Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Joshua Stapleton was arrested for public intoxication by Officer Ernesto Lozano after failing a field sobriety test. During the booking process, Stapleton informed Officer Lozano that he was not feeling well and exhibited signs of intoxication. Despite this, he did not receive medical attention and was placed in a holding cell. Over the next few hours, Stapleton's condition deteriorated, and he eventually died from "combined drug toxicity." His family sued the officers and the police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Stapleton's serious medical needs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied the officers' and police chief's motion to dismiss the lawsuit based on qualified immunity. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that the officers and chief were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm or that their conduct violated clearly established law. The district court's denial of the motion led to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a deliberate-indifference claim against the officers. The court found that the symptoms exhibited by Stapleton were initially ambiguous and did not suggest a need for immediate medical attention. The court also determined that the plaintiffs failed to show that the officers acted with deliberate indifference, as required to overcome qualified immunity. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. View "Stapleton v. Lozano" on Justia Law

Marci Walkingstick Dixon, a Native American woman and member of the Cherokee Nation, worked at Northeastern State University (NSU) in the Information Technology Services Department. After being supervised by Dr. Richard Reif, she reported experiencing discriminatory comments and actions based on her race and sex. Following her complaint to NSU's Title IX officer, she faced increased hostility from Dr. Reif. In 2018, after a dispute over compensatory time and subsequent reprimand, she formally complained about a hostile work environment. NSU then began characterizing her time report as falsified and eventually terminated her employment, citing poor job performance and improper timekeeping.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of NSU and Dr. Reif on Dixon's claims of Title VII sex and race discrimination, Title VII retaliation, and FMLA retaliation. The court found that Dixon failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and could not show that NSU's reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court also concluded that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Dixon's Title VII sex and race discrimination claims and her Title VII retaliation claim, finding that she had established a prima facie case and presented sufficient evidence of pretext. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Reif on the FMLA retaliation claim, agreeing with the lower court's application of the economic reality test to determine that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA. View "Dixon v. Regional University System of the Oklahoma Board" on Justia Law

Justin and Jared Brackett own and operate two restaurants in Harwich, Massachusetts: Ember Pizza, Inc. and The Port Restaurant and Bar, Inc. Both establishments held liquor and entertainment licenses issued by the town. Allegedly, they violated Harwich's noise ordinance and Massachusetts COVID-19 restrictions, leading to suspensions and restrictions on their permits. In response, they sued Harwich, several town officials, and other individuals in federal district court, asserting various federal and state claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely granted the defendants' dispositive motions, rejecting all of Ember and The Port's claims. The court also denied their request for leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. Ember and The Port then appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Ember and The Port failed to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, including their First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The court also found that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims and common law claims, including civil conspiracy and defamation, were inadequately pleaded. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich" on Justia Law

Johnnie Franklin Wills, a state prisoner, filed a habeas petition challenging his life sentence under West Virginia’s recidivist statute. He argued that the judicially crafted test for determining whether a recidivist life sentence is proportional to the crime is unconstitutionally vague. Wills was convicted of grand larceny and conspiracy to commit grand larceny in 2016, and due to his prior eight felony convictions, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after fifteen years under the recidivist statute.The West Virginia courts denied Wills relief, stating that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply to their proportionality test. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this decision, distinguishing Wills’s case from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya, which invalidated certain statutory provisions as unconstitutionally vague. The state court maintained that the proportionality test was clear and did not fall under the same scrutiny as the statutes in Johnson and Dimaya.Wills then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia also denied. The district court found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the proportionality test serves as a judicial limitation on the recidivist statute, unlike the statutory mandates in Johnson and Dimaya.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the state court’s ruling was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the U.S. Supreme Court has not extended the void-for-vagueness doctrine to judicially crafted proportionality tests. Therefore, Wills’s habeas petition was denied. View "Wills v. Pszczolkowski" on Justia Law

Carmen Wannamaker-Amos, a Black woman, worked in quality management at Purem Novi, Inc. for over thirty years. Despite receiving positive reviews from her supervisors, she faced negative treatment from Javad Hosseini, Purem’s chief quality executive. Hosseini repeatedly urged her supervisors to fire her, and in January 2020, after a problem with an automobile part, he requested her termination. Purem terminated her two days later. Wannamaker-Amos sued Purem, alleging racial and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted summary judgment to Purem, ruling that Wannamaker-Amos failed to produce sufficient evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason given for her firing was pretextual. The court found that she did not meet her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of her termination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that numerous issues of material fact were in dispute. The court found that Wannamaker-Amos provided ample evidence to dispute Purem’s claims about her performance and that Hosseini’s criticisms were baseless. The court also noted that Purem’s shifting reasons for her termination and failure to follow its own disciplinary policies could indicate pretext for discrimination. The court emphasized that it is the role of the jury to decide which party’s evidence is more persuasive.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing a jury to determine whether Wannamaker-Amos was subjected to intentional discrimination. View "Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc." on Justia Law

