Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Kenya Watkins, a Black woman, was employed by Genesh, Inc., d/b/a Burger King, from August 2014 to August 2015. She alleged that her manager verbally, physically, and sexually harassed her, including forcing her into a freezer, groping her, simulating sex with her, and stating she would not be promoted unless she had sex with him. Watkins filed an employment discrimination charge with the Kansas Human Rights Commission and the EEOC in early 2016. In December 2018, she alleged that Genesh admonished her then-employer, Church’s Chicken, for hiring her, leading to a second EEOC charge in 2019.In August 2019, Watkins sued Genesh in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination. The district court dismissed her complaint, finding her allegations did not plausibly support racial harassment. The court noted that Watkins had pending EEOC charges and could file her Title VII claims once the EEOC proceedings concluded. In July 2021, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2019 charge, which Watkins did not pursue. In April 2022, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2016 charge, leading Watkins to file a second lawsuit in July 2022, raising claims under Title VII and other statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed Watkins’s 2022 complaint as untimely. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. The court held that Watkins’s Title VII claims were precluded by the final judgment in her 2019 lawsuit, as both suits arose from the same employment relationship. The court reaffirmed that the absence of a right-to-sue letter did not deprive Watkins of a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Title VII claims in the initial suit. View "Watkins v. Genesh" on Justia Law

Clifton White, the plaintiff, claimed that officials from the New Mexico Corrections Department unlawfully detained him beyond his release date. White argued that his sentence for violating probation was wrongfully entered and that he informed the prison officials of this error. Despite acknowledging the potential mistake, the officials continued to detain him based on a facially valid court order.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico reviewed the case and denied the prison officials' motion to dismiss, which was based on qualified immunity. The district court concluded that it was clearly established law that prison officials violate constitutional rights when they continue to imprison individuals without a lawful basis or are deliberately indifferent to such a prospect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that no controlling Tenth Circuit law clearly established that prison officials act unlawfully when they rely on a facially valid judicial sentencing order, even if they believe the order was made in error. The court emphasized that prison officials are not required to ignore or correct a judicial sentencing order if they suspect it is flawed. The proper recourse for a defendant who disagrees with a judicial order is to appeal through the state or federal judicial process. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the law was not clearly established that the prison officials' conduct in this case was unconstitutional. View "White v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, "Lathfield") own three commercial buildings in Lathrup Village, Michigan, rented to various commercial tenants. The City of Lathrup Village and its Downtown Development Authority (collectively, the "City") require landlords to obtain a rental license and list each tenant's name and principal business. Lathfield applied for a landlord rental license in July 2020 but did not list the required tenant information, leading to the denial of their application and their tenants' business license applications. Lathfield sued the City, alleging unlawful compulsion to apply for unnecessary licenses and make unnecessary property improvements, bringing eleven claims, nine against the City.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the City on all nine claims. Lathfield appealed, arguing that the City improperly required site plan approval, violated due process and equal protection rights, and engaged in inverse condemnation, among other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lathfield's request for declaratory relief regarding site plan approval was moot since the site plan process was already completed. The court also found that Lathfield was required to obtain a general business license under the City Code and that the City Code's tenant registration requirement applied to Lathfield. The court rejected Lathfield's due process claims, noting that the City’s adoption of the Michigan Building Code was a legislative act not subject to procedural due process requirements. The court also dismissed Lathfield's equal protection claim due to a lack of evidence of differential treatment and found no basis for the Contracts Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lastly, the court concluded that Lathfield failed to establish an inverse condemnation claim or a civil conspiracy. View "Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich." on Justia Law

In July 2019, Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) workers encountered a two-month-old infant, L.M., with a severe skull fracture and extensive brain damage. The infant's parents, Erika and Brian Mabes, had taken him to the emergency room after finding him unresponsive. This led to child abuse and custody proceedings against the Mabeses. They eventually regained custody and sued nine DCS workers and a consultant doctor, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding unresolved factual disputes that precluded their requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's decision, granting qualified immunity to all defendants. The court found that the DCS workers and the consultant doctor acted reasonably under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. The court emphasized the urgency and severity of the situation faced by the DCS workers and the consultant doctor, concluding that their actions were lawful and reasonable. The court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the defendants acted with intent to misrepresent facts or ignored exculpatory evidence. The court remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Mabes v McFeeley" on Justia Law

Mark Eugene Ricks, a Texas state prisoner, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against employees of the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Ricks claimed that he was denied treatment for chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) based on nonmedical reasons and that the TDCJ HCV Policy was the driving force behind this unconstitutional denial of treatment. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Ricks's complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that his allegations did not support a claim for deliberate indifference. The district court also denied Ricks's motion for appointment of counsel. Ricks filed a timely appeal, and the district court denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, certifying that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court erred in dismissing Ricks's complaint without allowing him an opportunity to amend his pleadings. The appellate court held that Ricks's allegations, when liberally construed, could potentially raise a viable claim of deliberate indifference. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ricks's motion for appointment of counsel without considering the relevant factors set out in Ulmer v. Chancellor.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's orders granting the motion to dismiss and denying the appointment of counsel. The case was remanded with instructions for the district court to allow Ricks to amend his pleadings and to appoint counsel to represent him. View "Ricks v. Khan" on Justia Law

