court’s 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences imposed on young adult offenders, it does not provide cause for Moore and Williams to file their proposed successive postconviction petitions. Moore failed to allege facts that could support a finding that his brain development at the time of the crime required the court to treat him as a juvenile offender. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal in which Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State intentionally had delayed the prosecution in violation of his right to a speedy trial, holding that the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss did not constitute a final judgment.Defendant filed a motion to dismiss criminal charges the State had reinstitute against him after the trial accepted a nolle prosequi on the ground that the State was unable to locate material witnesses, arguing that the State had violated his right to a speedy trial by intentionally delaying the prosecution, and consequently, he lost the ability to have the counsel of his choice represent him at trial. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Defendant failed to satisfy either prong of the test established in State v. Curcio, 463 A.2d 566 (Conn. 1983). View "State v. Malone" on Justia Law

This qualified immunity case arises from the death of a man who was shot and killed by officers of the Stratford Police Department after he attempted to evade arrest while fleeing in a stolen car. Plaintiffs, the man’s minor child and his estate appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not pointed to sufficient authority clearly establishing that the officer’s conduct violated the law under the specific circumstances he was facing, and thus he is entitled to qualified immunity. Further, the court explained that here there are significant factual disputes about the manner in which the incident took place. If the facts are as the officers alleged them—that the man drove straight at the officer and missed, deadly force may well be reasonable. However, at the summary stage, the court must draw all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs’ version of facts. The district court did not address whether the man’s rights with respect to the second round of shots were clearly established. The court reversed the district court’s opinion granting summary judgment as to the second round of shots and remanded to the district court. View "Baker v. Coburn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued three Defendant correctional officers under Section 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. While Plaintiff was in his prison cell, two correctional officers sprayed a chemical agent on him. The parties contest why the officers did this: Plaintiff says it was in retaliation for his protected speech; the correctional officers respond that it was to stop Plaintiff from tampering with a sprinkler in his cell. Shortly after that, Plaintiff alleged that a supervising officer instructed the prison staff not to feed him—again, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected speech. Plaintiff sued the two officers and the supervising officer for violating his First and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the two correctional officers under Heck v. Humphrey because it concluded that the success of Plaintiff’s claims required a showing that his prison disciplinary conviction was invalid. But although the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages against the supervising officer, it allowed Plaintiff’s demand for nominal damages to go to trial. The jury returned a verdict for the supervising officer.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against the two correctional officers. The court explained that Heck does not bar Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, and even if Heck applies to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for compensatory and punitive damages. View "Wendall Jermaine Hall v. Lieutenant Peter Merola" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declined to address the merits of these appeals challenging the Attorney General's (AG) decision denying Plaintiffs' initiative petition that would have instituted limits on contributions to independent expenditure political action committees, holding that the appeals were moot.The AG determined that the proposed law conflicted with the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights' right of free speech and, therefore, addressed an excluded subject under article 48. Ultimately, the AG concluded that the proposed limitation on campaign contributions was precluded under United States Supreme Court precedent. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, the AG offered to agree to a stipulated order, but Plaintiffs refused to agree with the order. Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the AG argued that the appeals were moot because Plaintiffs did not gather the first round of signatures set forth in article 48. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the cases as moot, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet the deadline to file additional signatures with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. View "Herrmann v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to deny Petitioner's petition to reinstate his driver's license, holding that the district court did not err in denying the petition because Petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that the suspension of his driver's license was improper.On appeal, Petitioner argued that his request to speak to an attorney prior to taking a preliminary breath test and a post-arrest blood test should not have been taken as an implied refusal to submit to either test and, therefore, he did not refuse to take the tests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record reflected that Petitioner explicitly refused to take the tests; and (2) the district court correctly denied Petitioner's petition. View "Turner v. State" on Justia Law