Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.Defendant was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for robbing a bank. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process did not compel the circuit court to pre-screen the identification at issue when that identification was made for the first time in court; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's identification was more probative than prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was properly convicted of a second or subsequent offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law

Speech First, Inc., which identifies itself as a national organization committed to protecting the rights of college students, initiated this action against the President of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech or the University). Speech First asserts that two Virginia Tech policies — the Bias Intervention and Response Team Policy (the Bias Policy) and the Informational Activities Policy — violate the First Amendment rights of its student members. Speech First asked the district court to preliminarily enjoin both policies. The district court held that Speech First (1) lacked standing to challenge the Bias Policy because its members had suffered no injury in fact, and (2) failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to the Informational Activities Policy because the record was, at that time, inadequate as to that policy. Speech First appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Speech First offers only speculation in support of its argument that it has suffered an injury in fact. Because the district court’s factual findings make clear that no record evidence establishes any such injury, the organization has failed to establish an injury in fact and so lacks standing to challenge the Bias Policy. The court explained that once this case is returned to the district court, and after further factual development has taken place, it will be for that court to determine in the first instance whether the Informational Activities Policy complies with the First Amendment. Without a developed record, the district court did not err in determining that Speech First has not yet shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Timothy Sands" on Justia Law

The Estate of a man who was shot and killed by police brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state law alleging that police officers used excessive force. The Estate claimed that the decedent was known to the officers to be homeless and mentally ill. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that the man posed an immediate threat. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the man, he was carrying a replica gun, disregarded multiple warnings to drop it, and pointed it at the officers. While the misidentification of the replica gun added to the tragedy of this situation, it did not render the officers’ use of force objectively unreasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estate leave to amend the complaint. The complaint established that the man pointed the replica gun’s barrel at the officers, so it was objectively reasonable for the officers to respond with lethal force. Under these pleaded facts, it would be futile to allow leave to amend. View "ESTATE OF GABRIEL STRICKLAND, ET AL V. NEVADA COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“Department”). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave. Plaintiff also raised a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. The court wrote that Plaintiff has forfeited any arguments as to the district court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of these grounds in his opening brief. Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant consideration because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. View "Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of aggravated burglary and obstructing a police officer and sentencing him to forty years for aggravated burglary and six months for obstructing a peace officer, holding that the case must be remanded for resentencing.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) Defendant's claim of instructional error not warrant plain error review because he failed to show how he was prejudiced; (3) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail because Defendant he to show any prejudice; and (4) Defendant was entitled to resentencing because the district court relied on incorrect information when it imposed the sentence. View "State v. Kirn" on Justia Law

In 2018, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) hired Bronson as a treatment center teacher. Bronson was assigned to Lurie Hospital. Bronson and another teacher assigned to Lurie (Cooper), are Black; the third teacher, Lee, is White. Lurie’s family services director, Ruohonen, was the teachers’ “representative supervisor” at Lurie. Ruohonen is White. Bronson alleges that Lurie and Ruohonen treated Bronson and Cooper, the first Black teachers assigned to Lurie, in a discriminatory manner. In a departure from consistent past practice, Lurie denied Bronson and Cooper access to Lurie's electronic medical records system, EPIC, for a year. Identification badges issued to Bronson and Cooper bore a different color than those issued to others: Lee’s badge granted her “regular employee access” to EPIC. In 2019, Ruohonen sent an email to their CPS supervisor, complaining about Bronson and Cooper. Bronson contacted the Chicago Teachers Union, which responded that the complaint was inconsistent with the union contract, Bronson also alleges that she and Cooper were denied adequate office and desk space.In December 2019, Bronson filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, then filed suit, asserting violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Because the allegations in Bronson’s complaint establish that Lurie is not her de facto employer, she cannot sue Lurie under Title VII. View "Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital of Chicago" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (amended in 2006 and 2011) imposed registration requirements, restrictions on living and working in a school zone, and reporting requirements. Michigan retroactively imposed these obligations, including those contained in the amendments, on offenders convicted before 2006 and 2011. In another suit, the Sixth Circuit held, in 2016, that the retroactive application of SORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. While an interim order was in effect, in another suit, Michigan passed a fourth version of SORA, effective on March 24, 2021, removing or modifying provisions that had been declared unconstitutional.In 2021, five Michigan sex offenders filed suit, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the Michigan State Police enforced unconstitutional provisions of SORA from 2006 onwards, including after the previous cases were decided. They alleged that state officials, whom they purported to sue “in their individual capacities,” knew that the invalidated provisions were unconstitutional, but failed to stop their subordinates from enforcing them, noting the governors’ duty under the Michigan Constitution to ensure the faithful execution of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. They do not plausibly allege that the defendants authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. View "Does 1-5 v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of a double murder in Durham, North Carolina. But after new exculpatory DNA evidence was discovered, a state superior court judge vacated Plaintiff’s conviction, and he was released after 21 years in prison. Plaintiff then filed this civil rights action for his wrongful conviction. Ultimately, a jury found that former Durham Police Department Officer violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during the murder investigation, and it awarded Plaintiff $6 million. On appeal, Plaintiff asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse the district court’s dismissal on summary judgment of his claims against the City of Durham and two other officers. He also sought a new damages trial, arguing that the jury’s award was impacted by improper character evidence. On cross-appeal, Defendant asked the court to set aside the jury verdict and remand for a new trial.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict against the former police officer and the dismissal of the claims against the City; however, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the two other officers and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. The court explained that the jury could find that by not turning over the video of an alternative suspect making incriminating statements or their notes related to that interview, the two officers intentionally hid evidence from Plaintiff in his innocence proceedings—evidence that cast serious doubts on his conviction and, potentially, on DPD’s underlying investigation. The court wrote that any competing testimony is a credibility issue that should be left to the jury View "Darryl Howard v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying the Commonwealth's petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from a superior court judge's denial of the Commonwealth's motion to disqualify Rosemary Scapicchio, Defendant's appellate counsel, on the ground that she had a conflict of interest, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying the motion.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Later, represented by Scapicchio, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging ineffective of counsel. Thereafter, Scapicchio represented Michael Barros at a hearing in an unrelated criminal case. The Commonwealth moved to disqualify Scapicchio on the grounds that her representation of both Defendant and Barros gave rise to a conflict of interest. The superior court denied the motion. The Commonwealth then filed the petition at issue. The single justice denied relief without reaching its merits. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying the petition. View "Commonwealth v. Monteiro" on Justia Law