Jennifer Harmon’s son, N.J., died by suicide while residing at the Bruce Normile Juvenile Justice Center (BNJJC) under the care of the Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri. Harmon filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her son’s death, including various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state wrongful death claims against the Second Circuit, several named defendants from both the Second Circuit and BNJJC, Preferred Family Healthcare (PFH), and several named defendants from PFH. All defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the Second Circuit and Government Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the claims against the Second Circuit were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants were barred by qualified immunity, and the state tort claims against the Government Defendants were barred by official immunity. Harmon appealed these immunity judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Harmon’s claims against the Second Circuit, holding that the Second Circuit is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which Missouri has not waived. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants, concluding that the Government Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Harmon failed to show that any constitutional violation was clearly established. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s state tort claims against the Government Defendants, holding that the Government Defendants were entitled to official immunity under Missouri law because Harmon failed to plead both the existence of a department-mandated policy and a breach of that policy. View "Harmon v. Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Pearson Jr. was held at the Orange County Correctional Facility for a parole violation. He alleged that corrections officers beat him in his cell, tampered with his food, sprayed chemicals in his eye, causing pain and impaired vision, and denied him medical care. Pearson filed a pro se amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sergeant Gessner and Officers Morris, Halstead, and Broeckel.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Pearson's complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court considered materials outside the amended complaint, including a video and an Inmate Misbehavior Report, which it deemed integral to the complaint. The court found that the use of pepper spray by Gessner was not objectively unreasonable and that Pearson failed to state a claim for denial of medical care, as he was taken to the infirmary and refused treatment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the district court erred in considering materials outside the amended complaint, specifically the Misbehavior Report and the video, which were not relied upon by Pearson in drafting his complaint. The appellate court vacated the judgment in part, remanding for further proceedings on the excessive force claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims regarding denial of medical assistance, as the amended complaint itself indicated that Pearson was taken to the medical facility.The appellate court instructed that Pearson should be allowed to file a second amended complaint to clarify which defendants were responsible for the alleged acts of excessive force. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pearson v. Gesner" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at Woodborne Correctional Facility, Antonio Mallet sought medical care for urinary obstruction and painful urination, symptoms indicative of prostate cancer. Despite a cystoscopy revealing concerning results, prison doctors did not conduct further tests for prostate cancer, instead prescribing medication for a benign enlarged prostate. Mallet was released on parole in January 2019 and was diagnosed with late-stage prostate cancer in May 2021. He filed a lawsuit on February 25, 2022, against the State of New York, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), its acting commissioner, and three medical providers, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs and other constitutional violations, as well as state law claims for malpractice and negligence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Mallet’s constitutional claims as untimely, reasoning that the claims accrued by the time he was released from custody in January 2019, thus falling outside the three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in New York. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found it plausible that Mallet’s deliberate indifference claim had not accrued by February 25, 2019, making his complaint potentially timely. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the deliberate indifference claims against Dr. Makram and Dr. Stellato, finding them plausible, but affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Professor Ritaccio and the constitutional claims against New York State, DOCCS, and Annucci due to sovereign immunity. The court vacated the dismissal of the remaining constitutional claims and state law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Mallet v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision" on Justia Law

Karen Ashley, the former Chief Nursing Officer of Clay County Memorial Hospital (CCMH), raised concerns about patient safety issues, including missing fentanyl and procedural errors in blood transfusions. She reported these issues internally and publicly at a CCMH Board meeting. Ashley also advocated for CCMH to terminate its contract with Concord Medical Group PLLC and partner with ACPHealth. Following this advocacy, Ashley alleges that the County, CCMH, and the Foundation retaliated against her by terminating her employment, violating her First Amendment rights.Ashley filed suit against the County and Concord Medical Group, alleging retaliation under the Texas Occupations Code and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The County moved to dismiss, asserting it was not Ashley’s employer and had taken no adverse actions against her. Ashley amended her complaint to add CCMH as a defendant and narrowed her claims against the County. The County maintained it was not Ashley’s employer and moved to dismiss on governmental immunity grounds. CCMH invoked an arbitration clause in Ashley’s employment agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The district court compelled the County to arbitration alongside CCMH and denied the County’s motion to dismiss as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by not addressing the County’s governmental immunity defense before compelling arbitration. The appellate court reversed the district court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to resolve the issue of governmental immunity as it pertains to the County’s motion to dismiss before ruling on the motion to compel arbitration. View "Ashley v. Clay County" on Justia Law

David Bailey and his friends went to downtown San Antonio to film the police. They encountered Officers Oscar Ramos and Christopher Dech, who were guarding an ambulance. An altercation ensued, and Bailey was arrested for interfering with the duties of a public servant. Bailey filed constitutional claims against the City of San Antonio and Officers Ramos and Dech, but this appeal concerns only the claims against Ramos: unlawful arrest, unlawful seizure, First Amendment retaliation, and excessive force. Ramos moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims against the City and Bailey's right-to-record claim. It granted qualified immunity for the malicious prosecution claim but denied it for the unlawful arrest, unlawful seizure, First Amendment retaliation, and excessive force claims, citing genuine disputes of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding that Ramos was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Ramos could have reasonably believed he had probable cause to arrest Bailey for interference with public duties, even if mistaken. The court also determined that the force used by Ramos was not clearly established as unlawful at the time of the incident. Consequently, the court remanded the case with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Ramos and to dismiss Bailey's claims. View "Bailey v. Ramos" on Justia Law