Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendants responded to calls from the decedent’s neighbor that he was driving a pickup truck erratically on a rural field on his own property, that he was drunk and belligerent and may have fired a gun. An hour after thirty officers arrived at the property in marked police cars with their overhead lights on, Defendants used an unmarked armored vehicle to twice execute a pursuit intervention technique (“PIT”) maneuver by intentionally colliding with decedent’s truck in the field. Officers reportedly shot decedent after they thought they heard a gunshot and saw a rifle pointed at them. Decedent’s widow brought this civil suit seeking damages from the officers and the County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel first rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants violated decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering the property without a warrant. The officers’ decision not to obtain a warrant before entering the property was not the proximate cause of decedent’s death. The panel next held that a jury could find that Defendants’ second PIT maneuver constituted deadly and excessive force because (1) it created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, (2) decedent did not pose an imminent threat to the officers or others at that point, and (3) less intrusive alternatives were available. Nevertheless, no clearly established law would have provided adequate notice to reasonable officers that their use of the armored vehicle to execute a low-speed PIT maneuver under these circumstances was unconstitutional. View "APRIL SABBE V. WASHINGTON CNTY BD OF COMM'RS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Storme faced multiple charges of cyberstalking and unauthorized intrusion into a cell phone. He was ordered released on bond into the custody of his mother subject to conditions. He immediately attempted suicide. Months later, Pretrial Services reported that Storme had violated his curfew over 30 times and had been arrested for allegedly stalking a fourth woman. Storme was abusing alcohol and expressing suicidal ideation. The court did not his revoke release. Storme's mother moved to Virginia. The court did not appoint a new custodian. Months later, the court received a report from Storme’s therapist, expressing concern that Storme would kill himself if he thought the court might deny his motion to dismiss. Storme then began transferring assets to his mother and appeared multiple times in court to watch unrelated proceedings before his assigned judge.The district court heard arguments, then, without advance notice, revoked Storme’s pretrial release and ordered him detained, without making supporting findings. Storme began slamming his head to the floor and urging the marshals to kill him. In a holding cell, he tried to hang himself. After review by the Seventh Circuit, the government filed a motion to revoke. The district court granted its motion, finding probable cause to believe that, while on release, Storme committed crimes and otherwise violated his release conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the court reached the correct conclusion, based on the ongoing threat to the community, despite procedural irregularities under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. 3142(d)). View "United States v. Storme" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law

The case at hand is about whether Plaintiff was retaliated against by her former employer, Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants, Inc. (“APC”), and the company that contracted with her employer, Centurion of Florida, LLC (“Centurion”) (together, “Defendants”), for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged four counts. Centurion and APC both moved for summary judgment on all counts. The district court granted summary judgment on three of them. The district court directed the clerk to enter a final judgment on the three resolved counts, and it certified that the fourth count satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) for immediate interlocutory review, should either party file an appropriate application with the Eleventh Circuit. At issue is whether the district court’s certification was proper as to Plaintiff’s direct appeal and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) have been met as to Centurion’s cross-appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the answer to both questions is not and dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that there are substantial reasons to delay resolving Plaintiff’s appeal of her whistleblower counts against APC. Plaintiff’s whistleblower counts against Centurion and APC are identical. It makes good sense that appeals of an order dismissing those counts should be heard together. But because there is no final judgment against Centurion, the court wrote that it lacks the power to adjudicate those counts against Centurion at this time. View "Ronda Scott v. Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants Inc, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.Appellant was convicted of escape, retaliation, and other offenses and sentenced to 26.5 years in prison. Appellant later brought the current action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his sentencing entries and to grant any other relief to which he was "entitled." The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to raise his claim that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be expressly informed of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding and that the trial court's failure to do so in his case rendered his sentence void. View "State ex rel. Rarden v. Butler County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant on federal drug- and gun-related charges, holding that the district court erred by failing to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to law enforcement because the government failed to satisfy its burden to show that Defendant validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute those drugs; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement immediately following his arrest, arguing that the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant understood his Miranda rights and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived them. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government failed to show that Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and this error was not harmless. View "United States v. Donald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the "anti-abrogation clause" set forth in Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 6 guaranteeing that the "right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated" does not extend to dram-shop actions because they were recognized after statehood.At issue was whether the anti-abrogation clause extends to rights of action created after the Arizona Constitution was ratified, such as the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (1983). Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the owner of Jaguars Club in Phoenix, under theories of statutory and common law dram-shop liability. The jury found Defendant was liable under the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros but not liable under the dram-shop cause of action codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. 4-311(A). The jury apportioned forty percent of the fault to Defendant. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that the legislature's limitation of dram-shop liability to actions brought under section 4-311 did not run afoul of the anti-abrogation clause by abrogating the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros. View "Torres v. JAI Dining Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Kari Lake and Mark Finchem (“Plaintiffs”), the Republican nominees for Governor and Secretary of State of Arizona, filed this action before the 2022 general election, contending that Arizona’s use of electronic tabulation systems violated the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed their operative first amended complaint for lack of Article III standing. Lake v. Hobbs. Plaintiffs’ candidacies failed at the polls, and their various attempts to overturn the election outcome in state court have to date been unavailing. On appeal, they no longer seek any relief concerning the 2022 election but instead seek to bar use of electronic tabulation systems in future Arizona elections.   The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs’ “speculative allegations that voting machines may be hackable are insufficient to establish an injury in fact under Article III. The court explained that even assuming Plaintiffs could continue to claim standing as prospective voters in future elections, they had not alleged a particularized injury and therefore failed to establish the kind of injury Article III requires. None of Plaintiffs’ allegations supported a plausible inference that their individual votes in future elections will be adversely affected by the use of electronic tabulation, particularly given the robust safeguards in Arizona law, the use of paper ballots, and the post-tabulation retention of those ballots. The panel concluded that speculative allegations that voting machines may be hackable were insufficient to establish an injury, in fact, under Article III. View "KARI LAKE, ET AL V. ADRIAN FONTES, ET AL" on Justia Law