Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this habeas proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court holding that defense counsel’s delay in presenting to Petitioner a favorable plea offer from the prosecutor during trial amounted to deficient performance pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).Petitioner was convicted of felony murder. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he delayed presenting to her a favorable plea offer, an offer that the prosecutor later withdrew before it could be accepted. The habeas court agreed and concluded that Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the habeas court and Appellate Court properly determined that counsel’s delay in conveying the plea offer to Petitioner amounted to deficient performance. View "Helmedach v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that even assuming, without deciding, that the performance of Appellant’s trial counsel was deficient, Appellant failed to prove prejudice, and therefore, Appellant could not prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.Appellant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. Appellant’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant later filed an amended habeas petition alleging that Petitioner’s trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The habeas court concluded that trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered deficient performance and that Appellant satisfied his burden of demonstrating prejudice. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the question of whether the deficient performance of Appellant’s trial counsel resulted in prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed insomuch as the case was remanded, holding that Appellant was not prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel, and therefore, Appellant could not prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Hickey v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court improperly reached the merits of Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective of assistance of counsel in his habeas action.The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court denying Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain testimony on the basis of double hearsay. On appeal, Respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, argued that Petitioner’s claim was unreviewable because Petitioner raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Petitioner disagreed, claiming that defense counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668.The Supreme Court agreed with Respondent, holding that because Petitioner failed to present any evidence or pursue an argument before the habeas court that his counsel’s failure to object on the basis of double hearsay constituted deficient performance, the Appellate Court improperly reached the merits of Petitioner’s claim. View "Eubanks v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Defendant’s convictions for three counts of murder for the murders of Thomas Gaudet, Holly Flannery, and Kylie Flannery and two counts of capital felony for the coincident murders of Gaudet and Flannery and the murder of nine-year-old Kylie were improperly merged rather than vacated.Defendant was sentenced to death for his second capital felony conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court improperly merged his three murder convictions with the corresponding capital felony convictions as lesser included offenses of those crimes. The Supreme Court dismissed in part Defendant’s appeal and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant’s challenges to the penalty phase of his trial were either moot or unripe; and (2) pursuant to State v. Polanco, 61 A.3d 1084 (Conn. 2013), the trial court should have vacated the three murder convictions rather than merging them into the capital felony convictions. View "State v. Roszkowski" on Justia Law

Because Defendant was not self-represented during his testimony, the trial court’s decision to allow Defendant to testify in narrative form did not cause him to be self-represented without a proper waiver of his right to counsel.During the trial for the murder of his father and the physical assault of his elderly mother, Defendant demanded to testify that Satan had taken over his body and performed these acts. Based on the Rules of Professional Conduct, defense counsel requested that Defendant be permitted to give that testimony in narrative form. The trial court granted the request, and Defendant testified in that manner. After Defendant was convicted, he appealed, claiming that, pursuant to State v. Francis, 118 A.3d 529 (2015), he was entitled to a new trial because in order to exercise his right to testify, he was compelled to self-represent without a proper waiver of his right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Francis does not control the present case; and (2) under the facts of this case, Defendant was not self-represented during his narrative testimony or at any other point during the trial. View "State v. Jan G." on Justia Law

Defendant’s statement to two water company employees who had entered his property pursuant to an easement to service a fire hydrant was not “fighting words,” and therefore, the First Amendment forbids the imposition of criminal sanctions.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-182(a)(1). The conviction arose from Defendant’s statement to the water company employees that, if they did not leave his property, he would retrieve a gun and shoot them. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that, although inappropriate, Defendant’s words were not likely to provoke an immediate and violent reaction from the water company employees, and therefore, Defendant’s speech did not amount to fighting words. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, consistent with the First Amendment, Defendant’s statements did not constitute fighting words. View "State v. Parnoff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court concluding that, during Defendant’s in-home interrogation by the police, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).Defendant was convicted of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and attempt to commit robbery in the second degree. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress his oral and written statements to the police, arguing that any waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntarily given and, even if the police satisfied Miranda, his statements were obtained involuntarily, in violation of his due process rights. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and therefore, the police were not constitutionally required to provide him with Miranda warnings. View "State v. Castillo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant’s conviction of four counts of sexual assault in the second degree and three counts of risk of injury to a child, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that Defendant had waived any claim regarding his presence at sidebar conferences.Throughout the trial, both the defense and the state utilized sidebar conferences to make any detailed arguments on evidentiary objections. On appeal, Defendant argued that he had a right to be present at the sidebar conferences. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Defendant had waived any claim related to his presence at the sidebar conferences by agreeing to the procedure proposed by the trial court for handling arguments on evidentiary objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it would serve no purpose to repeat the discussion contained in the Appellate Court’s decision. View "State v. Tierinni" on Justia Law

Exercising jurisdiction over Defendant-insurer under the circumstances of this case was permitted by Connectictut’s corporate long arm statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 33-929(f)(1), and comported with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Defendant issued an automobile insurance policy covering a vehicle driven by Insured. The policy was written in New York at Defendant’s principal place of business, and Defendant did not direct or participate in any business transactions in Connecticut at the time. The coverage territory of the policy included Connecticut. Insured’s vehicle later collided with a vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs. A judgment was rendered against Insured in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant failed to defend Insured or to indemnify him for the judgment rendered against him. Plaintiffs then brought this action against Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s agreement to defend and indemnify Insured established personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute and that subjecting Defendant to the jurisdiction of this state comported with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Samelko v. Kingstone Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this habeas corpus proceeding, the Supreme Court held that the habeas court properly concluded that Petitioner was entitled to a new trial because counsel in his murder case rendered ineffective assistance.On appeal by the Commissioner of Correction from the habeas court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the habeas court properly found (1) counsel’s failure to obtain readily available evidence that he should have known was potentially critical to Petitioner’s alibi defense was constitutionally inexcusable; and (2) counsel’s inadequate performance resulted in prejudice to Petitioner sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of Petitioner’s criminal trial. View "Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law