Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Kinney worked as the hospital's director of imaging services. Her employer approved her 2018 request for intermittent medical leave due to anxiety. Kinney began working remotely in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. When safety protocols were developed, her coworkers returned to work in person. Kinney kept working remotely without asking permission. She asserts that she could not wear a mask in compliance with the hospital’s COVID-19 protocol because face coverings exacerbate her anxiety. When her absences led to complaints, hospital management told Kinney that she had to work on-site several days each week. Management denied her request for accommodations.Kinney resigned and sued the under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (alleging a hostile workplace, discrimination based on her sex in failing to select her for promotions, and constructive discharge), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 (retaliation). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the hospital. No reasonable juror could find that Kinney could perform certain essential functions of her job without being present in the department that she oversaw; Kinney was not a qualified individual for the job under the ADA and her accommodation request was not reasonable. Her resignation was not a constructive discharge. Kinney did not raise a genuine factual issue as to whether she was similarly or better qualified for the position than the chosen male candidate. View "Kinney v. St. Mary's Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing her claims of age, race, and gender discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to her retaliation claim and that it erroneously concluded that she had failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ race-neutral explanations for not selecting her for two internal promotions were pretextual.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants’ explanations for her non-promotions were pretextual. Second, the court held that although the district court applied an incorrect standard to her retaliatory hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation and did not demonstrate that her employer’s non-retaliatory explanations were pretextual. The court explained that Defendant’s evidence supporting summary judgment established that Plaintiff received negative performance evaluations because she was not adequately or timely completing her duties and had become increasingly challenging to work with. The court wrote that Plaintiff has not rebutted this showing with evidence demonstrating that the reasons the NYCTA provided for the poor performance reviews were pretextual. Instead, she argues that the performance reviews must have been retaliatory due to their temporal proximity to her complaints. But she offers nothing more to establish causation. View "Carr v. New York City Transit Authority" on Justia Law

In 2015, McBride was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. After two trials, a jury convicted McBride on all charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the court erred in failing to admit his full police interview, that the evidence could not support his convictions, and that his counsel was ineffective. While his appeal was pending, McBride filed unsuccessful motions requesting a “Ginther” hearing to present evidence of his counsel’s ineffectiveness.In a brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, McBride first alleged that his due process rights were violated during his pretrial detention. That court returned this brief because McBride was represented by counsel. In a federal habeas claim, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), McBride alleged his due process and Miranda rights were violated during his arrest and detention; his trial counsel was ineffective; and the Michigan courts erred in various evidentiary rulings. The district court dismissed claims without prejudice, citing the unexhausted first claim. A year later, McBride moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that his exhausted claims should be allowed to proceed under the Supreme Court’s “Rhines” decision which gives courts facing both exhausted and unexhausted claims two options besides dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting McBride’s argument that the district court should have sua sponte considered alternatives to dismissal. View "McBride v. Skipper" on Justia Law

John Telly King was murdered by a fellow inmate. King’s estate sued the South Carolina Department of Corrections prison guards on duty and their supervisors, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to King’s safety and medical needs and, therefore, responsible for his death. A magistrate judge disagreed, granting summary judgment to the defendants, and King appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the prison guards on duty failed to violate a clearly established right so are entitled to qualified immunity. And Plaintiff failed to allege, or raise a disputed material fact of, any individual involvement by the supervisor Defendants. The court explained that nowhere does Plaintiff identify how each defendant violated the constitution. This is a prerequisite to a supervisory-liability claim. Nor does Plaintiff present a material dispute about any individual Defendant’s knowledge. Instead, Plaintiff only claims that Defendants “either maintained actual or constructive knowledge of the risk” (whatever that risk may be). The court wrote that this boilerplate conclusion—lacking defendant specificity and factual support— does not state a claim for relief or allow a plaintiff to get past summary judgment. View "David King v. Timothy Riley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received his third citation for Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”). As a term of his probation, Plaintiff, an alcoholic, was required to attend weekly substance abuse classes. Some of these classes conflicted with shifts that Plaintiff was scheduled to work as an operator at a plant owned by Defendant La Grange Acquisitions, L.P. Plaintiff informed his supervisors that he was an alcoholic and that several of the court-ordered substance abuse classes would conflict with his scheduled shifts. When Plaintiff was unable to find coverage for these shifts, La Grange, citing this scheduling conflict, terminated Plaintiff. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Plaintiff sued La Grange under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. Sections 12112 et seq., for intentional discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of La Grange on all three claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the facts suggest only that a reasonable employer might have found that Plaintiff might have been seeking accommodation for his disability. To hold that La Grange was required to determine whether Plaintiff had a disability and needed accommodation in this situation would place the initial burden of identifying an accommodation request on the employer, not the employee. We cannot find that Plaintiff’s terse references to his struggles with drinking and self-identification as an alcoholic, made while discussing the legal implications of a recent DWI, were enough to place a legal responsibility on La Grange to probe whether Plaintiff was requesting a disability accommodation. View "Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions" on Justia Law

