Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A car leasing company leased a vehicle to an individual who defaulted on payments soon after the lease began. Despite having the right to repossess the car, the company did not do so. Two years later, the lessee was stopped by police in Butler, New Jersey, for driving with a suspended license, suspended registration, and no insurance. The police seized the car and had it towed by a contractor, Malanga’s Automotive. The lessee was informed of the tow but did not retrieve the vehicle. The towing company did not notify the leasing company that it possessed the car until nearly a year later, at which point it demanded payment of towing and storage fees before releasing the vehicle.The leasing company filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey against the towing company, later adding the Borough of Butler as a defendant and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted summary judgment to Butler on all claims. The District Court found that the company had a property interest in the vehicle but concluded that Butler’s policies provided sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, and that the seizure and retention of the vehicle were reasonable and did not constitute a taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Butler’s policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because they failed to require prompt notice to all holders of property rights in seized vehicles and did not provide an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the lawfulness of the tow or the fees. The court reversed and remanded the due process claim. However, it affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding no unreasonable seizure or unconstitutional taking. View "Honda Lease Trust v. Malanga's Automotive" on Justia Law

A tenured English professor at a public university in Ohio, who identifies as transgender, became involved in discussions about leading the university’s Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality during a period of departmental restructuring. Although the professor expressed interest in directing the Center and was considered a strong candidate, the position was not open as the Center had gone dormant. The professor was offered a partial teaching load reallocation to help develop a new gender-studies major, but after a series of profanity-laden and disparaging social media posts targeting colleagues and administrators, the offer was rescinded. The professor also sought a tenure transfer to the main campus, which was denied by faculty committees after considering collegiality and departmental needs, with no discussion of gender identity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the university and individual defendants on all claims. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and concluded that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, including the professor’s unprofessional conduct and the department’s academic requirements. The professor appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings on claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and perceived-disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation, that the professor’s social media posts did not constitute protected speech on matters of public concern under the First Amendment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a perceived-disability claim. The court clarified that adverse employment actions under Title VII need only cause some harm, but found the university’s reasons for its decisions were not pretextual. View "GPat Patterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute that made it a felony for individuals with felony convictions to vote before their rights were restored, regardless of whether those individuals mistakenly believed they were eligible. The statute, originally enacted in the late 19th century, was shown to have been motivated by racial animus and to have a disproportionate impact on Black North Carolinians. In 2023, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the statute to add a requirement that a person must “know” their rights had not been restored to be prosecuted, effective January 1, 2024.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina considered the plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. After the statute was amended, a magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of standing, but the district court found the case was not moot because prosecutions under the old statute for pre-2024 conduct could still occur, potentially chilling voter participation and requiring the plaintiffs to divert resources. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the case was not moot because prosecutions under the prior version of the statute could still proceed, and the plaintiffs retained a concrete interest in the outcome. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the challenged statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the statute’s original enactment and reenactment were motivated by racial discrimination, and that subsequent legislative changes did not “cleanse” the statute of its discriminatory origins, as the statute itself had not been substantively reenacted or amended in a way that would warrant a presumption of legislative good faith. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Five teenage boys disappeared in Newark, New Jersey, in 1978, and the case remained unsolved for decades. In 2008, police charged Lee Evans with their murders, relying primarily on a confession from Philander Hampton, Evans’s cousin. Evans was later acquitted at trial. He then filed a civil lawsuit, alleging that Detectives Lou Carrega and William Tietjen coerced Hampton’s confession and fabricated evidence to implicate him. Hampton later recanted, stating that his confession was false and coerced by the detectives.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case after Evans brought claims for malicious prosecution against the detectives. The detectives moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court denied summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claims, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude the detectives made reckless, material omissions by failing to disclose that Hampton’s confession was coerced, and that these omissions led to Evans’s prosecution without probable cause. The detectives appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s denial of summary judgment. The Third Circuit held that qualified immunity does not shield law enforcement officers from liability for malicious prosecution when the prosecution is based on evidence that was allegedly manufactured or coerced. The court affirmed the District Court’s order denying summary judgment to the detectives on the malicious prosecution claim, concluding that a reasonable jury could find the officers violated Evans’s constitutional rights by arresting and prosecuting him without probable cause, based on fabricated evidence. The court also remanded for further consideration of the timeliness of Evans’s separate fabrication of evidence claim. View "Evans v. City of Newark" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual alleged that, while detained at a county jail, he was assaulted by corrections officers, resulting in a fractured orbital bone, denied proper medical care, and unlawfully restrained for an extended period. He claimed to have submitted a grievance regarding the incident by placing it in the slot of his cell door, as he was in segregated housing and could not access the grievance box directly. The jail officials disputed his account, asserting that their use of force was justified, that he received prompt medical attention, and that he was restrained for a shorter period than he claimed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case after both parties moved for summary judgment. The defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, supporting their position with a declaration that no grievance from the plaintiff was found in the jail’s records. The plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, reiterated his claim of submitting a grievance, but did so only in unsworn statements within his complaint and opposition brief. The District Court concluded that these unsworn statements could not be considered as evidence and granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the basis of non-exhaustion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that, while unsworn statements cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact at summary judgment, the District Court erred in concluding it was entirely barred from considering such statements for other purposes, such as deciding whether to permit the plaintiff an opportunity to cure procedural defects under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lauria v. Lieb" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce, alleging that the Department’s handling of their unemployment benefits applications during the COVID-19 pandemic was unlawful. The plaintiffs claimed that the Department’s policies and practices resulted in unreasonable delays and inadequate communication, violating both the Social Security Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought various forms of injunctive relief, including orders requiring prompt decisions on applications, timely payment of approved claims, and clearer communication with claimants.The Montgomery Circuit Court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the case, without specifying the grounds for dismissal. The plaintiffs’ motion to alter or vacate the judgment was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies and that the courts lacked the power to address the merits of their claims. The plaintiffs then sought review by the United States Supreme Court.The United States Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s judgment, holding that the state’s administrative exhaustion requirement could not be used to bar federal due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged delays in processing unemployment benefits. On remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered supplemental briefing on whether the case had become moot, as the Secretary asserted that all plaintiffs had either been paid or received final denials. The plaintiffs disputed this and requested a remand for a factual determination. The Supreme Court of Alabama remanded the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court to determine whether the case is now moot, instructing the lower court to resolve the factual dispute regarding mootness. View "Johnson v. Reed" on Justia Law

