Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Kailins called the Gurnee Police Department to report that their daughter had been the victim of possible criminal conduct. Officer Greer arrived at their house around 8 p.m. to follow up. Six seconds after Kailin opened the door, Greer shot the Kailins’ dog, Timber, on their neighbor’s lawn. The Kailins sued, asserting illegal seizure, 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Officer Greer, a “Monell” claim of municipal liability, and a claim for indemnification by the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court noted the Kailins’ assertions, “that Timber never barked nor growled at Greer” and that Timber was "simply playing” but concluded that the video from the body-worn camera controlled and eliminated any dispute of fact.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The question of what Timber was doing and how she was behaving is key to determining the reasonableness of Greer’s actions and therefore to liability on all claims. This is not the rare case where the video definitively demonstrates what occurred. There is no audio to reveal whether Timber was growling or barking as Greer alleged. The entire video lasts only six seconds; it is disputable whether the dog can be seen at any time in the video until she has been shot. View "Kailin v. Village of Gurnee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a physician who provided medical care to Arkansas correctional facility inmates through her employer, Wellpath, LLC. Wellpath terminated Plaintiff’s employment, and she sued, claiming it unlawfully terminated her employment because she reported suspected alterations to her electronic patient medical records. The district court granted Wellpath’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly interpreted Arkansas law regarding what constitutes legally protected conduct under the public policy exception to at-will employment and improperly determined at the summary judgment stage that Plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between her tampering reports and her termination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Arkansas’s employment-at-will doctrine, employers may generally discharge employees whose employment is for an indefinite term “for good cause, no cause, or even a morally wrong cause.” Further, Arkansas recognizes a limited exception to this doctrine providing a cause of action to an at-will employee “for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the State.” The court explained that Plaintiff failed to show anything beyond mere speculation or her own conclusory allegations that call into question the legitimacy of Wellpath’s stated cause for her termination. The court wrote that reasonable minds could not believe an employer would see into the future and begin preemptively generating evidence to support an impermissible basis for terminating a whistleblower-to-be. Simply because Plaintiff reported suspected suspicious electronic activity while Wellpath administrators labored to resolve ongoing employment disputes does not abrogate Wellpath’s broad right to terminate her at-will employment. View "Melanie Jones v. WellPath, LLC" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Sherwood and Doyle lost their jobs because of the COVID-19 pandemic and applied for unemployment benefits. They never received those benefits, however, and still have not received notice of the denial of their claims or an opportunity for a hearing. Sherwood and Doyle filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES), asserting equal protection and procedural due process claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Under the “Young doctrine,” which provides an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, private parties may sue individual state officials for prospective relief to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law. Even if these plaintiffs had standing to bring the equal protection claims, sovereign immunity bars them; the Young exception does not apply when federal law has been violated only at one time or over a period of time in the past. The plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury to pursue their procedural due process claims and can invoke the Young exception to sovereign immunity but mandamus provides an adequate state-law remedy in this case. View "Sherwood v. Marchiori" on Justia Law

