Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of both deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that there was no error in the underlying proceedings or in the verdict.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant following a police trooper's examination of Defendant's vehicle, which was visibly parked in the driveway leading up to his house. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant's vehicle was not parked within the curtilage of his home the trooper's observations of the vehicle did not constitute a search for constitutional purposes; and (2) there was no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Wittey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has been incarcerated on death row in Arkansas since 1997. After he was denied relief in state court under Arkansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit against several Arkansas officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on both standing and immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the Attorney General currently possesses any of the DNA evidence he wants to test, Act 1780 provides the Attorney General an opportunity to play a critical role in the statute’s implementation. And here, the Attorney General responded to Plaintiff’s Act 1780 petition by opposing it in state court. The Attorney General “thereby caused,” in part, Plaintiff’s ongoing injury of being denied access to DNA testing that might prove his innocence. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that was caused by Defendants and that would be redressed by the relief he seeks in his Section 1983 action. He has standing to bring his procedural due process challenge to Act 1780. Further, the court found that Defendants here are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and has alleged a sufficient connection between the defendants and Act 1780’s enforcement. View "Stacey Johnson v. Tim Griffin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this pro se action in federal district court alleging, as relevant here, that the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) violated her children’s rights under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000ff, et seq. The district court dismissed the GINA claims because Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring those claims on her own behalf and because Plaintiff—who is not a licensed attorney—could not proceed pro se on behalf of her children. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in holding that she cannot represent her children in federal court.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the GINA claims and remanded. The court held that an absolute bar on pro se parent representation is inconsistent with Section 1654, which allows a pro se parent to proceed on behalf of her child in federal court when the child’s case is the parent’s “own.” 28 U.S.C. Section 1654. The court explained this condition would be met if federal or state law designated Plaintiff’s children’s cases as belonging to her. The court remanded because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider whether Plaintiff’s children’s claims under the GINA belong to Plaintiff within the meaning of Section 1654. View "Raskin v. Dallas Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress eyewitness identifications resulting from an out-of-court police procedure, holding that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion review and that the court of appeal correctly analyzed the merits under that standard.In denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the court of appeal applied the abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court's ruling on the out-of-court identification by the eyewitness. On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed "[d]ue to the abuse of discretion standard of review." The Supreme Court approved the decision below, holding (1) abuse of discretion review is the proper standard; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the out-of-court identification. View "Alahad v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation but vacated his conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, holding that the felony-murder conviction was improper.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony. In this appeal, consolidated with the appeal of his motions for a new trial and for reconsideration, Defendant argued, and the Commonwealth conceded, that the conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder was improper because the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping did not exist at the time of the killing. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's felony-murder conviction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's conviction of felony-murder lacked sufficient evidence to support it; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Commonwealth v. Samia" on Justia Law

At around nine o’clock in the evening, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a Ford Mustang darting erratically in the streets. Behind the wheel was a young white male, along with a blindfolded female in the car. With the aid of the car’s license plate number provided by the caller, Fountain Valley police officers figured out the home address of the driver and raced to that house. But this was not an ongoing kidnapping. In reality, the driver was taking his wife for a “surprise” anniversary dinner. And his parents would soon experience a surprise of their own as the police officers descended upon the home that they shared with their son. Before this mix-up could be cleared, the police officers ordered the Plaintiffs out of their home for obstructing the police and pushed the father to the ground as they handcuffed him. The Hills later sued, alleging (among other things) violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless arrests and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for police officers.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure when the officers ordered them to exit the home or face arrest for obstruction. The officers never seized Plaintiffs, who did not submit to the officers’ demand to leave the home. They, therefore, could not claim that they were unlawfully arrested. The panel next held that while the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice, they were nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity. View "STEPHEN HILL, ET AL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, ET AL" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.Defendant was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for robbing a bank. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process did not compel the circuit court to pre-screen the identification at issue when that identification was made for the first time in court; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's identification was more probative than prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was properly convicted of a second or subsequent offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law

Speech First, Inc., which identifies itself as a national organization committed to protecting the rights of college students, initiated this action against the President of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech or the University). Speech First asserts that two Virginia Tech policies — the Bias Intervention and Response Team Policy (the Bias Policy) and the Informational Activities Policy — violate the First Amendment rights of its student members. Speech First asked the district court to preliminarily enjoin both policies. The district court held that Speech First (1) lacked standing to challenge the Bias Policy because its members had suffered no injury in fact, and (2) failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to the Informational Activities Policy because the record was, at that time, inadequate as to that policy. Speech First appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Speech First offers only speculation in support of its argument that it has suffered an injury in fact. Because the district court’s factual findings make clear that no record evidence establishes any such injury, the organization has failed to establish an injury in fact and so lacks standing to challenge the Bias Policy. The court explained that once this case is returned to the district court, and after further factual development has taken place, it will be for that court to determine in the first instance whether the Informational Activities Policy complies with the First Amendment. Without a developed record, the district court did not err in determining that Speech First has not yet shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Timothy Sands" on Justia Law