Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction, holding Supreme Court should have suppressed a gun as the product of an impermissible stop because the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that Defendant had violated the rules of the road while riding his bicycle.Defendant was riding his bicycle down a road when police officers drove alongside him and asked him to stop. Defendant stopped and, in response to an officer's question, admitted that he was carrying a gun. Defendant pleaded guilty to a weapons charge. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) police interference with a bicyclist is a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense or probable cause of a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation; and (2) the officers in this case violated the New York and United States Constitutions when they stopped Defendant, and therefore, the indictment against Defendant must be dismissed. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, holding that the record did not support the trial court's conclusion that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), when he was handcuffed and questioned by law enforcement officers.On appeal, Defendant argued that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police while handcuffed and the physical evidence found in his vehicle because the officers failed to read him his Miranda rights prior to questioning him and because he never voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings when he answered questions by the police officers and therefore, Supreme Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his responses to the officers' questions; and (2) the Miranda violation when Defendant was stopped and handcuffed did not render his later written consent to search his vehicle involuntary. View "People v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert Anderson. Anderson’s estate and family sued Wright, Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the Section 1983 claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Plaintiffs’ rights were not clearly established. First, it was not obvious that defendants were constitutionally precluded from firing given that they were responding to an active domestic violence situation, lacked the benefit of having time to fully assess the circumstances, and needed to make split-second decisions as they were being charged. Second, Plaintiffs failed to show controlling authorities (or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would have put every reasonable officer on notice that defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing this case from other cases, the panel noted that Anderson was in a narrow hall and rapidly approaching the officers, with no barrier between them. He could have accessed the officers’ weapons at any time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if the officers took the option to retreat to the house’s entryway, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for whom they had just called an ambulance—alone with her husband or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a weapon from somewhere in his home. View "FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL" on Justia Law

At Northwest Missouri State University, they must notify an administrator before distributing “non-University publications.” Plaintiff Richard Hershey earns money promoting a vegan lifestyle on college campuses. In September 2015, he visited Northwest Missouri State with a stack of written materials. A student called campus police to report a “suspicious male” who was “attempting to pass something out to . . . students.” About a year later, Northwest Missouri State updated its policy. Nearly five years after he visited, Hershey sued multiple Northwest Missouri State officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to declare the old and new policies unconstitutionally overbroad and to enjoin their enforcement. The district court, for its part, treated the two policies as materially indistinguishable from one another. The main problem, at least in the district court’s eyes, was that neither required “a decision on the proposed speech within a reasonable period of time,” which could have the effect of silencing speakers indefinitely. So it awarded Hershey most of the relief he requested.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the entry of judgment in Defendants’ favor. The court explained that the procedural safeguards that must accompany prior restraints do not apply to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. No matter the First Amendment theory, Hershey has not shown that the advance-notice requirement has “a substantial number” of unconstitutional applications. It is neither content-based nor an impermissible prior restraint on speech, meaning it can remain in place. View "Richard Hershey v. Dr. John Jasinski" on Justia Law

Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __ (2022), individuals charged in California with unlawfully possessing a handgun have contended that their charges and resulting convictions were unconstitutional. They argued, unsuccessfully, that Bruen rendered California’s entire licensing scheme facially unconstitutional, and as a result, it was unconstitutional to punish nonfelons such as them for carrying a firearm in public solely because they did not have a license. Defendants-respondents Jaime Mosqueda and Juanita Mosqueda successfully raised the same contention against their unlawful possession charges by demurrer in the trial court. The Court of Appeal determined defendants had standing to raise the defense by demurrer, but also that Bruen did not render California’s entire licensing scheme or the charges against them unconstitutional. The offending “good cause” requirement was severable from the remainder of the licensing statute, as was the “good moral character” element which, for the sake of argument, presumed to violate the test laid down in Bruen. "Bruen is also not grounds for a facial attack on the discretionary nature of California’s licensing scheme, and it did not invalidate any of the other licensing provisions in [Penal Code] section 26150." The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, which concluded otherwise. View "California v. Mosqueda" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of murder in the second degree, holding that the admission of two autopsy reports through an expert witness who did not perform the autopsies, combined with that witness's testimony, violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, but the error was harmless.Defendant was convicted of murdering the two young children in her care by repeatedly stabbing them. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding (1) People v. Freycinet, 11 NY3d 38 (NY 2008), should no longer be followed because it is inconsistent with the demands of the Confrontation Clause as recently articulated by the Supreme Court; and (2) Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of the autopsy reports and the testimony of the witness at issue, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Ortega" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming Defendant's convictions for second degree robbery and petit larceny, holding that admission of a criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was error, and the error was not harmless, thus entitling Defendant to a new trial.On appeal, the appellate division ruled that Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was not violated when the criminalist performed his own analysis about the creation of DNA profiles. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed, holding that because the record failed to establish that the testifying analyst had the requisite involvement with the DNA profiles the admission of the criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was erroneous, and the People did not establish that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to Defendant's conviction. View "People v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a practicing Baptist, was incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility from 2002 until 2018. After prison officials failed to update the Protestant services “call-out list,” Wiggins was excluded from all religious services for over five months. He sued Green Haven officials Thomas Griffin, M. Kopp, D. Howard, and Dr. G. Jebamani under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that (1) Defendants did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion, (2) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) if there were a constitutional violation, Kopp was not personally involved in it.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. First, the court concluded that Defendants’ failure to update the Protestant services call-out list, which prevented Plaintiff from attending worship services for over five months, substantially burdened his religious exercise. Second, because disputed issues of material fact remain, qualified immunity cannot shield Defendants from liability at this juncture. Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Kopp’s personal involvement in a First Amendment violation by pleading that Kopp took no action even after she was informed that Plaintiff’s rights were being infringed. Finally, the court held that a Section 1983 free exercise claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights. View "Wiggins v. Griffin, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI) and eluding, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence about a preliminary breath test (PBT) and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.During the underlying jury trial, the district court admitted a portion of an officer body cam video showing Defendant agreeing to a PBT, after which the edited video jumped to Defendant's arrest for OWI. The Supreme Court held (1) this juxtaposition of the PBT and arrest violated Iowa R. Evid. 5.403 because it had minimal probative value while strongly implying that Defendant had failed the PBT, but the error was harmless; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's eluding conviction. View "State v. Amisi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court and court of appeals did not err in finding that Defendant was not seized before the law enforcement officer who eventually arrested him discovered his probable intoxication and that Defendant was lawfully detained on grounds of probable intoxication.In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that he had been seized when the officers partially blocked him in while he was parked in a parking lot, trained a spotlight on him, and shined flashlights into his car from both sides. The trial court concluded that Defendant had not been "seized" before the police discovered his intoxication. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the officers' actions were not "sufficiently coercive" to constitute a seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was lawfully detained because the officers did not seize him before his intoxication was observed. View "State v. Wittenberg" on Justia Law