In 1985, Clark and Devose assaulted and kidnapped a postal worker at gunpoint, stripped him of his uniform, and restrained him in his truck. Disguised in the uniform, Devose gained entry to a banker’s home, where they held the banker’s 85-year-old mother-in-law and 19-year-old daughter at gunpoint and called the banker to demand ransom. Clark raped the girl. They saw police outside and fled. Devose pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Clark.In 1990, Clark was convicted of two conspiracy offenses, attempted extortion, assault of a postal worker, kidnapping, theft of a postal vehicle, and using a firearm during a crime of violence--kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Clark was sentenced to life imprisonment plus five years for the firearm count, to be served consecutively, as section 924 required. The Sentencing Guidelines did not then apply. Clark filed an unsuccessful appeal and numerous unsuccessful collateral attacks. In 2019, the Supreme Court held that part of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague.In Clark’s successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, the parties agreed that kidnapping does not qualify as a section 924(c) crime of violence. The district court vacated Clark’s 924 conviction but declined to conduct a full resentencing. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As a matter of first impression, the court held that a certificate of appealability is required for a prisoner in federal custody to appeal a district court’s choice of remedy in a 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceeding. View "Clark v. United States" on Justia Law

Davis, a non-citizen, and Beckford, a U.S. citizen, met when they were children. In 1993, Davis was sentenced to life in prison for nonviolent drug convictions. When his sentence was reduced to 30 years in 2008, the two decided to marry. viewing marriage as an expression of their Christian faith. In 2012, Davis was moved to Moshannon Valley, a private prison that houses low-security alien inmates. The prison’s written policy for allowing marriage had certain behavioral requirements; the prison psychologist and other officials had to approve the request. Davis unsuccessfully challenged the denial of his marriage request through the prison’s administrative process. The Administrator of the Bureau of Prisons Privatization Management Branch informed Davis that marriage requests remained exclusively within the province of Moshannon officials. Davis learned that Moshannon had not approved a single request to marry during its contractual relationship. Davis’s sentence was later reduced to 27 years. He was deported after his release. Although their marriage would not have allowed Davis to challenge his deportation, Davis alleges that marriage to a U.S. citizen could provide a basis for other inmates to challenge their removals. Davis alleged that federal officials directed Moshannon officials to deny all inmate marriage requests to ensure that marriage to a citizen would not interfere with deportations. The district court dismissed claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, under 42 U.S.C. 1985; and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Third Circuit vacated in part. Davis stated a RFRA claim. View "Davis v. Wigen" on Justia Law

Following a federal trial, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decisions to (1) instruct the jury that a Section 1983 claim could not be grounded in a Miranda violation alone and (2) exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s coerced confessions expert. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the Miranda issue, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision. On remand, Plaintiff concedes that his Miranda claim is no longer viable but maintains that he is entitled to a new trial on his Fifth Amendment coercion claim because the district court improperly excluded his expert witness.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Defendants and remanded for a new trial on Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim that his confession was coerced. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert witness’s testimony on coerced confessions because the testimony was relevant, false confessions are an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson, and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s confession went to the heart of his case. View "TERENCE TEKOH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his position as Fire Chief for the City of Stockton based on his religion and, specifically, his attendance at a religious leadership event.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action under Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The panel held that, in analyzing employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the California FEHA, the court may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, under which plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions. Finally, the burden returns to Plaintiff to show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Alternatively, Plaintiff may prevail on summary judgment by showing direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.   The court explained that Plaintiff was required to show that his religion was “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision to fire him with respect to his federal claims and that his religion was “a substantial motivating factor” with respect to his FEHA claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory animus in Defendants’ statements and the City’s notice of intent to remove him from City service. And Plaintiff also failed to present sufficient specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of religious animus by Defendants. View "RONALD HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a pilot and flight instructor. After she failed to produce her pilot logbooks and training records upon request by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the FAA suspended Petitioner’s pilot certificate. Petitioner appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) but, days later, complied with the records request. The FAA then terminated her suspension, which lasted 14 days in total and reinstated her certificate. Nonetheless, an NTSB administrative law judge held a hearing on Petitioner’s appeal and concluded that the suspension was reasonable. Petitioner appealed the decision to the full NTSB, but it dismissed the matter as moot. Petitioner petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s final order under 49 U.S.C. Sections 44709(f) and 46110.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner lacked Article III standing and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the first problem with Petitioner’s theory of future injury is that she has not shown with particularity how her brief suspension for noncompliance with a records request would harm her job prospects. Further, the court wrote that even assuming the 14-day suspension would be damaging to her job prospects, Petitioner’s claims are not y “real and immediate.” Moreover, the court explained that the record here lacks any facts showing that Petitioner’s suspension would harm her reputation in the estimation of the pilot community. Instead, Petitioner relied on vague, blanket statements of reputational harm. View "Amy McNaught v. Billy Nolen" on Justia Law