Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant, who has long struggled with serious mental-health issues—has a pattern of threatening judges. This case arises out of a threat that he recently made against a federal magistrate judge in his hometown of Fort Pierce, Florida. Defendant was convicted in federal court of (1) mailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 876(c) and (2) threatening a federal official. For his crimes, he was sentenced to 60 months in prison. Defendant now challenged his convictions and sentence on five grounds.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the judge expressly considered two other factors when making his sentencing decision, both of which he cited as bases for an upward departure: (1) Defendant’s history of making threats; and (2) the evidence of racial animus. Further, even if the district judge’s reference to his own religious experience was improper, it didn’t “substantially affect his selection of Defendant’s sentence”—and, therefore, was harmless. View "USA v. Lawrence F. Curtin" on Justia Law

Officers swarmed a New Jersey hotel room to execute an arrest warrant for Montalvo-Flores in connection with his suspected involvement in a robbery. They found car keys during a search incident to arrest. Although Montalvo-Flores exclaimed that those were his car keys, he did not have a valid driver’s license. Upon locating the car in the parking lot, officers discovered that its registered owner was the Enterprise. Officers called Enterprise’s regional risk manager to obtain permission to search the car, stating that Montalvo-Flores was operating the vehicle while involved in criminal activity. The manager, noting Montalvo-Flores was not listed on the rental agreement (his girlfriend, Pisciotta, was) gave officers consent to search the vehicle. In that search, officers found 304 grams of cocaine inside the trunk.Montalvo-Flores, charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), moved to suppress, arguing that he, with his girlfriend’s permission, lawfully possessed and controlled the car. The district court denied Montalvo-Flores’s motion, holding that he lacked standing because he failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The Third Circuit reversed. Montalvo-Flores had dominion and control of the car with his girlfriend’s permission and had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. View "United States v. Montalvo-Flores" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 lawsuit against the City of St. Louis and Doc’s Towing, Inc., alleging that Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they detained her truck pursuant to a “wanted” report. On the first appeal of this case the Eighth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient for Plaintiff’s claims to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff then settled with Doc’s Towing, and her case against the City proceeded to trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the City on Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on her due process claim and awarded her compensatory damages. The district court denied the City’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law but partially granted its motion to reduce the damages award. Both the City and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as to Plaintiff’s assertion on cross-appeal that the district court erred by granting the City judgment as a matter of law on her unreasonable seizure claim, the court declined to reverse that ruling. The court explained that her due process claims and unreasonable seizure claim sought compensation for the same injury, and she concedes that she would not be entitled to additional compensatory damages beyond those that were already awarded by the jury. Accordingly, the court declined to remand because Plaintiff failed to articulate what relief she could obtain beyond what she has already achieved by way of the jury verdict. View "Mary Meier v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer, Defendant Montefiore Medical Center, and two of its employees, asserting claims of sexual harassment during and retaliatory discharge from her employment. Following the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in their favor, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims and sought sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel, Appellant Daniel Altaras and his firm, Appellant Derek Smith Law Group, PLLC (“DSLG”), contending that Plaintiff’s text message evidence was a forgery. The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff had fabricated the text messages, falsely testified about their production, and spoliated evidence in an attempt to conceal her wrongdoing. The district court also found that Altaras had facilitated Plaintiff’s misconduct. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice and imposed a monetary sanction of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Defendants. On appeal, Appellants challenged various aspects of the district court’s conduct.   The court vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment imposing a sanction on Altaras and DSLG and remanded for further proceedings consistent. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all other respects. The court held that the district court erred by failing to expressly make the finding of bad faith required to support the sanction it imposed against Altaras and DSLG.  The court directed that on remand, the district court may assess in its discretion whether Altaras’s misconduct—including his insistence on defending a complaint founded on obviously fabricated evidence or other actions—amounted to bad faith. View "Rossbach et al. v. Montefiore Medical Center et al." on Justia Law

