Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to sexual assault in the second degree, sexual assault in the third degree, and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. At the hearing for resentencing upon the second remand, Defendant moved to withdraw his prior pleas, and the trial court denied his motion. On appeal, Defendant claimed the trial court should have granted his motion pursuant to Practice Book 39-26 and 39-27(2) as well as due process protections because the Supreme Court previously determined that his plea agreement resulted in an unenforceable illegal sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, holding that Defendant's motion was beyond the scope of remand for resentencing and therefore should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography. As a condition of probation, Defendant was required to not possess or subscribe to any sexually stimulating material deemed inappropriate by probation officer. After finding Defendant violated his probation by visiting dating websites and possessing nude photographs, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the special condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face and unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim of unconstitutional overbreadth failed because because he did not allege a violation of his First Amendment rights; (2) there was no merit to Defendant's vagueness claim, and his as-applied vagueness claim failed under State v. Golding and the plain error doctrine; and (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding.

Defendant was adjudicated a youthful offender for committing the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ninety days' incarceration and a period of probation of two years. As a condition of probation, Defendant was ordered to make restitution to the victims in the amount of $2,000. Defendant appealed, arguing that since there was no evidence or finding that he had personally caused damage, the trial court's order to pay restitution was improper. The appellate court reversed the sentence imposed and remanded with direction to vacate the restitution order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because its order of restitution had a nexus to the crime of which Defendant was convicted and was, therefore, reasonably related to Defendant's rehabilitation.

Defendant David Sheriff was charged with several drug-related offenses. Flavio Bail Bonds executed a bail bond for Sheriff on each of the cases. After Sheriff failed to appear for the trial of the three cases, Flavio discovered that Sheriff had fled to Jamaica and remained there. The state subsequently declined to initiate extradition proceedings. Flavio filed a petition with the trial court for compromise or to release Flavio from its obligation on the bonds pursuant to Practice Book 38-23, which permits a court to relieve a surety of bond obligations after a showing of good cause. The trial court determined that Flavio had failed to establish good cause, and therefore, denied Flavio's petition. Flavio thereafter filed a writ of error. The Supreme court held that the trial court properly denied the petition and denied the writ, holding (1) the trial court applied the proper standard in making its determination, and (2) the trial court properly concluded that Flavio failed to show good cause under the rule.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant was found not guilty of murder, either as a principal or an accessory. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted testimony that Defendant previously had possessed a pistol on an occasion prior to the date of the crimes with which he was charged; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering, in sentencing Defendant, remarks made by the family of the victim in their impact statement and other evidence related to the murder charge, of which Defendant was found not guilty.

Defendant was charged with, inter alia, six counts of capital felony in connection with a triple murder, sexual assault, and arson. During the trial, the trial court granted the motion of intervenors, a newspaper and one of its reporters, to vacate an order sealing Defendant's "witness list." The appellate court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the trial court decision for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification to appeal, (1) concluding that the appeal should be treated as a late petition for certification to appeal and, therefore, not determining whether the appellate court properly concluded the trial court's decision was not a final judgment; and (2) reversing the trial court's order granting the intervenors' motion to vacate the sealing order, holding that Defendant demonstrated that the potential abridgement of his rights to a fair trial and to prepare a defense clearly outweighed the rights of the intervenors and the public to access the witness list document.

After Defendant was charged in three criminal cases and, in a fourth case, with violating his probation, he was found incompetent to stand trial and not restorable to competency. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges in all four cases, claiming (1) he was entitled to dismissal of two cases involving misdemeanor charges and the violation of probation case because the statute of limitations had expired, and (2) he was entitled to dismissal of the case involving a felony charge pursuant to Practice Book 41-8. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all four of the pending cases on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the two cases involving misdemeanor charges on the alternate ground that the charges were subject to dismissal pursuant to section 54-56d(m) because the statute of limitations had expired; (2) reversed the judgment of dismissal as to the felony charge and remanded for a determination as to whether the case should be dismissed pursuant to Practice Book 41-8(5); and (3) dismissed the portion of the appeal regarding the dismissal of the violation of the probation case.

At age fifteen, Defendant was charged with larceny in the second and fourth degrees and burglary in the third degree. Before the juvenile court, the State filed a motion to transfer the charges from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-127(b). The juvenile court denied the State's motion. After the State filed an appeal, the Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Fernandes, which interpreted section 46b-127(b) to comply with due process requirements because, prior to the finalization of the transfer of a case involving certain crimes from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket, the juvenile is entitled to a hearing in the criminal court to contest the appropriateness of trying the juvenile as an adult. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court's denial of the State's motion to transfer the charges of larceny in the second degree and burglary in the third degree and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) Fernandes controlled in this case, and (2) before the transfer of Defendant's case to the regular criminal docket was finalized, Defendant was entitled to a hearing before the court on the regular criminal docket. Remanded.

Defendant was charged and convicted of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a pistol. At trial, three witnesses who had criminal matters pending in a variety of venues testified that they had seen Defendant commit the murder. On appeal, Defendant claimed (1) the trial court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that the testimony of the three witnesses should be viewed with great caution in light of potential benefits the witnesses could receive from the government in their pending criminal matters in exchange for their testimony; and (2) in the alternative, the Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory power to require such an instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to give, sua sponte, a special credibility instruction for the three witnesses; and (2) because trial courts already have discretion to give a special credibility instruction under existing case law whenever the court reasonably believes a witness' testimony may be particularly unreliable, there is no need for the Court to create a new supervisory rule requiring a special credibility instruction in such cases.

After a jury trial, Harry Gonzalez was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and kidnapping in the first degree. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court improperly denied in part Gonzalez's motion to suppress certain statements he had made to the police because he made those statements as a result of police interrogation while in custody and without having been informed of his Miranda rights, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Gonzalez's constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated by his convictions of and separate punishments for felony murder and first degree robbery. Remanded for a new trial.