Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A plaintiff may rely on the "deterrent effect doctrine" to establish constitutional standing under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., where she lacks firsthand knowledge that an establishment is not in ADA compliance. A plaintiff has constitutional standing where her only motivation for visiting a facility is to test it for ADA compliance. The Ninth Circuit held that, although plaintiffs in this case have standing to maintain their ADA suit, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification because plaintiffs failed to meet the commonality requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. View "Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center v. Hospitality Properties Trust" on Justia Law

In this class action, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court declining to grant declaratory and injunctive relief from alleged violations of constitutional rights arising from the York County Probate Court schedule ordered by former York Court Probate Judge Robert Nadeau. While Plaintiff’s appeal was pending, Judge Nadeau filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case became moot when he lost the election for the probate judgeship. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) this appeal was is moot; and (2) the superior court did not err in determining that Judge Nadeau’s altered court schedule did not result in delays in these routine cases that rose to the level of constitutional deprivations, and Judge Nadeau did not violate the class members’ substantive due process rights as litigants in the York County Probate Court. View "Legrand v. York County Judge of Probate" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the practices of the Marion County Sheriff’s Department and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion County caused them to be detained in jail awaiting release for an unreasonably long period of time, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted certification for two proposed subclasses but denied it as to three. Plaintiffs appealed, under FRCP 23(f), the denial of certification of classes consisting of individuals who, from December 2012 to the present, were held in confinement after legal authority for those detentions ceased, due to the Sheriff’s practices of operating under a standard of allowing up to 72 hours to release prisoners who are ordered released and of employing a computer system inadequate for the purposes intended with respect to timely release of prisoners. The Seventh Circuit allowed the interlocutory appeal and reversed. The district court believed that detentions of less than 48 hours would be presumptively reasonable, and those that extended beyond 48 hours would be presumptively unreasonable, subjecting class members to different burdens of proof. The court erred in applying the 48-hour presumption in the context of a class composed of persons for whom legal authority for detention has ceased, whether by acquittal, release on bond, completion of the sentence, or otherwise. View "Driver v. Marion County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

Wright was arrested by Calumet City police, without a warrant, based on the murder of one individual and the shooting of others. Wright admitted to having a gun. At a minimum, he was to be charged with felony unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, but the prosecutor instructed the officers to wait to charge Wright until lab results came back establishing whether his gun matched casings and bullets at the scene. After being in custody for 55 hours, Wright sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the city violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. The next day, a judge made a probable cause finding. In the section 1983 action, Wright sought class certification, asserting that the city had a policy or practice authorizing officers to detain persons arrested without a warrant for up to 72 hours before permitting the arrestee to appear before a judge. The city made an offer of judgment. Despite accepting that Rule 68 offer, granting him relief as to "all claims brought under this lawsuit,” Wright appealed the denial of certification of a proposed class of “[a]ll persons who will in the future be detained.” He did not appeal with respect to persons who had been detained. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, finding that Wright is not an aggrieved person with a personal stake in the case as required under Article III of the Constitution. View "Wright v. Calumet City" on Justia Law

Cole, a Memphis police officer, was arrested after leaving a Beale Street nightclub. He filed a class action, alleging that Memphis’s routine practice of sweeping Beale Street at 3 a.m. on weekend nights violated his constitutional right to intrastate travel. The jury found that the city implemented its street-sweeping policy without consideration of whether conditions in the area posed an existing, imminent, or immediate threat to public safety. Based on those findings, the court found the policy unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, entered an injunction, and ordered other equitable relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in subjecting the Sweep to strict scrutiny and in certifying a class when the precise members of the class were not ascertainable. The primary purpose of the Sweep was to impede travel; it resulted in the broad denial of access to a popular, two-block area of a public roadway and sidewalk. The Sweep was more than an incidental inconvenience. Under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, the city bore the burden of justifying the Sweep to its stated goal of public safety. The jury found that the timing and execution of the Sweep was arbitrary. The precise identity of each class member need not be ascertained for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification, in a case seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief. View "Cole v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