Whitfield was scheduled for discharge from Menard Correctional Center in January 2010, to begin a term of mandatory supervised release. On that day, prison officials handed Whitfield only the signature page of a document called the “Electronic Detention Program Agreement.” That page stated that “the following conditions of the Program apply only to sex offender cases.” Whitfield was not a sex offender and objected to signing the Agreement without an explanation from a prison official clarifying why he, a non-sex offender, had to sign a form designed exclusively for sex offenders. Whitfield’s objections were rejected. Four times, clinical services supervisor Spiller directed Whitfield to sign the form. After his continued refusal, she issued a disciplinary ticket for failure to follow a direct order. Whitfield was transferred to disciplinary segregation; the Illinois Prisoner Review Board held a hearing and found he had violated the terms of his supervised release. His eligibility for supervised release was revoked. Whitfield remained in custody for another 18 months.Whitfield sued Spiller, other Menard officials, and Board members, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The case has narrowed to Whitfield’s claims against Spiller and then-warden Gaetz for First and Eighth Amendment violations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly granted the defendants summary judgment on some claims, but that Whitfield has sufficient evidence that Spiller’s conduct violated his First Amendment rights. View "Whitfield v. Cowan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Tug Hill Operating, LLC, for approximately a year and a half at rig sites in West Virginia. He commenced an action against Tug Hill under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that while Tug Hill formally classified him as an independent contractor, he actually qualified as an employee for purposes of the FLSA based on the degree of control that Tug Hill exercised over his work. He, therefore, claimed that Tug Hill was required to pay him overtime for those weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. Tug Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action on the ground that Plaintiff was contractually required to arbitrate his claim against it. In addition, RigUp itself filed a motion to intervene in order to seek the action’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. The district court granted both motions.   The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings and remanded. The court explained that the numerous provisions in the Agreement preclude any conclusion that the Agreement was entered into solely or directly for the benefit of Tug Hill, such that Tug Hill could enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Tug Hill’s motion to dismiss and compelling Plaintiff, under the arbitration agreement between him and RigUp, to proceed to arbitration with respect to his FLSA claim against Tug Hill. Moreover, the court explained that because RigUp’s agreement with Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in any litigation, Plaintiff might have with a company in Tug Hill’s position RigUp cannot now opportunistically claim that intervention is necessary. View "Lastephen Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute required the automatic suspension of residents’ driver’s licenses if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. in 2016, a group of indigent Virginians who lost their licenses when they were unable to pay court debts initiated a putative class action against the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“Commissioner”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s license-suspension scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs raised several claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: that the statute’s requirement of automatic suspension without notice or a hearing violated their procedural due process rights; and that the statute’s enforcement against those who were unable, not unwilling, to pay violated both their substantive due process rights and their equal protection rights. As relief, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the statute’s enforcement and requiring license reinstatement to the “hundreds of thousands of Virginians” with suspended licenses. Plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), which provides that the district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” in Section 1983 actions “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs here prevailed” in every sense needed to make them eligible for a fee award. The court explained that the named plaintiffs sought not only reinstatement of their own licenses but also class certification, a declaratory judgment that Section 46.2-395 was unconstitutional, and hence permanent license reinstatement for hundreds of thousands of Virginians. Those are precisely the kinds of considerations that bear on the “extent of a plaintiff’s success” – a critical factor in assessing a reasonable fee award in any fee litigation under Section 1988. View "Damian Stinnie v. Richard Holcomb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it admitted the victim's dying declarations into evidence during the jury trial, and this Court reaffirms that dying declarations are an exception to the Confrontation Clause; (2) the district court did not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel by denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police officers because Defendant validly waived his invoked right to counsel; and (3) there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of Spreigl evidence related to a prior assault charge into evidence significantly affected the verdict. View "State v. Buchan" on Justia Law

Prude, serving an 80-year sentence, helped a friend and fellow inmate file a successful civil rights lawsuit against their Wisconsin prison. According to Prude, his friend, grateful for the help, sent him $10,000 of his $40,000 damages award to help Prude retain an attorney for his own appeal. The prison’s Security Director, Meli, characterized the check as the product of an illegal business arrangement, seized the funds as contraband, and launched an investigation, after which he charged Prude with violations of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, including lying, unauthorized use of the mail, threats, and enterprises and fraud. Prude had a disciplinary hearing and was found guilty; the $10,000 was permanently seized. Although Meli was an investigating officer who should have recused himself from the hearing process, Prude claims he controlled the hearing and directed the actions of the hearing officer, Westra, to ensure a finding of guilt and to prevent Prude from ever getting his money.“Despite statements from Meli and Westra before and during the hearing suggesting a predetermined outcome,” the district court dismissed Prude's claims against Westra at the screening stage and later granted Meli summary judgment on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the evidence in the record plausibly supports a due process violation. View "Prude v. Meli" on Justia Law

High-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men, where there was a widespread COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that ultimately killed one prison guard and over twenty-five inmates. The guard’s family members sued the prison officials, claiming that the officials violated the guard’s due process rights. The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion with respect to some of the officials, who then filed an interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The panel held that based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of the guard’s substantive due process right to be free from a state-created danger, under which state actors may be liable for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger they otherwise would not have faced. The panel held that the unlawfulness of defendants’ alleged actions was clearly established by the combination of two precedents: L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising out of a prison’s disregard for the safety of a female employee who was raped after being required to work alone with an inmate known to be likely to commit a violent crime if placed alone with a woman; and Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2016). View "PATRICIA POLANCO, ET AL V. RALPH DIAZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2017, Elion pleaded guilty to three counts of distributing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The Probation Office classified him as a career offender, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), 4B1.2(b), yielding a heightened Guidelines range, 151–188 months, rather than 70-87 months. Elion’s attorney did not challenge the enhancement. Elion appealed his 167-month sentence, but his attorney moved to withdraw. Elion voluntarily dismissed his appeals. Months later, Elion filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Elion argued that had trial counsel objected to the career offender designation, he would have received a lower Guidelines range and a much-reduced sentence. Elion’s prior convictions were a 1999 Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of a look-alike substance within 1,000 feet of public housing property, a 2000 Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of a look-alike substance, and a 2006 federal conviction for distribution of a cocaine base.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Elion’s motion. The Illinois look-alike statute punishes conduct more broadly than the Guidelines controlled substance offense, and it is indivisible. Elion should not have been sentenced as a career offender. The district court must examine whether his attorney’s performance was deficient under the Strickland standard. View "Elion v. United States" on Justia Law