Brown injured his knee when he fell at his former prison. He received medical care and was placed on “special needs,” which included being assigned a lower bunk, a wheelchair, and crutches. Weeks later, Brown was transferred. Over the first few months, he spent time in segregation. Brown repeatedly asked several times for medical care but received none. He was later moved to a shared cell where his cellmate, who was disabled, slept in the lower bunk. While climbing to his top bunk, Brown fell. Afterward, Brown saw a doctor who said that Brown needed surgery but that the prison would not provide it. Brown then asked the prison’s “special needs committee” to provide him “accommodations,” and he “filed an ADA reasonable accommodation request.” He also alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part. Brown alleged a viable failure-to-accommodate claim, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Brown’s complaint did not need to identify any particular legal theory, nor did it need to allege all legal elements of a particular claim. Brown’s alleged knee injury renders him disabled under the ADA and he alleged failure to accommodate his disability. No rule of law required Brown to identify a particular accommodation in his complaint. The ADA “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice” but Brown’s claim is not about allegedly substandard medical care. View "Brown v. Fofana" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two women, Elwood Staffing Services, Inc., placed at a job site working for Schlumberger, Ltd. A senior coworker at their site was a lesbian who sexually assaulted one of the women and harassed the other. Plaintiff submitted a complaint about sexual harassment, and Schlumberger terminated her. The other Plaintiff later resigned. Together, the women filed suit in federal court alleging violations of Title VII. The district court entered a mixed summary judgment order, finding the women had viable claims against Schlumberger but releasing Elwood from the suit. Schlumberger subsequently settled with Plaintiffs at mediation. The women challenged the order to the extent it granted summary judgment in Elwood’s favor on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff does not provide evidence that Elwood knew what was happening to her in the gun shop. She did not report the discrimination and abuse she experienced to Elwood. And a report would not have been and was not a wasted action. Nor does she provide evidence that Elwood should have linked the other Plaintiff’s complaints to other employees. At best, she has shown that Elwood had good reason to ask Schlumberger some questions, which, of course, it did. But that does not meet the applicable knowledge element in her cause of action. The court concluded that Elwood did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile work environment experienced by Plaintiff. The court concluded that Plaintiffs sought to hold the wrong party liable for their injuries. They cannot establish why Elwood should be held responsible for the misconduct of Schlumberger’s employees. View "Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Svc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff y filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiff’s post was constitutionally protected speech and that the grant of summary judgment was improper. The court explained that regardless of the unnamed deputy’s comment, Iles admitted that he arrested Plaintiff at least in part because of the content of his Facebook post, rather than for some other conduct, i.e. Iles admitted that the arrest was at least “substantially motivated” by Plaintiff’s speech. Further, there is t no dispute as to the second element, as Plaintiff’s speech was chilled when he deleted his Facebook post in response to the arrest. Thus, when Iles arrested Plaintiff, he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and a patient at Patton State Hospital in California, he was twice attacked by a fellow patient. He sued Defendant, the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injuries from the second attack, alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel determined that both tests ask whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable, and both require Alexander to show that Defendant’s conduct was worse than negligent. The panel held that under either test, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant failed to act reasonably, let alone that he was “more than negligent” in not transferring Plaintiff or the other patient after the first attack. Although Plaintiff was attacked a second time, the evidence showed that Defendant’s responses to both incidents were thorough and careful. Accordingly, the panel found no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. View "SURIE ALEXANDER V. DAU NGUYEN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims that his former employer, ADESA Missouri, LLC (ADESA), discriminated against and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ADESA’s reasons for terminating him were pretext for disability discrimination and retaliation. The court agreed with Plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable jury could determine that the company’s VP made the decision to terminate Plaintiff  because of his medical restriction and only retroactively claimed a performance-based concern after HR advised her that terminating an employee due to his disability could be “an issue.” The evidence shows that the VP sent an email to HR about an employee with a “medical restriction” who had been “identified” for termination, asking if this could be “an issue.” Only after she learned that it could be a problem did the VP respond with specific criticisms of his performance. ADESA argues that because Plaintiff does not dispute he was underperforming compared to his peers, there can be no pretext. But neither the sales director nor the VP was able to say when they took these performance assessments into consideration. Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised genuine doubt as to ADESA’s proffered reasons for his termination. View "Roby Anderson v. KAR Global" on Justia Law

Appellant Attorney Kezhaya represented The Satanic Temple, Inc., in its lawsuits against the City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota. The Temple sued the City, claiming that the City opened a limited public forum for a Christian monument, but closed the forum to exclude a Satanic monument. The City sought $33,886.80 in attorney’s fees incurred by responding to the complaint in the second lawsuit and preparing the motion for sanctions. The court determined that the rates charged by the City’s counsel were reasonable but observed that a portion of the work was duplicative of the first lawsuit and that the issues unique to the second lawsuit were not complex, novel, or difficult. The court thus reduced the requested amount by fifty percent and ordered the Temple’s counsel to pay the City $16,943.40 under Rule 11(c). Kezhaya appealed the sanctions order. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (i) imposing sanctions, (ii) failing to consider non-monetary sanctions, and (iii) granting an arbitrary amount of sanctions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the circumstances, it disagreed with Kezhaya’s contention about the righteousness of a second lawsuit. For the claims dismissed “without prejudice” in the first lawsuit, Kezhaya and the Temple made a strategic choice to seek leave to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. Further, the court found that even if the City’s insurance carrier ultimately paid the fees, the fees were “incurred” for the motion and could be awarded under Rule 11(c)(2). View "Matthew Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law