Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In July 2020, Jamie Cunningham burglarized a car dealership in Cobb County, Georgia, and fled the scene. Cobb County police officers pursued him, and during the arrest, they used physical force to handcuff him. Cunningham later filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against certain police officers and Cobb County, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Georgia law. He also claimed that Cobb County was liable under the Monell doctrine for the officers' actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim because their use of force was objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established law. The court also found that the officers were entitled to official immunity on the state-law claim because Cunningham failed to show that the officers acted with actual malice. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment for Cobb County on the Monell claim, concluding that there was no underlying constitutional violation by the officers and no evidence of a defective custom or policy by Cobb County.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the officers' actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances, as Cunningham had resisted arrest and the officers had a reasonable belief that he might be armed. The court also agreed that the officers did not act with actual malice, and thus were entitled to official immunity. Finally, the court affirmed the summary judgment for Cobb County, as there was no underlying constitutional violation to support the Monell claim. View "Cunningham v. Cobb County, Georgia" on Justia Law

Law enforcement used a specialized software tool, Torrential Downpour, to download files containing child pornography from a specific IP address associated with the defendant. Torrential Downpour is designed to force a single-source download from a user on the BitTorrent peer-to-peer network, allowing officers to link specific files to a particular IP address. After obtaining these files, police secured a warrant and seized the defendant’s computer and other devices, which contained additional child pornography. The defendant argued that he did not knowingly share files and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files downloaded by law enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, considering expert testimony about BitTorrent’s functionality. The court found the government’s expert more credible and determined that the defendant had made the files available to the public. The court concluded that the use of Torrential Downpour did not access any information not already publicly shared and denied the motion to suppress. The court also denied a motion in limine to prevent the government from showing child pornography images to the jury, finding that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, especially since the defendant did not object to specific images.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the use of Torrential Downpour to download files from a peer-to-peer network did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in files he made publicly available. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to show a representative sample of images to the jury without first reviewing specific images, given the lack of specific objections. View "USA v. Ewing" on Justia Law

Cedric Lofton, a seventeen-year-old juvenile, died while in the custody of the Juvenile Intake Assessment Center (JIAC) in Sedgwick County, Kansas. Lofton, experiencing a mental health crisis, was placed in a prone restraint by JIAC officers for over forty minutes, leading to his death from cardiac arrest. Marquan Teetz, representing Lofton's estate, filed a § 1983 action against the officers, alleging excessive force.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claims, finding disputes of material fact. Specifically, the court noted that surveillance footage, although lacking audio, could support Teetz's version of events that Lofton had stopped resisting, making the continued use of force potentially excessive.The officers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court's finding of a factual dispute was "blatantly contradicted" by the record and that the court failed to properly analyze whether the law clearly established that their use of force was unconstitutional.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the use of a prolonged prone restraint on a subdued suspect constitutes excessive force. The court emphasized that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Teetz, showed that Lofton was no longer resisting at some point during the restraint. The court also held that it was clearly established law that applying pressure to a suspect's back while in a prone position after being subdued is unconstitutional due to the significant risk of asphyxiation and death. Thus, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Teetz v. Stepien" on Justia Law

Eric Holmes, an Indiana state prisoner, filed a lawsuit against the Marion County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes sought to proceed in forma pauperis, but the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) restricts this ability for prisoners who have had three prior civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that Holmes had incurred three strikes under the PLRA. The court determined that a previous case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey counted as Holmes’s third strike. Holmes did not contest the validity of his first two strikes. He filed a notice of appeal and moved to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but a motions panel of the Seventh Circuit denied his motion, identifying a different case dismissed due to judicial immunity as his third strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether dismissals based on affirmative defenses, such as those barred by Heck or due to judicial immunity, count as strikes under the PLRA. The court held that a case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck counts as a strike if the Heck bar is clear from the face of the complaint. Similarly, a case dismissed on judicial immunity grounds incurs a strike if the immunity defense is clear from the face of the complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Holmes’s current suit, concluding that both the Heck dismissal and the judicial immunity dismissal counted as strikes. View "Holmes v Marion County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

In 2017, the Saginaw County Sheriff’s Office seized fourteen firearms during a domestic-violence investigation involving Benjamin Heinrich. Heinrich's uncle, Gerald Novak, and distant cousin, Adam Wenzel, claimed ownership of the firearms and sought their return. Sheriff William Federspiel refused to return the firearms, arguing that Novak and Wenzel had not proven ownership. Novak and Wenzel then sued Federspiel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law, asserting various federal constitutional and state claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to Federspiel on all claims and denied Novak and Wenzel’s motion for partial summary judgment. The court found that qualified immunity protected Federspiel in his personal capacity and that Novak and Wenzel had not established constitutional violations. It also held that Michigan law does not recognize a cause of action to sue municipal officials for constitutional torts and that Novak and Wenzel could not establish the elements of claim and delivery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Federspiel on the individual-capacity takings claims, procedural-due-process claims, substantive-due-process claims, Fourth Amendment claims, and inverse-condemnation claims. However, it vacated the grant of summary judgment on the official-capacity and injunctive-relief takings claims, official-capacity Second Amendment claims, and the claim-and-delivery action. The court remanded these claims for further proceedings, noting that Novak and Wenzel’s affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact regarding ownership of the firearms, and that the district court should address whether Federspiel’s actions were consistent with historical firearm regulation. View "Novak v. Federspiel" on Justia Law

