Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Christopher Lockhart, a licensed Arkansas bail bondsman and private investigator, was stopped by Siloam Springs police officer Zachary Ware around 3:30 AM on March 11, 2019, for alleged traffic violations. Lockhart was arrested and charged with DWI, careless driving, and driving left of center. After refusing a plea deal, Lockhart was tried for DWI but was found not guilty. Subsequently, Lockhart filed a § 1983 action against multiple defendants, including claims of unreasonable stop, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims but allowed Lockhart’s illegal stop and false arrest claims against Officer Ware and the malicious prosecution claim against Siloam Springs to proceed. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Officer Ware had probable cause to stop Lockhart, as the dashcam video did not conclusively support Ware’s testimony. The court also denied summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, finding a material fact dispute about whether the prosecutor had probable cause to try Lockhart for DWI.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Officer Ware had probable cause to stop Lockhart for careless driving, as Lockhart’s tires touched the centerline, which under Arkansas law constitutes a traffic violation. The court reversed the district court’s decision regarding the initial stop and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining issues. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, agreeing that Arkansas statutory immunity does not apply to intentional torts like malicious prosecution. View "Lockhart v. Siloam Springs, Arkansas" on Justia Law

In 2001, the Commonwealth charged Robert Gene Rega with first-degree murder and other crimes for shooting a security guard, Christopher Lauth, during a robbery at the Gateway Lodge in Jefferson County, Pennsylvania. Rega, along with Shawn Bair, Raymond Fishel, and Stanford Jones, planned the robbery, while Jones’s wife, Susan, stayed at Rega’s home. During the robbery, Lauth was killed. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimonies of Bair, Fishel, and the Joneses, who identified Rega as the shooter. Additional evidence included a video of Rega purchasing ammunition and testimony from a friend that Rega asked for a false alibi.The Pennsylvania state court convicted Rega of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Rega's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal and in a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) proceeding. Rega then filed a federal habeas petition. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied his guilt-phase claims but granted relief from his death sentence, ordering a new sentencing hearing or life imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Rega raised claims that the prosecutor withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and presented false testimony in violation of Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on these claims, concluding that the evidence and testimony in question were not material to Rega’s murder conviction. The court found that the prosecutor’s noncommittal statements to witnesses about considering their cooperation in future plea deals did not significantly undermine their credibility, as the jury was already aware of their potential motives. Additionally, evidence of Susan Jones’s memory problems was deemed not material, as it did not sufficiently undermine her testimony or the overall case against Rega. View "Rega v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Roy Cooper of North Carolina issued an executive order limiting attendance at outdoor venues to twenty-five people. Robert Turner, who operated Ace Speedway in Alamance County, publicly opposed these restrictions and kept the racetrack open. This led to a series of events where Governor Cooper allegedly pressured local officials to enforce the order against Ace Speedway, culminating in the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issuing an abatement order to shut down the racetrack as a health hazard.The Superior Court of Alamance County initially issued a preliminary injunction against Ace Speedway, prohibiting it from holding events until it complied with the abatement order. Ace Speedway and its operators counterclaimed, alleging constitutional violations, including the right to earn a living and selective enforcement. The trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss these counterclaims, and the State appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, allowing the case to proceed.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that Ace Speedway sufficiently alleged colorable claims under the North Carolina Constitution. The allegations suggested that the State's actions were not for a proper governmental purpose but to retaliate against Turner for his public criticism, thus violating the right to earn a living. Additionally, the selective enforcement claim was deemed colorable because Ace Speedway alleged it was targeted while other similar venues were not, based on Turner’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Court concluded that these claims were sufficient to overcome the State’s sovereign immunity at this stage. View "Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd" on Justia Law

Bobby Stevenson, a prisoner at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, claims he was forced to labor in the prison’s agricultural fields despite severe ankle pain caused by two broken surgical screws. He alleges that two prison physicians, Dr. Randy Lavespere and Dr. Paul M. Tocé, refused to fix the screws or relieve him from field labor. Stevenson asserts that the broken screws caused him tremendous pain and secondary injuries, and that the physicians ignored his complaints and medical recommendations for surgery.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana reviewed the case. The magistrate judge allowed Stevenson to file an amended complaint and recommended denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, which argued for qualified immunity. The district court accepted this recommendation and denied the motion, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Stevenson sufficiently alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by ignoring his severe medical needs and forcing him to work despite his condition. The court also determined that the defendants had fair warning from existing case law that their actions were unconstitutional. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, rejecting the defendants' claim of qualified immunity. View "Stevenson v. Toce" on Justia Law

Xiomara Santiago was hired as the Deputy Director for the Head Start Program in Utuado, Puerto Rico. Following a mayoral election, the new mayor, Jorge Pérez, terminated her employment. Santiago claimed her dismissal violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and was politically motivated, violating her First Amendment rights. She sought a preliminary injunction to be reinstated.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held hearings and ultimately denied Santiago's request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that Santiago had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of either her due process or political discrimination claims. The magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which the district judge adopted, found that Santiago's initial hire was contrary to Puerto Rico law, meaning she did not have a property interest in her employment. Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence to support her claim of political discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Santiago had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims. The court noted that Santiago's argument regarding the incorrect application of Puerto Rico law was waived because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court found no clear error in the district court's assessment that Santiago's political affiliation was not a substantial factor in her termination. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Santiago v. Municipality of Utuado" on Justia Law

