Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, both of which require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim, at the time of the offense, was physically helpless. After the state presented its case at trial, and again following the close of evidence Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming the state had failed to offer sufficient evidence that the victim was physically helpless. The trial court denied the motions. The appellate court reversed after considering the sole issue of whether the jury reasonably could have found that the state introduced sufficient evidence to prove that the victim was unable to communicate her lack of consent to Defendant's sexual advances and concluding that the state had failed to sustain its evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state failed to produce any credible evidence that the victim was either unconscious or so uncommunicative that she was physically incapable of manifesting to Defendant her lack of consent to sexual intercourse the time of the alleged sexual assault. View "State v. Fourtin" on Justia Law

Defendant was under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board from 1985 for a period not to exceed twenty-five years, following his acquittal of several criminal counts. In 2009, approximately one year before the end of Defendant's twenty-five year term, the state petitioned for an order to continued commitment, arguing that Defendant remained mentally ill and that his discharge from the jurisdiction of the board would constitute a danger to himself or others. The trial court granted the state's petition and ordered that Defendant be committed to the jurisdiction of the board for an additional three years pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-593(c). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 17a-593 would withstand intermediate scrutiny if such scrutiny were warranted; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's claim that his original plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. View "State v. Dyous" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. Petitioner later filed an amended three count petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and actual innocence with respect to his convictions. The habeas court granted in part Petitioner's amended petition on the ground that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing, inter alia, to present expert testimony to challenge the state's presentation of incriminatory expert evidence on medical issues relating to the child victim's symptomatology. Respondent, the commissioner of correction, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance of trial counsel. Remanded. View "Michael T. v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

These appeals arose from the ruling of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), that defendant Rashad El Badrawi was entitled, under the Freedom of Information Act (act), to the disclosure of a document that the plaintiff, the commissioner of correction (commissioner), obtained from a file in the National Crime Information Center, which is maintained by the FBI. The commissioner and the intervenor, the United States, appealed from the commission's ruling, claiming that the commission improperly ordered disclosure of the document because, among other reasons, disclosure was barred by a federal regulation, and therefore, the document was exempt from the act in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-210(a). The trial court dismissed in part and sustained in part the appeals and ordered that a redacted version of the document be disclosed to El Badrawi. The commissioner and the United States appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the document fell within an exemption to the act set forth in section 1-210(a), and therefore, El Badrawi was not entitled to disclosure of the document. View "Comm'r of Corr. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n " on Justia Law

The sole issue in this certified appeal was whether Defendant's conviction of, and punishment for, both criminal possession of a firearm in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-217(a)(3)(A) and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-223(a) violated his federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, Defendant contended that the appellate court improperly concluded that the legislature clearly intended to permit multiple punishments for the same offense and, therefore, that his two convictions were not a double jeopardy violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding section 53a-217(a)(3)(A) and 53a-223(A) are not the "same offense" under Blockburger v. United States, as applied by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in United States v. Dixon, and there is no evidence that the legislature clearly intended to preclude defendants from being convicted of, and punished for, committing both offenses. View "State v. Bernacki" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of risk of injury to a child. The appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed, claiming that the appellate court improperly concluded that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence four statements by an expert witness, each to the effect that the complainant exhibited behaviors consistent with those of sexual abuse victims; and (2) reversal was required because these improper evidentiary rulings were not harmless error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the four statements were improperly admitted into evidence, and the Court did not have a fair assurance that those improprieties did not substantially sway the jury's verdict. View "State v. Favoccia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit murder; (2) the prosecutor did not engage in impropriety by eliciting from a key state witness a statement that she would never lie, and the prosecutor did not argue outside of the evidence in his rebuttal argument, and therefore, the prosecutor did not engage in improper conduct; and (4) the record was ineffective was inadequate for review of both of Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and accordingly, the ineffective assistance claims should be resolved after an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. View "State v. Taft" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-92(a)(2)(A). After a trial to the court, Defendant was convicted of violation of probation. Defendant appealed, raising two claims of error. The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the court erred in omitting limiting language in instructing the jury that the phrase "without consent," as defined by Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-91(a)(1) includes "any means whatsoever, including acquiescence of the victim," for purposes of the restraint element of section 53a-92(a)(2); and (2) it was reasonably possible that the trial court's improper instruction had the effect of misleading the jury, and a new trial was, therefore, required on the kidnapping charge. View "State v. Devalda" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations applicable to the offense had expired and had not been tolled because he left the state. Defendant's principal assertion was that he did not flee the state because he was returning to his home in Massachusetts after the commission of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it was undisputed that Defendant returned to Massachusetts after the commission of a crime and continued to reside there until his arrest more than twenty years later, and accordingly, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss because it properly concluded that the state had shown probable cause that the statute of limitations had been tolled; (2) the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal because the state proved there was sufficient evidence that Defendant fled the state; and (3) the trial court's instructions on the statute of limitations defense were not misleading. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge on the ground that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to prevent the liberation of the victim for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which was necessary to commit the sexual assault as required by State v. Salamon. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to the kidnapping charge, holding (1) the trial court improperly improperly granted Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and rendered judgment of not guilty on the kidnapping charge, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that Defendant's restraint of the victim was not merely incidental to the sexual assault; (2) the judgment may not be affirmed on the alternate ground that the kidnapping statute, as applied to Defendant's conduct, was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court's instruction on the kidnapping charge was not misleading. Remanded. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law