Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Connecticut Supreme Court
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence of his refusal to answer questions from the police. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Defendant opened the door to evidence of his refusal to answer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in determining that defense counsel opened the door to the admission of the evidence at issue. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree and related crimes. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in precluding him from cross-examining the complainant about whether she had lied to the police on an unrelated matter in violation of his right to examine a witness' character for untruthfulness, his right to confrontation, and his right to present a defense. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined the trial court reasonably concluded that inquiry into the collateral matter should not be permitted. View "State v. Annulli" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of murder and other offenses in connection with a shooting that left one man dead and two others seriously wounded. At trial, one of the victims testified falsely regarding the consideration he expected to receive in exchange for his testimony. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the State had deprived him of a fair trial by failing to correct the false testimony. The habeas court denied relief, concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate materiality. The appellate court reversed, finding that Petitioner was entitled to a new trial where there was a reasonable likelihood that the victim's testimony could have affected the jury's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the victim's perjurious testimony was significant enough that the State's failure to correct it warranted relief under the strict materiality standard applicable in this case. View "Adams v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of criminally negligent homicide, two counts of cruelty to persons, and two counts of risk of injury to a child. The convictions arose from Defendant's restriction of fluids to a two-year-old child in order to correct certain behavioral problems. The child died of dehydration. Due to her low IQ, Defendant did not know that withholding liquids could cause the child to die, but Defendant did understand that depriving someone of fluids could cause dehydration. The appellate court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that the State presented sufficient evidence Defendant had the required mental state in order to convict her of the offenses. View "State v. Patterson" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, promoting a minor in an obscene performance, risk of injury to a child, and possession of child pornography in the third degree. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his Gmail account through the execution of a search warrant. Specifically, Defendant argued that the warrant was an extraterritorial search warrant for his Gmail account contained on Google's servers located in California. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the merits of Defendant's argument, holding that any impropriety in the issuance and execution of the warrant was, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless error that did not affect the verdict. View "State v. Esarey" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-two years incarceration and lifetime sex offender registration. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the appellate court erred in finding that Defendant's objection to the admission of expert testimony was unpreserved. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court correctly found that defense counsel's objection was not preserved; and (2) therefore, the Court declined to review Defendant's claim that the State's expert improperly expressed an opinion on the ultimate issue. View "State v. Jorge P." on Justia Law

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On a conditional plea of nolo contendere, Defendant was convicted of child pornography in the first degree. During the course of the proceedings, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress numerous photographic and video recorded images depicting child pornography, which the police discovered in computer equipment that had been seized from Defendant's residence pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant appealed, claiming the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was improper because the warrant authorizing the search of his residence was not supported by probable cause. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court properly determined the affidavit in support of the search warrant application contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe that child pornography would be found at Defendant's residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded probable cause existed to support the issuance of the warrant. View "State v. Shields" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and carrying a dangerous weapon. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court's instruction regarding Defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial in relation to the jury's credibility assessment of his testimony deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial improprieties that deprived Defendant of a fair trial; and (2) the trial court's instruction to the trial did not affect the fairness of the trial or prejudice Defendant. However, the Court directed trial courts in the future to refrain from instructing jurors, when a defendant testifies, that they may specifically consider the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case and the importance to him of the outcome of the trial. View "State v. Medrano" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request an increase in bond on two prior charges so that Petitioner could be credited for presentence confinement credit on those charges. The habeas court granted relief, concluding that Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel for a matter pertaining to presentence confinement. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of its conclusion in Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, decided this same day, holding (1) the habeas court properly determined that Petitioner was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at the plea hearing and sentencing; and (2) the failure of Petitioner's counsel to request an increase in the bond on his first arrest constituted deficient performance and such performance prejudiced Petitioner by exposing him to an additional seventeen days in jail for which he received no credit. View "Huertas v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

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Petitioner was arrested three times for three different offenses and later pleaded guilty to violation of a protective order and threatening in the second degree. Petitioner subsequently filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to request that the court credit Petitioner with seventy-three days of presentence confinement credit for one of his first two arrests. The habeas court found that Petitioner met his burden of proving that counsel's performance was deficient and ordered the Commissioner of Correction to credit Petitioner with seventy-three days of presentence confinement credit. The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel at his arraignment; and (2) Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly ruled that (1) the Sixth Amendment confers a right to the effective assistance of counsel in matters pertaining to credit for presentence confinement; and (2) Petitioner showed deficient performance and prejudice within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington. View "Gonzalez v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law