Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant Darryl W. was convicted of criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of violation of probation based on his conviction of the criminal offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his claims that the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the elements of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm and regarding his affirmative defense to kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm; and (2) certain comments by the senior assistant state's attorney during closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial impropriety.

After a jury trial, Defendant Herman Apodaca was convicted of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial court properly dismissed a juror midtrial for cause; (2) the trial court properly instructed the juror on the felony murder count; (3) under the facts of the case, the court did not violate its obligations by declining to rephrase the entire conspiracy instruction in laypersons' terms after the jury requested further instructions; and (4) the trial court's instructions on conspiracy to commit robbery were not misleading, and therefore, Defendant's due process rights were not violated by the instructions.

Defendant Alia Altajir pleaded nolo contendere to charges of misconduct with a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years' incarceration, suspended after one year, and five years of probation. Defendant later violated the special conditions of her probation. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the trial court admitted undated photographs gathered from Facebook, on which Defendant maintained a profile. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had violated her right to due process by admitting the photographs. The appellate court determined that this claim was unpreserved and did not merit review. The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the photographs satisfied the minimum standard of reliability constitutionally required to admit evidence at the dispositional phase of a probation revocation hearing.

Defendants, an attorney and a law firm, represented Plaintiff Robert Grimm in an action to dissolve Grimm's marriage. Plaintiff subsequently brought a legal malpractice action against Defendants. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for judgment because Plaintiff had not disclosed an expert when one was required and, therefore, could not establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice as to Defendants' breach of the standard of care. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) determining that the critical statements concerning Defendants made by the Court in its opinion affirming the underlying divorce action were not sufficient expert evidence of Defendants' malpractice; and (2) considering Defendants' motion for judgment the day after the motion was filed and the day before jury selection began in order to avoid the delay and expense of a trial in which Plaintiff could not present any evidence to support his claim.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes. The trial court enhanced Defendant's sentence for being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-40. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that section 53a-40(h) was unconstitutional to the extent it required the trial court to make the requisite finding that Defendant's extended incarceration would best serve the public interest. On remand, the jury found that extended incarceration of Defendant would best serve the public interest, and the trial court again imposed an enhanced sentence pursuant to section 53a-40. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the information because the retroactive application to Defendant of section 53a-40(h), as modified by the constitutional gloss that the Court placed on it before remand, did not violate the ex post facto clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) construing the term "public interest," as used in section 53a-40(h), to exclude consideration of the costs of incarceration; (3) precluding Defendant from introducing expert testimony about his anticipated release date from a concurrent federal sentence; and (4) admitting evidence of the details of the victim's injuries.

Defendant pleaded guilty to murder and capital felony and was sentenced to death. The case was remanded for a new penalty phase hearing, during which Defendant waived his right to have a jury determine his sentence. After the hearing, a three-judge panel again sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of a jury for the penalty phase hearing was constitutionally valid; (2) the presiding judge at the penalty phase hearing did not make comments that warranted recusal, and his involvement in earlier proceedings did not give rise to an improper appearance of impartiality; (3) Defendant failed to establish that the absence of a specific intent requirement in the aggravating factor found by the panel rendered his death sentence unconstitutional; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the panel's finding of an aggravating factor; (5) the panel properly weighed aggravating and mitigating factors and determined that death was the appropriate punishment; (6) Defendant failed to establish that his sentence was the product of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors; and (7) the death penalty, as a general matter, does not violate the state constitution.

Defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree and sentenced to one-year incarceration, execution suspended, and three years probation. Defendant was later arrested and charged with risk of injury to a child and, subsequently, with violation of probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation on the basis of its finding that Defendant had committed the crime of risk of injury to a child, and committed Defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for the unexecuted portion of his original one-year sentence. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant violated his probation by committing the crime of risk of injury to a child when he failed to supervise a two-year-old who was in his care and able to exit the home. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendant.

Following a jury trial, Defendant John Papandrea was convicted of nine counts of larceny in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed. At trial, the state claimed that Defendant stole corporate funds from his employer in order to purchase artwork. Defendant conceded that he took the funds but asserted in his defense that he lacked the wrongful intent necessary for first degree larceny. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate court properly concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence of Defendant's intent to commit larceny. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Defendant had the necessary intent to commit larceny.

Petitioners, George Gould and Ronald Taylor, were arrested and charged with, inter alia, murder, felony murder, and robbery in the first degree. The jury acquitted Petitioners of the murder charge but convicted them on all of the other counts. Subsequently, Petitioners filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. The habeas court granted the petitions and vacated the convictions, concluding that petitioners had established their entitlement to relief on the basis of actual innocence because two of the state's witnesses had recanted their testimony. Respondent, the commissioner of correction, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the habeas court's judgments, holding that, under the test set forth in Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, actual innocence requires affirmative evidence that Petitioners did not commit the crimes of which they were convicted, not simply the discrediting of evidence on which the conviction rested. Remanded for a new trial under the proper standard.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of possession of narcotics, possession of a controlled substance, interfering with an officer, and tampering with physical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence taken from the motor vehicle that Defendant was operating at the time of his arrest; (2) concluding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction on the possessory charges; (3) admitting Defendant's unredacted medical records into evidence; and (4) instructing the jury as to the State's burden of proof.