Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendants appealed an order certifying a class and a subclass of inmates in Arizona's prison system who claim that they are subject to systematic Eighth Amendment violations. Defendants argued that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs have demonstrated commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs' claims depend upon common questions of law or fact that are answerable in one stroke. Here, plaintiffs are all inmates in ADC custody and each declares that he or she is being exposed, like all other members of the putative class, to a substantial risk of serious harm by the challenged ADC policies. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality and typicality requirement of Rule 23(a). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a single injunction and declaratory judgment could provide relief to each member of the proposed class and subclass. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Parsons v. Ryan" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were amendments to the Sex Offender Registry Law that the Governor signed into law on July 12, 2013, including amendments that would require the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) to publish on the Internet information contained in the sex offender registry regarding individuals given a level two or three classification. On July 5, 2013, Plaintiffs, as putative representatives of a class of persons presently and prospectively classified as level two sex offenders, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an injunction barring SORB from publishing registry information on the Internet of the class of level two offenders. The Supreme Judicial Court declared unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments to the extent they would require the Internet publication of the registry information of individuals who were finally classified as level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 2013 but noted that SORB was allowed to publish on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was given a final classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013. View "Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five independent retail pharmacies licensed in California, and Defendants were prescription drug claims processors. In 2002, Plaintiffs filed a federal class action suit alleging that Defendants failed to comply with Cal. Civil Code 2527, which requires prescription drug claims processors to compile and summarize information on pharmacy fees and transmit that information to their clients. The district court dismissed the cases for lack of standing without reaching the merits. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Plaintiffs had standing, reversed the district court, and remanded. On remand, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that section 2527 unconstitutionally compels speech in violation of the California and U.S. Constitutions. The district court denied the motions. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to answer a question of state law. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) section 2527 implicates the right to free speech guaranteed by the California Constitution and is subject to rational basis review; and (2) the statute satisfies that standard because the compelled factual disclosures are reasonably related to the Legislature's legitimate objective of promoting informed decisionmaking about prescription drug reimbursement rates. View "Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt." on Justia Law

A putative class of female former and current managers of Family Dollar stores filed suit alleging violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Section 216(b) of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The court found that the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint was based on an erroneous interpretation of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and the denial was thus an abuse of discretion. Without resolving the class certification issue, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider whether, based on the court's interpretation of Wal-Mart, the proposed amended complaint satisfied the class certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. View "Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

African-American and Hispanic borrowers under National City Bank mortgages, 2006-2007, sued, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3605, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691, by an established pattern or practice of racial discrimination in the financing of home purchases. They cited National’s “Discretionary Pricing Policy,” under which brokers and loan officers could add a subjective surcharge of points, fees, and credit costs to an otherwise objective, risk-based rate, so that minority applicants were “charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related charges than similarly-situated Caucasian persons.” During discovery, National provided data on more than two million loans issued from 2001 to 2008. After mediation, the parties reached a proposed settlement: National did not concede wrongdoing, but would pay $7,500 to each named plaintiff, $200 to each class payee, $75,000 to two organizations for counseling and other services for the class, and $2,100,000 in attorneys’ fees. After granting preliminary approval and certification of the proposed class, the district court considered the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and held that the class failed to meet Rule 23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements and denied certification. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the proposed class is national, with 153,000 plaintiffs who obtained loans at more than 1,400 branches; significant disparity in one branch or region could skew the average, producing results indicating national disparity, when the problem may be more localized. View "Rodriguez v. Nat'l City Bank" on Justia Law

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's Proposition 100. Proposition 100 commands that Arizona state courts could not set bail for serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof was evident or the presumption great as to the charge. After reviewing the record, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and partial dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs have not raised triable issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its implementing procedures violated the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the United State's Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws were preempted by federal immigration law. The court concluded that the Arizona Legislature and Arizona voters passed the Proposition 100 laws to further the state's legitimate and compelling interest in seeing that those accused of serious state-law crimes were brought to trial. View "Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law

The parents and the grandmother of two black children sued the Nashville Board of Public Education on behalf of their children and all black students in the District whose school assignments were adversely affected by the elimination of the mandatory noncontiguous transfer zones. They allege that the Rezoning Plan eliminated the desirable practice of being bused to a good, racially diverse school and replaced it with two inferior choices: staying in a bad, racially isolated neighborhood school or being bused to a bad, racially diverse school. They claim that has led to resegregation in violation of the students’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the Board. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the change serves legitimate state interests in school under-utilization. The Plan actually solved the problem that many schools were operating at levels below what their resources and infrastructure would permit, while other schools were overflowing. The court stopped short of endorsing the Plan, noting that certain students in poor neighborhoods had to share textbooks; that the racial achievement gap apparently exists much as before; and that Nashville public-school students as a whole continue to do poorly after the Plan. View "Spurlock v. Fox" on Justia Law

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirteenth North Carolina residents who lost access to in-home personal care services (PCS) due to a statutory change, brought suit challenging the new PCS program. The district court granted plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Defendants appealed, raising several points of error. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in this case. The court held, however, that the district court's order failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 because it lacked specificity and because the district court neglected to address the issue of security. Accordingly, the court remanded the case. View "Pashby v. Delia" on Justia Law