Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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Joe Feazell, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, sued his doctor, Andrew Tilden, and the prison’s healthcare contractor, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., alleging deliberate indifference to his hemorrhoid condition and significant gastrointestinal bleeding, violating the Eighth Amendment. Feazell claimed that Dr. Tilden failed to respond promptly to his abnormal lab results and adequately treat his hemorrhoids, while Wexford's treatment protocol was ineffective and deliberately indifferent.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, who later granted summary judgment for Wexford and partial summary judgment for Dr. Tilden. Feazell went to trial on his remaining claim against Dr. Tilden but was barred from testifying about his medical diagnoses or their causes. The jury returned a verdict for the defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's summary judgment decision, finding no evidence that Wexford's Collegial Review policy caused Feazell to receive deficient care or that Dr. Tilden was aware of Feazell's hemorrhoids before the colonoscopy. The court also upheld the magistrate judge's evidentiary rulings, barring Feazell from testifying about medical diagnoses or causation, as he was not qualified to provide such testimony.The Seventh Circuit concluded that Feazell failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding Wexford's policy causing a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and that Dr. Tilden was not deliberately indifferent to Feazell's medical needs. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Feazell v Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

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On June 1, 2018, Officer Jonathan Guzman of the City of Miami Police Department identified a speeding driver in a black Jeep Compass. The driver crashed into another vehicle and fled on foot. During an inventory search of the Jeep, Guzman found a firearm, ammunition, and marijuana. Shortly after, a radio dispatch reported the vehicle as stolen. Officer Michael Bloom arrived at the scene of the reported theft, where Samuel Scott Jr. claimed his Jeep had been stolen. Guzman arrived and recognized Scott as the driver who fled the crash. Scott was arrested for multiple charges, including reckless driving and falsely reporting a crime. The charges were later dropped.Scott filed federal and state law claims in the Southern District of Florida against the officers and the City of Miami, alleging unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified and sovereign immunity, and found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Scott based on Guzman’s eyewitness identification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Guzman’s eyewitness identification provided sufficient probable cause for Scott’s arrest. The court also found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and that the City of Miami was not liable under state law due to the presence of probable cause. Consequently, all of Scott’s claims were dismissed. View "Scott v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

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The defendants in this case challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which criminalizes unlawfully reentering the United States after a prior removal. They argued that the statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by discriminating against Mexican and other Latin American immigrants. Their theory was that the statute’s predecessor, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was enacted with discriminatory intent, and that § 1326, first codified in 1952 and amended several times thereafter, perpetuates that taint.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss their indictments. The court assumed without deciding that the Arlington Heights framework applied but concluded that the defendants had failed to establish a discriminatory purpose behind § 1326’s enactment. The court also concluded that the statute easily satisfied rational-basis review. The defendants then entered conditional guilty pleas or proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, reserving their rights to appeal the constitutional issue. The District Court sentenced the defendants to varying terms of imprisonment and supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court’s decision. The court found no clear error in the District Court’s conclusion that the defendants had not shown that § 1326 was enacted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. The court noted that the defendants’ evidence, including historical context, statements by public officials, and statistical disparities, was insufficient to establish that the 1952 Congress acted with discriminatory intent. The court also emphasized that laws do not carry forward “taint” through reenactment unless the later legislature acted with the same constitutionally impermissible purpose. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "USA v. Ferretiz-Hernandez" on Justia Law

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The case involves Plaintiff Craig Gabaldon, who was stopped by New Mexico State Police Officer Kevin Smith for multiple traffic violations, including improper merging, speeding, and failing to use a turn signal. During the stop, Officer Smith detected signs of intoxication and arrested Gabaldon after a struggle, during which a loaded gun was found on Gabaldon. Officer Kurtis Ward assisted in the arrest. Gabaldon filed a civil action alleging constitutional violations and state-law claims, asserting that the stop was motivated by his affiliation with the Bandidos Motorcycle Club.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted Defendants' motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, as Gabaldon had returned his Bandidos gear to the club, which likely destroyed it. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Gabaldon's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity and finding reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and probable cause for the arrest. Gabaldon's affidavit, which contradicted his deposition testimony, was struck down as a sham affidavit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the spoliation motion or in striking Gabaldon's affidavit. The appellate court agreed that the affidavit was an attempt to create a sham fact issue, as it contradicted Gabaldon's earlier deposition testimony without new evidence. The court also upheld the summary judgment, finding that Officer Smith had reasonable suspicion to stop Gabaldon based on observed traffic violations. The appellate court concluded that the district court's rulings were correct and affirmed the judgment. View "Gabaldon v. New Mexico State Police" on Justia Law

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Aarin Clinkscale was indicted in 2014 for his involvement in an armed robbery that resulted in two deaths. He pled guilty to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and two counts of involuntary manslaughter. In 2016, the trial court sentenced him to a total of 14 years in prison, including a mandatory three-year term for the firearm specification. Clinkscale received 762 days of jail-time credit for time served prior to sentencing.Clinkscale filed his first motion for judicial release in June 2020, which the trial court denied, stating he would be eligible for release in October 2022. He filed a second motion for judicial release in October 2022. The State objected, arguing that Clinkscale was not eligible until November 2024, as he needed to serve the mandatory term and then wait five years. The trial court granted Clinkscale’s motion, and the State appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Clinkscale’s jail-time credit shortened the waiting period for judicial release.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the Tenth District’s conclusion. The court held that jail-time credit does not reduce the required five-year waiting period following the expiration of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d). The court emphasized that the five-year waiting period is fixed and begins only after the mandatory term is completed. Consequently, Clinkscale’s motion for judicial release was premature. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Clinkscale’s equal-protection argument. View "State v. Clinkscale" on Justia Law

