Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In a case involving the Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds in Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that these individuals are included in "the people" whose right to bear arms is protected under the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs, including three individuals who were aged 18 to 20 when the case was filed, along with two gun rights organizations, challenged Pennsylvania's statutory scheme that effectively bans 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms outside their homes during a state of emergency. The Court found that the term "the people" in the Second Amendment presumptively encompasses all adult Americans, including 18-to-20-year-olds, and there was no founding-era law that supported disarming this age group. The Court reversed the District Court's decision dismissing the case and denying the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to enter an injunction forbidding the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police from arresting law-abiding 18-to-20-year-olds who openly carry firearms during a state of emergency declared by the Commonwealth. View "Lara v. Commissioner PA State Police" on Justia Law

The case concerns Tia Deyon Pugh, who was charged with impeding law enforcement during a civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) during a protest in Mobile, Alabama. She smashed a police car window with a baseball bat, thus obstructing law enforcement officers in their official duties during the civil disorder. Pugh challenged the constitutionality of Section 231(a)(3) on four grounds, arguing that it: (1) exceeds Congress’s power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, (2) is a substantially overbroad regulation of activities protected by the First Amendment, (3) is a content-based restriction of expressive activities in violation of the First Amendment, and (4) is vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Pugh was found guilty by a jury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Pugh’s conviction. The court held that Section 231(a)(3) does not exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as the statute's jurisdictional element is sufficient to limit its scope to constitutional applications. The court also found that the statute does not violate the First Amendment as it does not broadly prohibit protected speech and expressive conduct. Furthermore, the court ruled that the statute is not a content-based restriction and does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause due to vagueness. The court concluded that the statute constitutionally applies to Pugh's conduct, and she may not challenge the statute on vagueness grounds based on its application to others. View "USA v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Valentino Bagola, serving a life sentence for two counts of first-degree murder, was required to pay $9,000 in restitution through monthly installment payments during his incarceration. When Bagola received funds as part of a federal COVID-related stimulus payment, the government filed a motion to release these funds to apply towards his restitution obligations. Bagola objected, arguing that the funds were not garnishable. However, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled in favor of the government, ordering the turnover of $924.60 from Bagola's trust account towards his restitution obligations. The court concluded that the funds were not exempt under 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1) and there was a valid lien against these funds. Bagola appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court did not err in determining that the stimulus funds constituted "substantial resources" under § 3664(n). Bagola’s contention that applying stimulus funds to restitution was improper and threatened prison security by negatively impacting inmate morale was raised for the first time on appeal and did not meet the plain error standard for review. The court also found that the amount of the funds, over $900, could be considered substantial relative to Bagola's usual monthly installment amounts. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling that the stimulus payment funds were subject to turnover towards Bagola's restitution obligations. View "United States v. Bagola" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with a case involving police officers who shot and killed Schaston Hodge after he refused to pull over his vehicle, led the officers on a chase, and exited his car with a gun in his hands. The officers' actions were captured on their bodycam footage. Hodge's mother, Shandra Hodge, filed a suit against the officers, Joshua Engleman and Robert Litvin, as well as the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) and the City of Dallas, alleging excessive force and failure to train and supervise. The district court granted the officers' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity (QI), treating the dismissal as an implicit conversion to summary judgment, even though the footage was not included in the pleadings.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision. The court found that the bodycam footage showed a complete account of the incident, including Hodge raising a gun and pointing it at one of the officers. The court concluded that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable given the circumstances they faced. As a result, the court held that the officers did not violate Hodge's Fourth Amendment rights and were entitled to QI. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Hodge v. Engleman" on Justia Law

This case involves Bradley Barlow, Frances Biddiscombe, and others who were members of either the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 668 or the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 13. They all signed union membership agreements authorizing the deduction of membership dues from their paychecks. The authorizations were irrevocable, regardless of union membership status, unless they provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window. After resigning from their respective unions, their membership dues continued to be deducted until the next annual revocation window. They sued, claiming that the continued collection of dues after their resignations constitutes compelled speech, violating their First Amendment rights. They relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that public-sector unions charging fees to nonmembers is a form of coerced speech that violates the First Amendment. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of their complaints, holding that Janus was focused on nonmembers who never elected to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. The court also rejected their due process claims for failure to provide procedures for notice and the ability to object to how their dues were spent, as these procedures were based on avoiding subjecting nonconsenting individuals from subsidizing a political agenda, which was not the case for these appellants. The court also rejected the appellants' contract defenses. View "Barlow v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

A decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether the Governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis, violated the First Amendment rights of Andrew Warren, a state attorney for Florida’s Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, when he suspended Warren from office. Warren, a vocal advocate for criminal justice reform, had been elected to his position twice. During his time in office, he implemented several policies and signed onto advocacy statements related to issues such as transgender health care and abortion rights. Governor DeSantis suspended Warren from his position, justifying the decision on the basis of these activities. Warren sued, claiming that the suspension was retaliation for his First Amendment-protected activities. The district court found that six factors motivated DeSantis to suspend Warren, two of which were protected by the First Amendment. However, the court concluded that DeSantis would have suspended Warren regardless of these protected activities, basing this conclusion on the other four factors. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in not considering all of Warren's activities as protected by the First Amendment. The court emphasized that, as an elected official, Warren had a right to express his views on policy matters of public concern and that his suspension based on these expressions violated his First Amendment rights. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Warren v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The case concerned Everett Maynard, a police officer in West Virginia, who was convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law. This conviction was based on his use of excessive force against an arrestee, Robert Wilfong, which resulted in Wilfong being hospitalized with a broken nose and lacerations on his upper head. During the trial, witnesses were required to wear face masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Maynard appealed his conviction, arguing that the mask requirement violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and that the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements for obstruction of justice and for causing "serious bodily injury."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the mask requirement did not violate Maynard's Sixth Amendment right, as the protection against the spread of COVID-19 is an important public policy interest and the reliability of the witnesses’ testimony was assured. This was because the witnesses were under oath, cross-examined, and the jury could observe their demeanor. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the injuries inflicted on Wilfong constituted "serious bodily injury," and affirmed the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, finding that a defendant's perjurious testimony at trial is relevant to sentencing because it reflects on a defendant’s criminal history, willingness to obey the law, and general character. View "US v. Maynard" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, a coalition on homelessness and seven current or formerly homeless residents of San Francisco, who sought to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing any ordinance that punishes sleeping, lodging, or camping on public property. The plaintiffs argued that such enforcement violated the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, the defendants argued, for the first time, that the enforcement actions did not leave unhoused individuals with nowhere else to go, but instead required them to relocate from specific encampment sites and only at certain times. The Ninth Circuit deemed this argument waived as it was not brought up in the lower court and even if it was considered, the argument would not change the outcome as the defendants' enforcement of the laws were no narrower in scope than the laws at issue in prior cases, Martin v. City of Boise and Johnson v. City of Grants Pass. The court held that the defendants have yet to show that the preliminary injunction was improper based on the arguments and evidentiary record before the district court. View "Coalition on Homelessness v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Larry Trent Roberts spent 13 years in prison for a murder that he did not commit. After being exonerated, he sued several state actors involved in obtaining his wrongful conviction, including Assistant District Attorney John C. Baer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Baer is not entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because his actions of seeking a new witness to establish a motive for the murder served an investigatory function, not a prosecutorial one. The court noted that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity when they perform investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer. Baer argued that he was immune from liability as his conduct occurred post-charge and was designed to produce inculpatory evidence for trial. However, the court clarified that the timing of a prosecutor's actions as pre- or post-indictment and the presence or absence of a connection to a judicial proceeding are only "relevant considerations" in determining whether a prosecutor’s action served a prosecutorial function. They are not enough to establish that a prosecutor's post-charge effort to fabricate evidence for trial served a quasi-judicial function. The court affirmed the District Court's decision denying Baer's motion to dismiss. View "Roberts v. Lau" on Justia Law

In this case, Alexander Hebrard, an inmate in Oregon, brought a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was disciplined in prison without due process of law. Hebrard claimed that he was found guilty of prison rule violations without sufficient evidence and was denied the opportunity to present a defense. As a result of his alleged wrongful conviction, Hebrard was fined, had money confiscated from his prison account, was placed in segregated housing, lost visitation rights, and had earned-time credits revoked. In his lawsuit, Hebrard sought damages for all these sanctions, except for the revocation of his earned-time credits. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hebrard's complaint as barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Under Heck, a claim for damages that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the length of an inmate's sentence must be dismissed unless the inmate first challenges his sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding and obtains relief. The Ninth Circuit determined that even though Hebrard did not seek relief for the revocation of his earned-time credits, his claim nonetheless implicated the validity of his disciplinary conviction, which in turn affected the length of his sentence. The court concluded that Hebrard needed to obtain habeas relief before filing this § 1983 action. Because he did not do so, his claim was barred by Heck. View "Hebrard V. Nofziger" on Justia Law