Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
by
A federal inmate, Dustin Rowland, developed a hernia after a pretrial detention fight. A physician deemed the hernia "reducible and stable," recommending non-surgical treatments. Rowland, desiring surgery, utilized the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Administrative Remedial Program, which involves a four-step grievance process. His initial requests were denied, but a later appeal led to approval for a surgical consultation. However, Rowland's final appeal was denied for procedural reasons, and he did not correct the deficiency. He eventually received surgery but filed a lawsuit claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, seeking damages under Bivens, injunctive relief for post-operative care, and a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Rowland's Bivens claim, granted summary judgment against his injunctive relief claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Rowland's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens claim, noting that Rowland's case presented a new context not covered by previous Bivens cases and that the BOP's Administrative Remedial Program provided an adequate alternative remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the injunctive relief claim, as Rowland failed to exhaust administrative remedies specifically for post-operative care. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FTCA claim, emphasizing the jurisdictional requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Rowland's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. View "Rowland v. Matevousian" on Justia Law

by
Robert J. Hall, an inmate in the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed a lawsuit against MDOC and Corrections Officer Paul Woodruff, in his individual capacity, for injuries he sustained from an attack by a fellow inmate, Ahmad Townsend. Hall had previously submitted an "Enemy Listing/Protective Custody Declaration" form indicating he felt threatened by Townsend. Despite this, Woodruff placed Townsend in Hall's cell while Hall was asleep, leading to the attack and resulting in mental and physical injuries.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Woodruff’s motion to dismiss based on official immunity. Woodruff appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Hall. The court examined whether Woodruff was entitled to official immunity under Missouri state law, which protects public officials from liability for discretionary acts performed during their official duties. The court found that the MDOC policies cited by Hall did not create a ministerial duty because they allowed for discretion in how and when enemy declarations were checked and safeguards implemented.The Eighth Circuit concluded that Woodruff's actions were discretionary, not ministerial, and thus he was entitled to official immunity. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hall v. Woodruff" on Justia Law

by
Ngozi Iweha, a Black woman born and educated in Nigeria, was hired as a staff pharmacist at Larned State Hospital (LSH) in Kansas. She alleged that she faced a hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Incidents included exclusion from projects, insensitive comments about Nigeria, and a confrontation with a coworker involving "slave trade beads." She was eventually placed on administrative leave and terminated following an investigation into her workplace conduct.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the incidents described by Iweha did not amount to a hostile work environment as they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive. The court also determined that Iweha failed to show that her termination was pretextual. The court noted that the employer's progressive discipline policy was discretionary and that the investigation into Iweha's conduct was independent and thorough. Additionally, the court found that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, as her complaints did not specifically allege discrimination based on race or national origin.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the incidents described by Iweha were not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. The court also found that Iweha failed to demonstrate that the reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court noted that the investigation into her conduct was independent and that the decision to terminate her was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The court also upheld the finding that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Iweha v. State of Kansas" on Justia Law

by
Horace Crump, an inmate at Lakeland Correctional Facility in Michigan, filed a § 1983 lawsuit against several prison employees, alleging they withheld treatment for his multiple sclerosis. The key issue at this stage is whether Crump can proceed with his lawsuit without paying the filing fee upfront, as he sought to proceed in forma pauperis due to his inability to pay.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Crump's complaint, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes rule, which disqualifies prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim. Crump appealed, disputing two of the three strikes counted against him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether Crump's prior dismissals counted as strikes under the Act. The court found that Crump's previous cases, which included dismissals for failure to state a claim and decisions not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, did not count as strikes. The court reasoned that the Act's language refers to entire actions being dismissed on specific grounds, not individual claims. Additionally, dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity do not count as strikes under the Act.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Crump's lawsuit to proceed without the upfront payment of the filing fee. View "Crump v. Blue" on Justia Law

by
Tremonti Perry, while incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center, experienced a severe medical emergency that resulted in him being placed in a medically induced coma for a month. Several years after recovering, Perry filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison's warden, the Missouri Department of Corrections Director, and two medical-care contractors, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Perry admitted he did not use the prison’s administrative remedy, which required filing a complaint within fifteen days of the incident, but argued that his coma made it impossible to meet this requirement.The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Perry had not exhausted his available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They acknowledged that the grievance process was unavailable to Perry during his coma and a reasonable period afterward but contended that Perry should have made a diligent effort to exhaust his claims once he recovered. The district court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Perry could have filed a grievance after his medical conditions resolved.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court determined that the prison’s administrative grievance process was unavailable to Perry due to his physical incapacity during the coma and the prison’s rules not allowing late filings. The court rejected the Defendants' arguments that Perry could have filed an untimely grievance or that the grievance deadline was perpetually renewed due to ongoing medical issues. The court also denied the Defendants' motion to supplement the record with new evidence. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Perry’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perry v. Precythe" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) and allegations of negligence in handling child protective services (CPS) investigations. DHS received multiple referrals regarding potential child abuse involving J.F.L., a registered sex offender living with J.M.K. and her children. DHS conducted investigations in 2015 and 2018, concluding there was no evidence of abuse or neglect. However, in 2020, another referral led to the discovery of sexual abuse by J.F.L., resulting in his indictment and conviction on numerous charges.The plaintiffs, representing the children, sued DHS, claiming negligence, gross negligence, and other wrongful acts, asserting that DHS failed to follow its internal policies, which they argued created clearly established statutory rights. They also claimed negligent training and supervision by DHS. DHS sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, arguing that its internal policies did not constitute clearly established law.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied DHS's motion for summary judgment, stating that a jury should decide whether DHS's actions were oppressive and whether mandatory duties were not followed. The court also denied summary judgment on the negligent supervision and training claims.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that DHS's internal policies, not being legislatively approved, could not create clearly established statutory rights. The court held that DHS was entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that DHS violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs did not provide evidence of improper motive or oppressive conduct by DHS employees. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case with directions to grant summary judgment in favor of DHS and dismiss the action. View "West Virginia Department of Human Services v. David B., Guardian ad Litem and Next Friend of J.B. and M.B., and S.M., Individually" on Justia Law

