Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that any error during the underlying proceedings that may have violated Defendant's right to confrontation was harmless.Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of delivering more than fifty grams of methamphetamine. In his postconviction petition, Defendant argued that the admission of certain testimony was hearsay, and therefore, his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment was violated. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that if any error occurred it was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, assuming without deciding that Defendant's confrontation right was violated, the error was harmless. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of both deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that there was no error in the underlying proceedings or in the verdict.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant following a police trooper's examination of Defendant's vehicle, which was visibly parked in the driveway leading up to his house. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant's vehicle was not parked within the curtilage of his home the trooper's observations of the vehicle did not constitute a search for constitutional purposes; and (2) there was no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Wittey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has been incarcerated on death row in Arkansas since 1997. After he was denied relief in state court under Arkansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit against several Arkansas officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on both standing and immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the Attorney General currently possesses any of the DNA evidence he wants to test, Act 1780 provides the Attorney General an opportunity to play a critical role in the statute’s implementation. And here, the Attorney General responded to Plaintiff’s Act 1780 petition by opposing it in state court. The Attorney General “thereby caused,” in part, Plaintiff’s ongoing injury of being denied access to DNA testing that might prove his innocence. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that was caused by Defendants and that would be redressed by the relief he seeks in his Section 1983 action. He has standing to bring his procedural due process challenge to Act 1780. Further, the court found that Defendants here are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and has alleged a sufficient connection between the defendants and Act 1780’s enforcement. View "Stacey Johnson v. Tim Griffin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this pro se action in federal district court alleging, as relevant here, that the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) violated her children’s rights under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000ff, et seq. The district court dismissed the GINA claims because Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring those claims on her own behalf and because Plaintiff—who is not a licensed attorney—could not proceed pro se on behalf of her children. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in holding that she cannot represent her children in federal court.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the GINA claims and remanded. The court held that an absolute bar on pro se parent representation is inconsistent with Section 1654, which allows a pro se parent to proceed on behalf of her child in federal court when the child’s case is the parent’s “own.” 28 U.S.C. Section 1654. The court explained this condition would be met if federal or state law designated Plaintiff’s children’s cases as belonging to her. The court remanded because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider whether Plaintiff’s children’s claims under the GINA belong to Plaintiff within the meaning of Section 1654. View "Raskin v. Dallas Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress eyewitness identifications resulting from an out-of-court police procedure, holding that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion review and that the court of appeal correctly analyzed the merits under that standard.In denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the court of appeal applied the abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court's ruling on the out-of-court identification by the eyewitness. On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed "[d]ue to the abuse of discretion standard of review." The Supreme Court approved the decision below, holding (1) abuse of discretion review is the proper standard; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the out-of-court identification. View "Alahad v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zephryn Hammond appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant University of Vermont Medical Center on plaintiff’s claims of employment discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment in April 2019. In October 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant had discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff based on plaintiff’s race and disabilities in violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). The civil division concluded plaintiff had established a prima facie case that plaintiff’s termination was motivated by racial discrimination. However, it ruled that defendant had articulated a legitimate basis for the termination decision, namely, the performance issues identified in plaintiff’s evaluations and during the disciplinary process, and plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual. The court determined that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that plaintiff’s termination was the result of disability discrimination. Finally, the court concluded that the fact that plaintiff was terminated shortly after complaining of possible racial and disability discrimination created a prima facie case of retaliation, but that defendant offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination and plaintiff had failed to show that the stated reasons were false. It therefore granted summary judgment to defendant on each of plaintiff’s claims. Finding no reversible error in the civil division's judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hammond v. University of Vermont Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation but vacated his conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, holding that the felony-murder conviction was improper.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony. In this appeal, consolidated with the appeal of his motions for a new trial and for reconsideration, Defendant argued, and the Commonwealth conceded, that the conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder was improper because the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping did not exist at the time of the killing. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's felony-murder conviction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's conviction of felony-murder lacked sufficient evidence to support it; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Commonwealth v. Samia" on Justia Law

At around nine o’clock in the evening, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a Ford Mustang darting erratically in the streets. Behind the wheel was a young white male, along with a blindfolded female in the car. With the aid of the car’s license plate number provided by the caller, Fountain Valley police officers figured out the home address of the driver and raced to that house. But this was not an ongoing kidnapping. In reality, the driver was taking his wife for a “surprise” anniversary dinner. And his parents would soon experience a surprise of their own as the police officers descended upon the home that they shared with their son. Before this mix-up could be cleared, the police officers ordered the Plaintiffs out of their home for obstructing the police and pushed the father to the ground as they handcuffed him. The Hills later sued, alleging (among other things) violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless arrests and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for police officers.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure when the officers ordered them to exit the home or face arrest for obstruction. The officers never seized Plaintiffs, who did not submit to the officers’ demand to leave the home. They, therefore, could not claim that they were unlawfully arrested. The panel next held that while the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice, they were nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity. View "STEPHEN HILL, ET AL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellants are agricultural workers hired by strawberry growers (“the Growers”) to pick the fruit that was then turned over to the Appellees Red Blossom Sales, Inc. and Better Produce, Inc. (“the Marketers”) for distribution. Appellants sought to hold the Marketers liable for their wages as “client employers.” The Marketers cooled and sold the berries principally to large retail grocery chains. The Marketers conducted their cooling and distribution operations on premises that were close to but separate from the farms. The Growers stopped paying Appellants and later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants sued the Growers and the Marketers as joint employers under California and federal law. Appellants also sued the Marketers as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. The district court ruled for the Marketers on all theories. Appellants appeal only with respect to the Marketers’ liability under Section 2810.3.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Appellants were not performing labor within the Marketers’ “usual course of business” as defined by the statute. That term is defined as “the regular and customary work of a business, performed within or upon the premises or worksite of the client employer.” Given the particular facts of this case, the court concluded that Appellants’ work took place on the farms where the strawberries were grown, not on the premises or worksites of the Marketers. The Marketers are, therefore, not liable as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. View "LUIS MORALES-GARCIA, ET AL V. BETTER PRODUCE, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law