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R.M.A., a transgender student who transitioned from female to male, attended public school in the Blue Springs R-IV School District. R.M.A. requested to use male-designated restrooms and locker rooms during the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the School District denied the request. R.M.A. filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, alleging public accommodation discrimination based on sex. After receiving a notice of right to sue, R.M.A. filed a petition against the School District, claiming sex discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).The Circuit Court of Jackson County dismissed R.M.A.'s petition, stating that the public accommodation protection in section 213.065 does not cover claims based on gender identity. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed this decision in R.M.A. I, finding that R.M.A. had pleaded sufficient facts to establish a claim of sex discrimination and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, R.M.A. proceeded to trial, and the jury found the School District liable for sex discrimination, awarding R.M.A. compensatory and punitive damages.The School District filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial, arguing that R.M.A. failed to make a submissible case for sex discrimination. The circuit court sustained the JNOV motion, finding that the evidence showed R.M.A. was excluded from male facilities due to female genitalia, not male sex. R.M.A. appealed.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that R.M.A. did not present sufficient evidence that the School District's denial was based on R.M.A.'s male sex. The court concluded that the term "sex" in section 213.065 refers to biological sex, and the evidence indicated the School District's decision was based on R.M.A.'s female genitalia. Consequently, the court upheld the JNOV and denied R.M.A.'s motion for attorney fees. View "R.M.A. vs. Blue Springs R-IV School District" on Justia Law

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In 2008, a class action was filed against officials from the City of Tenaha and Shelby County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs claimed that the officials had an illegal practice of targeting and seizing property from racial or ethnic minorities. A settlement agreement, including a consent decree, was reached, requiring the defendants to follow specific procedures to prevent future illegal stops. The decree also included a court-appointed monitor to ensure compliance. The consent decree was initially entered in 2013, amended in 2019, and expired in July 2020. Plaintiffs' motion to extend the decree was denied, and the County Defendants settled, leaving only the City Defendants in the case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas handled the case, where class counsel filed four motions for attorney fees. The first three motions were granted, totaling $324,773.90. The fourth motion requested $88,553.33 for fees from April to December 2020. Initially denied as untimely, the decision was vacated and remanded by the appellate court. On reconsideration, the district court awarded $16,020, reducing the hourly rates and the hours deemed reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court failed to provide class-wide notice of the attorney-fee motion as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). This failure deprived class members of the opportunity to object to the fee motion. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by not enforcing the notice requirement and vacated the fee award, remanding the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Rule 23(h). View "Morrow v. Jones" on Justia Law

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Mark Petersen sued Deputy Stefanie Pedersen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest for drunk driving and an unlawful blood draw. On December 27, 2018, Deputy Pedersen responded to a car crash in rural Wisconsin. She found Petersen, who was intoxicated, attempting to change a tire on a car registered to him. Witnesses confirmed he was the only person near the car. Petersen had a history of uncooperative behavior with law enforcement and prior OWI charges. Based on the scene, his behavior, and his intoxication, Pedersen arrested him for OWI and obtained a search warrant for a blood draw, which confirmed his high BAC.In the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Petersen was charged with OWI – 4th Offense. He moved to suppress the BAC evidence, arguing lack of probable cause for his arrest. The state court granted his motion, leading to the dismissal of the charges. Petersen then filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was reduced to claims against Deputy Pedersen for false arrest and unreasonable search. The district court granted summary judgment for Pedersen, finding probable cause for the arrest and a valid search warrant for the blood draw, and also granted her qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that probable cause supported Petersen’s arrest based on the totality of the circumstances, including his intoxication, the scene of the crash, and witness statements. The court also found the blood draw was lawful as it was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. Additionally, the court held that Deputy Pedersen was entitled to qualified immunity for both the arrest and the blood draw. View "Petersen v Pedersen" on Justia Law

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The appellant was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes related to the shooting death of Sean Turner and the robbery of Turner and Stephen Thomas. The crimes occurred on December 4, 2015, and the appellant was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury found the appellant guilty on all counts except malice murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life in prison for felony murder, along with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges.The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in several respects, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's convictions for felony murder and armed robbery. The court also found that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to charge the jury on accomplice corroboration, as the accomplice's testimony was corroborated by other evidence. Additionally, the court held that the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was not violated, as the co-indictee who refused to testify was never brought before the jury. The court also found that any error in admitting testimony about the appellant's alleged gang involvement was harmless.Regarding the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that the appellant's counsel was not deficient in failing to file a general demurrer, request an accomplice corroboration charge, renew an objection to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, or move to exclude evidence of a handgun. The court concluded that the appellant did not suffer cumulative prejudice from the alleged errors and affirmed the convictions. View "FLOYD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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Gregory Wilson was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including human trafficking of a minor by force or fear, human trafficking to commit another crime, kidnapping, and criminal threats. He was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 31 years and eight months, followed by an indeterminate term of 30 years to life. Wilson appealed, arguing that his defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp" during closing arguments, which he claimed violated the Racial Justice Act (RJA).The trial court had found Wilson guilty based on substantial evidence, including testimonies from victims B.W., K.W., and B.C., who described being forced into prostitution through violence and threats. The jury found Wilson not guilty of rape and forcible oral copulation but convicted him on other charges. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective as a matter of law for failing to object to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp." The court reasoned that the term is a recognized term of art in the sex trafficking subculture, describing a pimp who uses force and violence. The court also noted that the issue of ineffective counsel should be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding, where defense counsel can explain their conduct.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding substantial evidence supporting Wilson's convictions for human trafficking and kidnapping. The court also rejected Wilson's claims regarding sentencing, including the argument that the trial court abused its discretion and violated section 654's prohibition against multiple punishments. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law