Alvin Moore, a Black man, worked at Coca-Cola Bottling Company (CCBC) from 2015 to 2018. In March 2017, after a workplace accident, Moore tested positive for marijuana at a level below the company's threshold. Despite this, he signed a Second Chance Agreement (SCA) requiring random drug testing for 24 months. In June 2017, Moore was fired for insubordination but was reinstated under a Last Chance Agreement (LCA), which he signed under pressure. In 2018, Moore tested positive for marijuana again and was terminated. He sued CCBC for racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Ohio law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of CCBC, finding that Moore had waived his pre-LCA claims by signing the LCA and failed to establish that CCBC's reasons for his termination were pretextual. The court presumed Moore had made a prima facie case for racial discrimination and retaliation but concluded that Moore did not show that CCBC's reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Moore voluntarily waived his pre-LCA claims by signing the LCA. The court noted that Moore's union representative had advised him to sign the LCA, suggesting he could still pursue his claims. The court also found that Moore had shown enough evidence to suggest that CCBC's reasons for his termination could be pretextual, particularly in light of the different treatment of similarly situated white employees.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Moore to pursue his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation. View "Moore v. Coca-Cola Consolidated, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2016, two Seattle police officers, Scott Miller and Michael Spaulding, fatally shot Che Andre Taylor during an attempted arrest. Kshama Sawant, a Seattle City Council member, publicly referred to the incident as a "blatant murder" and later reiterated that Taylor was "murdered by the police." Following an inquest, prosecutors declined to file charges against the officers due to insufficient evidence of malice. Miller and Spaulding subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging defamation and outrage under state law, as well as a federal defamation claim against Sawant.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the federal defamation claim but retained jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court later granted Sawant's motion for summary judgment on the state law claims and awarded her expert witness deposition expenses, including fees for preparation time. Miller and Spaulding appealed the decision, challenging the award of expert witness fees and the admissibility of the expert's opinions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows for the recovery of reasonable expenses for time an expert witness spends preparing for a deposition. The court joined other circuits in concluding that such preparation fees are recoverable under Rule 26. The court found that the expert witness deposition preparation fees awarded to Sawant were reasonable and did not result in manifest injustice. The Ninth Circuit also noted that objections to the admissibility of the expert's opinions did not negate the obligation to pay a reasonable fee under Rule 26. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and the award of expert witness deposition expenses. View "Miller v. Sawant" on Justia Law

Jonathan Hardin, a former Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) officer, was terminated after the Chief of Police found he violated four Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These violations stemmed from two incidents at a school where Hardin was a resource officer: one involving excessive force against a student and another where he failed to read Miranda rights to a juvenile. Hardin appealed his termination to the Louisville Metro Police Merit Board, which upheld the termination after finding he committed three of the four SOP violations.Hardin then appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court, arguing that the Merit Board improperly considered expunged materials, violated his due process rights by admitting transcribed witness statements without cross-examination, and wrongfully relied on his arrest and criminal charges without a conviction. The Circuit Court affirmed the Merit Board's decision. Hardin further appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the expungement statute did not apply to the internal employment records of the LMPD's Professional Standards Unit (PSU). It also found that Hardin's due process rights were not violated by the Merit Board's consideration of sworn, transcribed witness statements, as the statutes allowed for such evidence and provided sufficient procedural safeguards, including the right to subpoena witnesses. Lastly, the Court ruled that the Chief's termination of Hardin was not arbitrary, even though it partially relied on his arrest and criminal charges, as there were other independent bases for the termination. View "HARDIN V. LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT" on Justia Law

Dezmon Moore, a police officer with the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD), was terminated after the Chief of Police found he had committed three violations of the department's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These violations stemmed from incidents involving domestic altercations with his wife, Bethel Moore, which led to multiple arrests and charges, including assault and violation of a no-contact order. Moore's criminal charges related to these incidents were eventually dismissed or expunged.Moore appealed his termination to the Louisville Metro Police Merit Board, which upheld the termination after finding he had committed two of the three SOP violations. The Jefferson Circuit Court affirmed the Merit Board's decision, and the Court of Appeals also affirmed, though it noted errors in the Merit Board's consideration of expunged materials and transcribed witness statements without cross-examination. However, the Court of Appeals deemed these errors harmless.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. The Court held that the Merit Board did not violate Moore's statutory or constitutional due process rights by considering transcribed witness statements without live testimony and cross-examination. The Court found that the statutes governing the Merit Board provided sufficient procedural safeguards, including the opportunity for Moore to subpoena witnesses. The Court also determined that the expungement statutes did not apply to the internal employment records of the LMPD's Professional Standards Unit (PSU), and thus, the Merit Board did not err in considering those materials.Finally, the Court held that Moore's termination was not arbitrary, even though it was based on arrests and charges rather than convictions. The Chief's decision was supported by proper evidence, and the Merit Board's affirmation of the termination was justified. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT V. MOORE" on Justia Law

Sara Caruso, a flight attendant for Delta Air Lines, failed a breathalyzer test on August 4, 2018, after a layover in Dallas, Texas. Caruso claimed she was drugged and sexually assaulted by Delta First Officer James Lucas the night before. The Dallas Police Department found insufficient evidence to support her claim, and Delta also took no action against Lucas after its investigation. Caruso completed an alcohol rehabilitation program and sought accommodations from Delta for PTSD related to the alleged assault. Although Delta and Caruso initially agreed on accommodations, Caruso resigned after a month back at work.Caruso sued Delta in Massachusetts state court, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which granted summary judgment for Delta on all counts. The court found no causal connection between Delta's actions and the alleged harassment and determined that Delta responded reasonably to the allegations. Additionally, Caruso's disability discrimination claims failed because she did not engage in an interactive process in good faith with Delta to develop reasonable accommodations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Caruso failed to show a causal connection between Delta's actions and the alleged harassment, and that Delta's investigation and response were reasonable. The court also found that Caruso did not cooperate in the interactive process for her disability accommodations, and her retaliation claims were either waived or undeveloped. Thus, the summary judgment for Delta was affirmed on all counts. View "Caruso v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law