Jeremy Mooney, a former deputy in the Pike County Sheriff’s Office, was convicted of two counts of depriving an inmate, Thomas Friend, of his civil rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The incidents occurred on November 17-18, 2019, when Mooney pepper sprayed and punched Friend multiple times while Friend was restrained in a chair. Surveillance footage captured these events. Mooney claimed his actions were in response to Friend spitting on him and that he was instructed by his supervisor to use pepper spray.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied Mooney’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the government destroyed exculpatory video evidence in bad faith. The court found no bad faith or exculpatory value in the lost footage. At trial, the jury found Mooney guilty on both counts. The court also excluded evidence of Friend’s Hepatitis C, ruling it irrelevant and potentially prejudicial. Mooney was sentenced to 100 months in prison, with an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on allegedly false trial testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Mooney’s conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Mooney acted willfully to deprive Friend of his constitutional rights. The court also upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the Hepatitis C evidence and the admission of testimony from Deputy Jonathan Chandler about police training.However, the Sixth Circuit vacated Mooney’s sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement. The court found that the district court failed to make specific findings necessary to establish perjury, as required for the enhancement. The case was sent back to the district court to either resentence Mooney or make the required factual findings. View "United States v. Mooney" on Justia Law

Jeffrey G. Hutchinson was convicted of murdering his girlfriend Renee Flaherty and her three children in 1998. After an argument with Renee, Hutchinson drank heavily, returned to her home with a shotgun, and killed Renee and two of her children with single shots to the head. He then shot the third child, Geoffrey, twice, killing him. Hutchinson called 911, admitting to the shootings, and was found by police with gunshot residue on his hands and body tissue from Geoffrey on his leg. He was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the murders of the three children.Hutchinson's convictions and death sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Florida Supreme Court. He filed multiple postconviction motions, all of which were denied. His initial state postconviction motion and successive motions were also denied, as were his federal habeas petitions. His fourth successive postconviction motion, filed after the Governor signed a death warrant, was denied by the circuit court without an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Hutchinson's appeal of the denial of his fourth successive postconviction motion and his habeas corpus petition. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial, rejecting Hutchinson's claims that the warrant period violated his constitutional rights, that the warrant selection process was arbitrary, and that his execution would be cruel and unusual punishment. The court also denied his habeas claims, including his argument that Atkins v. Virginia should extend to individuals with neurocognitive disorders and his challenge to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator. The court denied Hutchinson's requests for a stay and oral argument, and ordered the mandate to issue immediately. View "Hutchinson v. State" on Justia Law

In May 2023, Officers Jacob Ondich and Mathew Lougee of the Casper Police Department arrested Daniel Charles Hemmer at his home and transported him to the Natrona County Detention Center (NCDC). Hemmer was charged with felony theft and entered a no-contest plea in December 2023. Subsequently, Hemmer filed a civil suit against the officers, the Casper Police Department, and NCDC, alleging unlawful entry, arrest without probable cause or a warrant, and a strip search at NCDC. He claimed the officers' actions constituted kidnapping and sought $12 million in damages.The Natrona County District Court dismissed Hemmer's complaint. The court found that Hemmer did not allege facts showing NCDC's involvement in his arrest or provide legal authority for his claims against the detention center. The court also dismissed the claims against the Casper Police Department due to a lack of specific allegations. The kidnapping claim against the officers was dismissed because Hemmer did not support it with legal authority. Additionally, the court concluded that Hemmer failed to submit a timely notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and summarily affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court noted that Hemmer's pro se brief did not comply with appellate rules, lacked a statement of issues, and failed to present cogent arguments supported by legal authority. The court emphasized that while pro se litigants are given some leniency, they must still reasonably comply with procedural rules. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Hemmer's complaint. View "Hemmer v. City of Casper Police Department" on Justia Law

Ms. Shela Linton participated in a sit-in protest at the Vermont statehouse on January 8, 2015, against the governor's perceived lack of support for universal healthcare. When the statehouse closed at 8 p.m., law enforcement warned the demonstrators to leave or face arrest. Linton and others remained, linking arms and singing. During her arrest, Sergeant Jacob Zorn used a "rear wristlock" pain compliance technique, causing Linton to cry out in pain and suffer permanent injuries to her left wrist and shoulder. Linton later alleged that she was diagnosed with PTSD, depression, and anxiety due to the incident.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont granted summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Zorn, concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that no clearly established law put Zorn on notice that his actions might violate Linton's Fourth Amendment rights. Linton appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its interpretation of relevant case law and failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the case Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford clearly established that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques on a passively resisting protestor constitutes excessive force. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the degree of Linton's resistance and the appropriateness of Zorn's use of force. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. View "Linton v. Zorn" on Justia Law

Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law