Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The city disbanded its dive team because of budget cuts, after which two children drowned. Plaintiff, a fire department employee and member of the disbanded dive team, spoke at a city council meeting, indicating that the budget cuts caused the deaths and would cause more deaths. Plaintiff was ordered to serve unpaid suspension, equivalent to three 24 hour shifts, on grounds of insubordination, malfeasance, misfeasance, dishonesty, failure of good behavior, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. After a grievance hearing the mayor affirmed the suspension, finding that plaintiff’s statements had been false. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether the statements were false; whether any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; whether a reasonable official would have believed any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; and, if necessary, whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighed the city’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

Plaintiff, publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state prison system, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after prison officials concluded that the March 2007 edition posed an unacceptable risk to inmate rehabilitation and prison security and refused to distribute the issue to inmates. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary judgment in their favors. A second case was filed by a prisoner, against DOC employees, after they confiscated medical records and legal documents regarding other inmates, as well as copies of an article he published in the newsletter. The district court dismissed the claims on their merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions. The publisher did not establish that confiscation of the newsletter was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. DOC's policy, restricting prisoners' access to third-party mail did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights.

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Maine election laws (Me.Rev.Stat. title 21A sec. 1052) as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms, particularly with respect to the phrase "for the purpose of influencing," as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees and reporting of independent expenditures. The district court upheld the law. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the organization had standing. The record showed that its fears were objectively reasonable and led to self-censorship. With respect to the overbreadth claim, the court rejected an argument based on the distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy, characterizing the distinction as irrelevant and applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard because the law does not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but merely requires maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information. There is a "substantial relation" between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue. The terms "promoting," "support," "opposition," "influencing," "expressly advocate" and "initiation" are sufficiently clear.

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Rhode Island election laws as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees, contributions to and expenditures on behalf of candidates, and reporting of independent expenditures. The organization claimed that it would refrain from certain political activities if required to register as a PAC, but would comply with independent expenditures under protest. After receiving assurances that the organization could engage in its planned speech without registering as a PAC, the district court denied a preliminary injunction, noting the minimal burden imposed by the law and the valuable governmental interest underlying it. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the organization had not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits.

Unlike many states, Pennsylvania allows felons to vote immediately upon release from prison. To correct widespread misunderstanding, public-interest organizations planned an advertisement encouraging ex-prisoners to vote. The Port Authority denied a request to place the ad on buses, based on a written policy, prohibiting noncommercial ads. Evidence indicated that, despite the policy, the Authority had accepted many noncommercial ads in recent years. The district court found viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the rejection was based on hostility to the ad's message and that the Authority is not now required to accept all noncommercial messages.

The school board has a policy of praying at its regular meetings, routinely attended by students. The district court upheld the policy, based on a Supreme Court holding that Nebraska's practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that a school board may not claim the exception established for legislative bodies and that traditional Establishment Clause principles governing prayer in public schools apply.

Plaintiffs a pro-life, non-profit corporation engaged in anti-abortion activities, including publicity campaigns, and an individual, challenged government policies that, they allege, target individuals defendants deem to be "rightwing extremists" for disfavored treatment. The district court dismissed claims under the First and Fifth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that despite many conclusory and irrelevant allegations, plaintiffs did not identify any policy aimed at their constitutionally-protected rights. Plaintiffs did not address affirmative conduct undertaken by defendants, did not allege any time, place, or manner restrictions imposed on speech, did not allege that they were taxed or punished for First Amendment activities, did not allege any prior restraint on protected, and did not allege any form of retaliation for exercise of protected speech on identified occasions. There was no plausible evidence of disparate treatment

The school district and chief of police sent an e-mail to officials and citizens instructing them "if you see this person in or around the district schools, please contact the police." Plaintiff claimed that the email used his real name and stated that he had been known to hang around schools, had not approached any kids, and that his mental status was unknown. It contained his picture, home address, the make, model, and license plate number of his vehicle, and his driver's license number. His suit, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged deprivation of freedom of movement, illegal seizure of personal records, violation of right to privacy, conspiracy, and failure to train, supervise and discipline agents. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously and, after a deadline for filing in his own name passed, dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court provided two independently sufficient reasons for dismissal: refusal to prosecute in compliance with court orders and consideration of factors concluding that plaintiff would not suffer substantial harm that might sufficiently outweigh the public interest in an open trial.

The student was suspended for using a home computer to create an internet profile of her middle school principal, including sexual content and vulgar language. The site did not include the principal's name, but did include his picture from the school website. Other students were not able to view the site from school computers and the student made an effort to limit viewers to a few of her friends. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school on First Amendment claims (42. U.S.C. 1983). The Third Circuit reversed in part. The school violated the student's rights in suspending her for for off-campus speech that caused no substantial disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption in school. There was no disruption beyond "general rumblings" and a few minutes of talk in class; the profile was outrageous and there was no evidence that anyone took it seriously. The court rejected the parent's Fourteenth Amendment claim of interference with their "liberty" interest in raising their child. The court affirmed that the school handbook and computer use policy were not overbroad and vague.

Each summer, plaintiff leads a group of Christians at the Arab International Festival with a goal of converting Muslims to Christianity. In 2009, Dearborn police instituted a restriction that prohibited leafleting from sidewalks directly adjacent to Festival attractions and on sidewalks and roads that surround the Festivalâs core by one to five blocks; it allowed leafleting at the Festival only from a stationary booth and not while walking. The district court denied a temporary restraining order before the 2009 Festival and granted summary judgment to the defendants in 2010. The Sixth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal for the 2010 Festival, permitting leafleting from outer sidewalks and roads, but not on sidewalks directly adjacent to attractions, then reversed with respect to the "free speech" claim. The restriction on sidewalks adjacent to attractions does not serve a substantial government interest. The city keeps those sidewalks open for public traffic and permits sidewalk vendors, whose activity is more obstructive than leafleting; the prohibition is not narrowly tailored to the goal of isolating inner areas from vehicular traffic. The city can be held liable because the Chief of Police, who instituted the leafleting restriction, created official municipal policy.