Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to murder and capital felony and was sentenced to death. The case was remanded for a new penalty phase hearing, during which Defendant waived his right to have a jury determine his sentence. After the hearing, a three-judge panel again sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of a jury for the penalty phase hearing was constitutionally valid; (2) the presiding judge at the penalty phase hearing did not make comments that warranted recusal, and his involvement in earlier proceedings did not give rise to an improper appearance of impartiality; (3) Defendant failed to establish that the absence of a specific intent requirement in the aggravating factor found by the panel rendered his death sentence unconstitutional; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the panel's finding of an aggravating factor; (5) the panel properly weighed aggravating and mitigating factors and determined that death was the appropriate punishment; (6) Defendant failed to establish that his sentence was the product of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors; and (7) the death penalty, as a general matter, does not violate the state constitution.

Defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree and sentenced to one-year incarceration, execution suspended, and three years probation. Defendant was later arrested and charged with risk of injury to a child and, subsequently, with violation of probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation on the basis of its finding that Defendant had committed the crime of risk of injury to a child, and committed Defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for the unexecuted portion of his original one-year sentence. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant violated his probation by committing the crime of risk of injury to a child when he failed to supervise a two-year-old who was in his care and able to exit the home. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendant.

Following a jury trial, Defendant John Papandrea was convicted of nine counts of larceny in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed. At trial, the state claimed that Defendant stole corporate funds from his employer in order to purchase artwork. Defendant conceded that he took the funds but asserted in his defense that he lacked the wrongful intent necessary for first degree larceny. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate court properly concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence of Defendant's intent to commit larceny. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Defendant had the necessary intent to commit larceny.

Petitioners, George Gould and Ronald Taylor, were arrested and charged with, inter alia, murder, felony murder, and robbery in the first degree. The jury acquitted Petitioners of the murder charge but convicted them on all of the other counts. Subsequently, Petitioners filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. The habeas court granted the petitions and vacated the convictions, concluding that petitioners had established their entitlement to relief on the basis of actual innocence because two of the state's witnesses had recanted their testimony. Respondent, the commissioner of correction, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the habeas court's judgments, holding that, under the test set forth in Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, actual innocence requires affirmative evidence that Petitioners did not commit the crimes of which they were convicted, not simply the discrediting of evidence on which the conviction rested. Remanded for a new trial under the proper standard.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of possession of narcotics, possession of a controlled substance, interfering with an officer, and tampering with physical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence taken from the motor vehicle that Defendant was operating at the time of his arrest; (2) concluding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction on the possessory charges; (3) admitting Defendant's unredacted medical records into evidence; and (4) instructing the jury as to the State's burden of proof.

Defendant pled guilty to sexual assault in the second degree, sexual assault in the third degree, and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. At the hearing for resentencing upon the second remand, Defendant moved to withdraw his prior pleas, and the trial court denied his motion. On appeal, Defendant claimed the trial court should have granted his motion pursuant to Practice Book 39-26 and 39-27(2) as well as due process protections because the Supreme Court previously determined that his plea agreement resulted in an unenforceable illegal sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, holding that Defendant's motion was beyond the scope of remand for resentencing and therefore should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography. As a condition of probation, Defendant was required to not possess or subscribe to any sexually stimulating material deemed inappropriate by probation officer. After finding Defendant violated his probation by visiting dating websites and possessing nude photographs, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the special condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face and unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim of unconstitutional overbreadth failed because because he did not allege a violation of his First Amendment rights; (2) there was no merit to Defendant's vagueness claim, and his as-applied vagueness claim failed under State v. Golding and the plain error doctrine; and (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding.

Defendant was adjudicated a youthful offender for committing the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ninety days' incarceration and a period of probation of two years. As a condition of probation, Defendant was ordered to make restitution to the victims in the amount of $2,000. Defendant appealed, arguing that since there was no evidence or finding that he had personally caused damage, the trial court's order to pay restitution was improper. The appellate court reversed the sentence imposed and remanded with direction to vacate the restitution order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because its order of restitution had a nexus to the crime of which Defendant was convicted and was, therefore, reasonably related to Defendant's rehabilitation.

Defendant David Sheriff was charged with several drug-related offenses. Flavio Bail Bonds executed a bail bond for Sheriff on each of the cases. After Sheriff failed to appear for the trial of the three cases, Flavio discovered that Sheriff had fled to Jamaica and remained there. The state subsequently declined to initiate extradition proceedings. Flavio filed a petition with the trial court for compromise or to release Flavio from its obligation on the bonds pursuant to Practice Book 38-23, which permits a court to relieve a surety of bond obligations after a showing of good cause. The trial court determined that Flavio had failed to establish good cause, and therefore, denied Flavio's petition. Flavio thereafter filed a writ of error. The Supreme court held that the trial court properly denied the petition and denied the writ, holding (1) the trial court applied the proper standard in making its determination, and (2) the trial court properly concluded that Flavio failed to show good cause under the rule.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant was found not guilty of murder, either as a principal or an accessory. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted testimony that Defendant previously had possessed a pistol on an occasion prior to the date of the crimes with which he was charged; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering, in sentencing Defendant, remarks made by the family of the victim in their impact statement and other evidence related to the murder charge, of which Defendant was found not guilty.