As a result of criminal convictions Immigration and Customs Enforcement sought removal of lawful U.S. permanent residents. Pending removal proceedings, each was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which provides that if ICE has “reason to believe” that an alien is “deportable” or “inadmissible” by virtue of having committed a specified crime, that alien “shall” be taken into custody when released from detention for that crime, "without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” In a purported class action, the district court dismissed in part, holding that section 1226(c) did not violate substantive due process with respect to aliens who assert a substantial challenge to their removability. The court later held that the form giving aliens notice of their right to seek a hearing does not provide constitutionally adequate notice, that the government was required to revise the form, and that procedures for that hearing violate due process by not placing the initial burden on the government. The court then denied a motion to certify the class, stating that certification was “unnecessary” because “all aliens who are subjected to mandatory detention would benefit from the injunctive relief and remedies.” Stating that the district court “put the cart before the horse a,” the Third Circuit vacated. Once petitioners were released from detention, their individual claims became moot so the court retained jurisdiction only to rule on the motion for class certification—not to decide the merits issues. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Richardson was placed in Lewisburg Penitentiary's Special Management Unit (SMU) program, intended for inmates with histories of violence and individuals who “participated in or had leadership roles in geographical groups/gang related activity." In a purported class action, seeking damages and injunctive relief for “[a]ll persons who are currently or will be imprisoned in the SMU program at USP Lewisburg,” Richardson alleged that through a “pattern, practice or policy,” officials at USP Lewisburg frequently placed inmates with hostile cellmates, unnecessarily increasing the risk of violence and that if an inmate refused to accept a hostile cellmate, he would be placed in painful restraints. Richardson claims that he was subjected to this policy. The district court found Richardson’s class definition “untenable because it [wa]s not objectively, reasonably ascertainable.” Meanwhile, Richardson was transferred out of USP Lewisburg. The Third Circuit remanded, holding that Richardson’s class claims are not moot. When individual claims for relief are acutely susceptible to mootness, a would-be class representative may, in some circumstances, continue to seek certification after losing his personal stake in the case. Richardson may continue to seek class certification based on the Third Circuit’s intervening 2015 holding, in Shelton v. Bledsoe, that ascertainability is not required for Rule 23(b)(2) classes. View "Richardson v. Dir., Fed. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former detainees, brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cook County, claiming that the level of dental care at the Jail demonstrated deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court originally certified two classes of plaintiffs under FRCP 23, but later decertified one class and modified the other, finding that the Jail’s implementation of a consent order with the Department of Justice eliminated a common question concerning inadequate staffing and brought care into compliance with national standards. The court could not find another common factor among the claims, noting that “treatment of dental pain may fall below the deliberate indifference threshold for many reasons and at many stages.” The court then determined that the detainees’ motion for injunctive relief was moot. While an appeal was pending, the detainees unsuccessfully moved for a new trial (FRCP 60(b)) based on newly discovered evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding decertification of the classes because of the lack of a common issue of fact or law. The detainees’ questions do not point to the type of systematic and gross deficiency that would lead to a finding that all detainees are effectively denied treatment; they did not allege a specific policy that directly causes delay, nor a pattern of egregious delays across the entire class. Filing a Rule 60(b) motion during the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate; there was no final judgment in the case. View "Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law

The Home and Community‐Based Care Waiver Program allowed states to diverge from the traditional Medicaid structure by providing community‐based services to people who would, under the traditional structure, require institutionalization, 42 U.S.C. 1396n. The Indiana Family and Social Services Administration operates the Aged and Disabled Medicaid Waiver Program (A&D waiver), the Community Integration and Habilitation Medicaid Waiver Program (CIH waiver), and the Family Supports Medicaid Waiver Program (FS waiver). Because Indiana has closed most of its institutional facilities, these waiver programs serve the vast majority of its people with disabilities. Until 2011, the Administration placed many people with developmental disabilities on the A&D waiver, which has no cap on services. The Administration then changed its policies, rendering many developmentally disabled persons ineligible for the A&D waiver. These people were moved to the FS waiver, under which they may receive services capped at $16,545 annually. The CIH waiver is uncapped, but not everyone qualifies for the CIH waiver. Plaintiffs argue that their new assignments violated the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 because it deprives them of community interaction and puts them at risk of institutionalization. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the integration‐mandate claims and denied class certification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that there is a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the individual claims based on the integration mandate. The court agreed that the proposed class is too vague. View "Steimel v. Wernert" on Justia Law

Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. is an international media company that produces news and entertainment programming through a proprietary mobile software application (the “App”). Plaintiff downloaded and installed the App on his Android mobile device. Every time Plaintiff watched a video clip on the App, Gannett shared information about Plaintiff with Adobe Systems Incorporated. Plaintiff brought this putative class-action lawsuit against Gannett for allegedly disclosing information about him to a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). The district court dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that that information disclosed by Gannett was “personally identifiable information” (PII) under the VPPA but that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff was a “consumer” under the VPPA. Remanded. View "Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc." on Justia Law