Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Three former officers of a local affiliate of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (“AFGE”) filed a lawsuit alleging that AFGE unlawfully retaliated against them for speech protected under Section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Specifically, the former officers challenge AFGE’s imposition of a trusteeship on the local union and their removal from office. The district court granted summary judgment to AFGE as to two officers and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on the merits for AFGE as to the third officer.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish a prima facie free speech claim under Section 101(a)(2), then, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in speech protected by LMRDA; (2) she was subject to an adverse action; and (3) that action is causally linked to the protected speech. If the non-movant, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, “fails to make a sufficient showing to establish an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” a court must enter summary judgment against it. Here, the court wrote that Appellants failed to make the requisite showing, and consequently summary judgment was appropriate on their free speech claims. View "Alexander Bastani v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer for allegedly underpaying him for overtime hours. Plaintiff worked in Florida, but he sued Waste Pro USA, Inc., and its subsidiary, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc., as one of several named plaintiffs in a purported collective action in the District of South Carolina. That court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it denied as moot his motion to sever his claims and transfer them to a district court in Florida. Instead of appealing or seeking other relief in the South Carolina court, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida, alleging the same claims. The Florida district court granted summary judgment in favor of Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida because it determined that Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff had “alternate ways of preserving his cause of action short of invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling.” He could have filed a motion for reconsideration of or for relief from the dismissal order and argued that transfer was in the interest of justice. He also could have appealed the dismissal. “The right to appeal generally is regarded as an adequate legal remedy [that] forecloses equitable relief.” The court wrote that a diligent plaintiff would have filed a protective action or pursued a legal remedy in the South Carolina proceeding. Further, to the extent Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if equitable tolling does not apply in this case, that is the consequence of his own failure to pursue his remedies at law. Equity will not intervene in such circumstances. View "Anthony Wright v. Waste Pro USA Inc, et al." on Justia Law

Police officers shot and killed a teenage boy. His parents, Plaintiffs, sued the officers and the City of Benton, Arkansas, under Section 1983 and state law. After the district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, the Eighth Circuit court reversed and remanded in part. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parents argued that the parties genuinely dispute how their son moved the gun before being shot and that this dispute is material.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the parents identified a genuine dispute of material fact about whether their son pointed his gun at the officers. A jury could conclude, based on the expert’s testimony, that Plaintiffs’ son “never pointed the gun at the officers” but instead “moved his gun in compliance with commands to drop his gun.” This precludes summary judgment. The district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim is reversed. Because the district court relied on its excessive-force conclusion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell and state-law claims, those decisions are vacated. View "Piper Partridge v. City of Benton, Arkansas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus challenging the decision of the Ohio General Assembly placing a proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution on the ballot for a special election to be held on August 8, 2023, holding that a writ was warranted in part.In May 2023, the Ohio General Assembly passed a joint resolution to place to placed a proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution on the ballot for a special election. Relators filed this original action against Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the Ohio Ballot Board arguing that the ballot language and title of the proposed amendment were incomplete and misleading. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that LaRose's use of the word "any" in reference to "constitutional amendment" in the ballot title was likely to mislead voters, and the ballot board shall reconvene to adopt lawful ballot language that accurately characterizes and explains the definition of "electors" in reference to the petition signature requirements in the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

The City of Balch Springs Police Department hired an officer who a jury later convicted of murdering a teenage boy while on duty. Plaintiff (the boy’s father) sued the City under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the department’s use-of-force policy was constitutional and also that Plaintiff’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary theories of liability lacked factual support.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ultimate judgment. Plaintiff argued that the City’s policy is facially unconstitutional because it contains “no immediacy requirement necessary to justify an officer’s use of deadly force” and because it calls “for an officer to use the officer’s own subjective beliefs in determining whether deadly force was justified.” The court explained that a local government’s official, written policy is itself unconstitutional only if it affirmatively allows or compels unconstitutional conduct. The City’s policy passes muster under that standard. It does not affirmatively allow officers to use deadly force absent an immediate threat, and it does not affirmatively allow officers to rely on subjective factors when evaluating whether to use deadly force. Likewise, the prior constitutional violations that Plaintiff relies on are too dissimilar and generalized to establish a pattern. For that reason, Plaintiff cannot show that the City’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary failures (if any) arose from deliberate indifference. In turn, he cannot satisfy Monell’s third element. View "Edwards v. Balch Springs, Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying motions to dismiss this tort action brought against correction officers Bryon Whetzel and Isaiah Blancarte and West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOC), holding that the circuit court erred in denying DOC's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's negligent training and supervision claim.Plaintiff asserted three claims against the officers, including failure to protect and deliberate indifference, and two claims against the DOC - failure to train and adequately supervise and vicarious liability for the violation of his clearly established rights under the Eighth Amendment. In denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff alleged sufficient particularized facts to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying the officers' motions to dismiss; (2) did not err in denying DOC's motion to dismiss the vicarious liability count; but (3) erred in denying DOC's motion to dismiss the negligent training and supervision count because the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to deprive DOC of the immunity from suit that otherwise attaches to its discretionary functions of training and supervising employees. View "W. Va. Division of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Robbins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's conviction of attempted murder in the second degree and other crimes, holding that the principles of double jeopardy were violated by Defendant's convictions for brandishing a deadly weapon and wanton endangerment involving Deputy Coty Pierson.Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, two counts of wanton endangerment, one involving Deputy Pierson and the other involving Jeffrey Barnhouse, and brandishing a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) the jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer should not be set aside; (2) it was plain error for Defendant to have been convicted and sentenced for brandishing and wanton endangerment of Deputy Pierson because those crimes were lesser included offenses of the offense of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer; and (3) the trial court did not favor the State during Defendant's trial. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the required "substantial threshold showing of insanity" and that his mental illness claims were procedurally barred.On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court issued a warrant for Petitioner's execution. One month later, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he was incompetent to be executed under the standard set forth in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and because he was severely mentally ill. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim and filed a motion for a stay of execution while his incompetency claim was adjudicated. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's habeas petition and overruled as moot his accompanying motion for a stay of execution, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the substantial threshold showing of insanity required by Panetti and Ford. View "State ex rel. Johnson v. Vandergriff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, holding that the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct in the underlying proceedings.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct in the way he referred to and used the testimony of a forensic interviewer in his opening statement and closing argument. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that the prosecutor's statement violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (2) there was no plain error in the State's closing argument. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law