by
A Monongalia County deputy sheriff responded to a domestic dispute involving John D. Stewart, Jr., who suffered from mental illness. The deputy, after advising against backup, pursued Mr. Stewart, who allegedly threatened with a knife. The deputy shot Mr. Stewart, fatally wounding him. Amanda F. Stewart, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, filed a wrongful death action against the Monongalia County Commission and the deputy, alleging excessive force and negligence.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed claims against the Commission for direct liability but allowed claims for vicarious liability and against the deputy to proceed. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, stating it was premature.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim against the Commission, finding the Commission is not immune from vicarious liability for the deputy’s negligence. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the deputy, as the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to suggest the deputy acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.However, the court reversed the lower court’s decision regarding punitive damages. It held that the Tort Claims Act prohibits punitive damages against the Commission and the deputy, as the deputy was sued in his official capacity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Monongalia County Commission A/K/A Monongalia County Sheriff's Department and John Doe Deputy v. Amanda F. Stewart, Individually and/or as Administrator of the Estate of John D. Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

by
Indiana enacted a law prohibiting physicians from altering a child's sex characteristics through medication or surgery as treatment for gender dysphoria. Plaintiffs, including transgender children, their parents, and a physician, argued that the law violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause, substantive due process, and the First Amendment. The district court found these arguments likely to succeed and issued a preliminary injunction against the law. Indiana appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment. The court concluded that the law discriminated based on sex and transgender status and that the aiding and abetting provision regulated speech based on its content. The court also found that the balance of harms favored the plaintiffs and that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the law did not classify based on sex or transgender status in a way that warranted heightened scrutiny. The court applied rational basis review and found that the law was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting children from uncertain and potentially harmful medical treatments. The court also held that the law's aiding and abetting provision did not violate the First Amendment, as it regulated speech integral to unlawful conduct. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "K.C. v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a fatal shooting by Deputy Jafet Santiago-Miranda, who fired his weapon into a moving vehicle, killing two young individuals, Angelo Crooms and Sincere Pierce. The plaintiffs, representing the estates of the deceased, claimed that Santiago-Miranda used excessive force, failed to render medical aid, and committed state-law battery. They also raised claims against Deputy Carson Hendren and Sheriff Wayne Ivey. The incident occurred after the deputies pursued a vehicle they believed to be stolen, which then accelerated towards Santiago-Miranda, prompting him to fire his weapon.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court dismissed all claims against Hendren with prejudice and ruled that Santiago-Miranda's use of force was constitutionally permissible. The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment decision regarding Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff Ivey.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Santiago-Miranda's use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances, as he had probable cause to believe that his life was in danger when the vehicle accelerated towards him. The court also found that the plaintiffs' state law battery claims failed for the same reasons. Additionally, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Ivey on the Monell claims, as there was no underlying constitutional violation by Santiago-Miranda. View "Baxter v. Hendren" on Justia Law

by
In August 2021, New York City’s Department of Education mandated COVID-19 vaccinations for all staff and contractors working in school settings. This mandate was updated over time, including a religious exemption process. The plaintiffs, New York City public sector employees, challenged the constitutionality of the mandate and the exemption process, both facially and as applied.The Southern District of New York denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed the consolidated amended complaint on the merits. The Eastern District of New York also denied a similar preliminary injunction motion. The plaintiffs appealed these decisions, leading to a consolidated review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part the denials of preliminary injunctions, affirmed the dismissal of the facial challenges, and affirmed in part while vacating and remanding in part the dismissal of the as-applied challenges. The court found that the request to rescind the vaccine mandate was moot due to its official rescission and denied the request for reinstatement and backpay, as the plaintiffs could not show irreparable harm post-termination. The court upheld the dismissal of the facial challenges, finding no evidence that the Citywide Panel process preferred certain religions or was infected with religious animus. However, the court vacated and remanded the as-applied challenges for plaintiffs Natasha Solon and Heather Clark, who plausibly alleged that their religious accommodation requests were improperly denied. View "New Yorkers for Religious Liberty v. City of New York" on Justia Law