A 78-year-old inmate in a Texas men’s prison, who identifies as a transgender woman, sought sex-reassignment surgery after being diagnosed with gender dysphoria in 2013. The inmate received hormone therapy and was chemically castrated, but was ultimately denied surgery by prison medical staff. The inmate alleged that state officials discriminated by providing reconstructive vaginoplasty to female inmates while denying similar surgery to transgender inmates, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially denied motions to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, finding that the inmate was similarly situated to cisgender female inmates and that the claims met the requirements of the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders, holding that the inmate had not adequately pled that any defendant was sufficiently connected to enforcement of the challenged policy. On remand, after further proceedings and discovery, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendants were either improper under Ex parte Young or that the requested relief was not permitted, and dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the inmate lacked standing. The court found that the alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants, as there was no evidence that any treating physician had determined the inmate was a suitable candidate for surgery or would refer the inmate for the procedure. Without such evidence, the injury could not be redressed by a favorable judicial decision against the defendants. View "Haverkamp v. Linthicum" on Justia Law

Christina Henry, a Licensed Practical Nurse at Southern Ohio Medical Center (SOMC), refused to comply with SOMC’s COVID-19 policy requiring either vaccination or weekly nasopharyngeal testing, citing religious objections. SOMC granted her a religious exemption from vaccination but denied her request for an exemption from all forms of COVID testing. Henry maintained that her religious beliefs prohibited her from undergoing any COVID test, including non-invasive methods, and proposed self-screening as an alternative. After continued refusal to test or vaccinate, SOMC placed her on unpaid leave. Henry did not request alternative testing methods during her leave and later declined to return to SOMC after the testing requirement was lifted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of SOMC. The court found that Henry’s communications to SOMC indicated she sought exemption from all COVID testing, not just nasopharyngeal testing. It held that accommodating her request would impose an undue hardship on SOMC by endangering vulnerable patient populations. The court also determined that even if Henry had requested saliva testing, this would still constitute an undue hardship due to delays in obtaining test results and reduced effectiveness. Additionally, the court found that Henry failed to show SOMC’s stated reasons for placing her on unpaid leave were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that Henry did not provide sufficient notice to SOMC of a limited objection to only certain types of testing and that either exempting her from all testing or providing saliva testing would impose an undue hardship on SOMC. The court also held that Henry failed to establish pretext in her retaliation claim. View "Henry v. Southern Ohio Medical Center" on Justia Law

Ulysses Feagin was involved in a police encounter after driving erratically, nearly causing a collision with a marked police cruiser, and subsequently leading officers on a brief pursuit. Upon stopping in a parking lot, Feagin ignored repeated commands to exit his vehicle, rolled up the windows, and appeared to reach toward the center console. When officers attempted to remove him, bullets fell from his pocket, and he physically resisted their efforts. Officer Moore deployed a taser to subdue Feagin, who was then handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser. While detained, Feagin continued to resist by kicking the cruiser’s window, prompting Moore to use pepper spray. A subsequent search of Feagin’s vehicle revealed drugs and firearms, leading to his conviction on multiple charges.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims but denied it on two: Feagin’s excessive force claim related to the use of a taser and his deliberate indifference claim regarding medical care after being pepper sprayed. The district court found a genuine dispute over whether Feagin’s resistance was active or passive at the time of the tasing, but granted summary judgment on the pepper spray claim, citing Feagin’s continued resistance. The deliberate indifference claim was set for trial because defendants had not moved for summary judgment on that issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the excessive force claim, holding that Officer Moore’s use of a taser was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established law. The court dismissed the appeal regarding the deliberate indifference claim for lack of jurisdiction, as the issue had not been raised below, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Feagin v. Mansfield Police Dep't" on Justia Law

A hotel in the Town of Newburgh, New York, agreed to provide long-term housing to asylum seekers as part of a program initiated by New York City. In response, the Town alleged that the hotel’s actions violated local zoning and occupancy ordinances, which limited hotel stays to transient guests for no more than 30 days. The Town inspected the hotel, found modifications suggesting long-term use, and filed suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Orange County, seeking to enjoin the hotel from housing asylum seekers for extended periods. The state court issued a temporary restraining order, but allowed the asylum seekers already present to remain pending further orders.The hotel removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the Town’s enforcement was racially motivated and violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus justifying removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The district court found that removal was improper because the hotel had not sufficiently pleaded grounds for removal under § 1443(1), and remanded the case to state court.While the hotel’s appeal of the remand order was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the underlying state court action was discontinued with prejudice after the asylum seekers left and the City ended its program. The Second Circuit determined that, because the state court case was permanently terminated, there was no longer a live controversy regarding removal. The court held the appeal was moot and, following standard practice when mootness occurs through no fault of the appellant, vacated the district court’s remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Town of Newburgh v. Newburgh EOM LLC" on Justia Law