Karyn Stanley, a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, since 1999, was forced to retire in 2018 due to a disability. When she was hired, the City provided health insurance until age 65 for retirees with 25 years of service or those who retired due to disability. In 2003, the City revised its policy, limiting health insurance to 24 months for those retiring due to disability. Stanley, who retired under the revised policy, received only 24 months of health insurance.Stanley sued the City, alleging that the revised policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by discriminating against those who retire due to disability. The district court dismissed her ADA claim, stating that the alleged discrimination occurred after her retirement, making her not a "qualified individual" under Title I of the ADA, as she no longer held or sought a job with the City. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that to prevail under §12112(a) of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that they held or desired a job and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation at the time of the alleged discrimination. The Court concluded that the ADA's protections do not extend to retirees who neither hold nor seek a job. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit was affirmed, upholding the dismissal of Stanley's ADA claim. View "Stanley v. City of Stanford" on Justia Law

Carl and Roberta Culp filed a lawsuit alleging federal and state law claims against various defendants, including Fort Wayne and Allen County police officers. The claims included excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, criminal mischief, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The incident in question occurred on August 20, 2018, when Carl Culp, a double amputee, expressed suicidal intentions during a psychiatric appointment, leading to police intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, leaving only Carl Culp’s § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims against Officers Woods and Schulien for trial. A jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims except for Roberta Culp’s state law battery claim against Officer Woods, awarding her nominal damages of $1. The Culps appealed the summary judgment decision, and Woods and Schulien cross-appealed the denial of costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants, as the defendants’ brief complied with the local rules. The court also found that the Culps failed to present evidence of discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, without deciding, that these laws applied to law enforcement actions but concluded that the evidence did not support the Culps' claims.Regarding the cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to deny costs to both parties, recognizing the mixed outcome of the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Culp v. Caudill" on Justia Law

Donterious Stephens was present when Officer Juanita Mills arrested his mother, Mary Stephens, at her workplace. Donterious approached the scene and asked Officer Mills why his mother was being arrested. Officer Mills warned him not to walk up on her, and Donterious complied by standing back. After Mary was placed in a police vehicle, Donterious's father, Warren Stephens, was also arrested. Donterious then spoke to Officer Mills again, and she ordered his arrest. Donterious was arrested but not charged. Mary Stephens and another plaintiff sued Officer Mills, alleging that Donterious's arrest was unlawful.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Officer Mills's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Donterious's arrest was lawful. Officer Mills appealed this decision, arguing that the undisputed material evidence showed she did not violate Donterious's rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that Officer Mills did not have actual or arguable probable cause to arrest Donterious for obstructing government operations. The court found that Donterious's mere presence at the arrest scene and his questioning of Officer Mills did not provide probable cause for his arrest. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment and qualified immunity for Officer Mills, concluding that Donterious's actions did not amount to obstruction under Arkansas law. View "Willis v. Mills" on Justia Law

Junius Joyner, III, an African-American male, was hired by a legal staffing agency, Mestel & Company (Hire Counsel), and assigned to work at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Washington, D.C. He worked on the merger of Sprint Corporation with T-Mobile U.S., Inc. from July to December 2019. Joyner alleged several incidents of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, including delayed work assignments, derogatory comments, and harassment by coworkers. He also claimed wrongful discharge under D.C. law, asserting he was terminated after reporting potential antitrust violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Joyner did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim under D.C. law, concluding that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s federal claims, agreeing that Joyner failed to plausibly allege that his treatment was racially motivated or that the work environment was sufficiently hostile. The court found that Joyner’s allegations did not meet the necessary standard to infer racial discrimination or a hostile work environment. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP" on Justia Law

Tony Clark was convicted of capital murder, attempted murder, and possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon. His death sentence was affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. Clark subsequently filed his first motion for post-conviction relief, claiming intellectual disability and ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues.The Madison County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Clark's convictions and sentence. Clark then sought post-conviction relief, which led to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed Clark's motion for post-conviction relief. The court granted the motion in part, remanding the case to the Madison County Circuit Court for an Atkins hearing to determine if Clark is intellectually disabled, which would make him ineligible for execution under the Eighth Amendment. The court found that Clark presented sufficient evidence, including affidavits from medical professionals, to warrant a hearing on his intellectual disability claim. However, the court denied all other claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel related to mitigation evidence, Batson challenges, jury wheel issues, the avoiding arrest aggravator, jurors' racial bias, and jury instructions. The court also rejected Clark's cumulative error argument. The decision was to grant post-conviction relief in part and deny it in part. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law